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Abstract 
Goal incongruence, both within organisations and between organisations 
operating in a network context, has long been acknowledged as an important 
influence on organisational behaviour. This work presents the findings from an 
ethnographic study of goal incongruence in a public service network located in 
the UK. The study develops a conceptual framework for defining and 
researching the extent and sources of goal incongruence within public service 
networks.  The author defines incongruence as contradiction between goals, 
draws evidence from organizationally enacted behaviours and recognises 
distinctions between formal goals and the operative goals of network groups. 
Empirical evidence is used to evaluate two explanations of goal incongruence: 
that goal incongruence is produced by the nature of bureaucratic delegation (the 
hierarchical model) and that it is produced by professional difference (the 
horizontal model).   
The findings of the study indicate that bureaucratic delegation is the source of 
goal incongruence. However, several elements of the hierarchical model are 
questioned.  The evidence does not support the orthodox view that incongruence 
between formal and operative goals increases as conceptions of desired ends are 
transmitted downward within hierarchies.  The study finds that the operative 
goals of actors at the apex of the network were most highly incongruent with the 
formal goals of the network.  Professional difference was not a source of goal 
incongruence.  Indeed the study provided evidence that operational staff who 
exhibited different professional identities co-operated to integrate practice and 
reduce goal-incongruence.   
The study concludes that the application of the novel conceptual framework 
provides a more selective, detailed and convincing account of goal incongruence 
than those found in the recent literature.  The sources of goal incongruence were 
hierarchical elites putting the resources of the network to their own purposes as 
social agents and hierarchically imposed systems of organisational obligation 
and performance control. Finally, the study suggests that evidence for inter-
professional integration indicates that the role of peer groups in moderating goal 
incongruence is under-represented in theoretical and empirical accounts of goal 
incongruence.   
	   	  
	   	   	  
	  
vi	  
 
Table	  of	  Contents	  
	  
DECLARATION	  .............................................................................................................	  II	  
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	  ...........................................................................................	  IV	  
ABSTRACT	  ....................................................................................................................	  V	  
LIST OF FIGURES	  ........................................................................................................	  X	  
ABBREVIATIONS	  ........................................................................................................	  XI	  
CHAPTER 1	        INTRODUCTION	  ............................................................................	  1	  
THE	  RESEARCH	  SETTING	  ............................................................................................................	  4	  
The	  Strategic	  Core	  ...........................................................................................................	  5	  
The	  Delivery	  Network	  ......................................................................................................	  6	  
OVERVIEW	  OF	  THE	  THESIS	  .........................................................................................................	  8	  
CHAPTER 2 	   CONCEPTUALISING GOAL INCONGRUENCE	  ...........................	  18	  
INTRODUCTION	  ..................................................................................................................	  18	  
THE CONCEPTUALISATION OF GOAL INCONGRUENCE	  ......................................................	  18	  
Making	  Sense	  of	  Organisational	  Goals	  .........................................................................	  22	  
The	  Early	  View	  of	  Goal	  Incongruence	  ............................................................................	  23	  
The	  Later	  View	  of	  Goal	  Incongruence	  ...........................................................................	  24	  
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF GOAL INCONGRUENCE	  .............................................................	  27	  
QUALITATIVE	  CASE	  STUDIES	  OF	  GOAL	  INCONGRUENCE	  .................................................................	  32	  
The	  Volunteers	  ..............................................................................................................	  33	  
The	  Analysis	  of	  Goals	  in	  Complex	  Organisations	  ...........................................................	  35	  
Organization	  for	  Treatment	  ..........................................................................................	  38	  
Achieving	  Goal	  Congruence	  in	  Complex	  Environments	  .................................................	  40	  
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR GOAL INCONGRUENCE	  ..............................................	  44	  
Incongruence	  as	  Contradiction	  .....................................................................................	  47	  
Incongruence	  is	  Enacted	  ...............................................................................................	  49	  
Dimensions	  of	  goal	  incongruence	  .................................................................................	  52	  
The	  Network	  Context	  ....................................................................................................	  52	  
CONCLUSION	  .....................................................................................................................	  56	  
CHAPTER 3	    EXPLANATIONS OF GOAL INCONGRUENCE	  ............................	  58	  
INTRODUCTION	  ..................................................................................................................	  58	  
DEVELOPING THE EXPLANATORY MODELS	  ......................................................................	  59	  
HIERARCHICAL EXPLANATIONS OF GOAL INCONGRUENCE	  ..............................................	  60	  
Preoccupation	  and	  Compliance	  .....................................................................................	  67	  
Bifurcation	  of	  Interests	  ..................................................................................................	  67	  
Inadequate	  Comprehension	  ..........................................................................................	  70	  
Organisational	  Segmentation	  .......................................................................................	  71	  
Performance	  Control	  .....................................................................................................	  73	  
	   	  
	   	   	  
	  
vii	  
HORIZONTAL EXPLANATIONS OF GOAL INCONGRUENCE	  .................................................	  74	  
Reinforced	  Pre-­‐dispositions	  ...........................................................................................	  78	  
Communities	  of	  Practice	  ...............................................................................................	  79	  
Inter-­‐Professional	  Competition	  .....................................................................................	  82	  
CONCLUSION	  .....................................................................................................................	  84	  
CHAPTER 4	    RESEARCH DESIGN	  ........................................................................	  87	  
INTRODUCTION	  ..................................................................................................................	  87	  
CRITICAL CASE STUDIES	  ...................................................................................................	  88	  
PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION	  .............................................................................................	  92	  
Defining	  the	  Goal	  Carrying	  Constituency:	  Who	  to	  Observe?	  .........................................	  93	  
NEGOTIATING ACCESS TO THE RESEARCH SETTINGS	  .......................................................	  95	  
Limiting	  Engagement	  in	  The	  Research	  Setting	  ..............................................................	  97	  
COLLECTING DATA	  .........................................................................................................	  100	  
Writing	  Field	  Notes	  .....................................................................................................	  104	  
INTERPRETING THE DATA	  ...............................................................................................	  108	  
CONCLUSION	  ...................................................................................................................	  110	  
CHAPTER 5	    EVIDENCE OF GOAL INCONGRUENCE	  .....................................	  113	  
INTRODUCTION	  ................................................................................................................	  113	  
AN OVERVIEW OF GOAL INCONGRUENCE IN THE CASE STUDY NETWORK	  ....................	  114	  
EMPIRICAL CONTEXTS IN WHICH THE PRESENCE OF GOAL INCONGRUENCE IS 
ESTABLISHED	  ..................................................................................................................	  115	  
Formal	  –	  Operative	  goal	  incongruence	  within	  the	  Strategic	  Core	  ..............................	  115	  
Formal	  –	  Operative	  goal	  incongruence	  within	  the	  Delivery	  Network	  .........................	  120	  
Operative	  -­‐	  Operative	  goal	  incongruence	  within	  the	  Delivery	  Network	  ......................	  122	  
Formal	  –	  Operative	  goal	  incongruence	  between	  the	  Strategic	  Core	  and	  Delivery	  
Network	  ......................................................................................................................	  125	  
Operative	  –	  Operative	  goal	  incongruence	  between	  the	  Strategic	  Core	  and	  Delivery	  
Network	  ......................................................................................................................	  128	  
EMPIRICAL CONTEXTS IN WHICH THE PRESENCE OF GOAL INCONGRUENCE IS NOT 
ESTABLISHED	  ..................................................................................................................	  132	  
Formal	  –	  Formal	  goal	  incongruence	  within	  the	  Strategic	  Core	  ...................................	  132	  
Formal-­‐Formal	  goal	  incongruence	  within	  the	  Delivery	  Network	  ................................	  134	  
Formal	  –	  Formal	  goal	  incongruence	  between	  the	  Strategic	  Core	  and	  Delivery	  Network
	  ....................................................................................................................................	  136	  
Operative	  –	  Operative	  goal	  incongruence	  within	  the	  Strategic	  Core	  ..........................	  138	  
CONCLUSION	  ...................................................................................................................	  141	  
CHAPTER 6	     BUREAUCRATIC DELEGATION AS THE SOURCE OF GOAL 
INCONGRUENCE	  ......................................................................................................	  143	  
INTRODUCTION	  ................................................................................................................	  143	  
SUMMARY OF SHAPING INFLUENCES FOR HIERARCHICAL GOAL INCONGRUENCE	  ........	  144	  
EVIDENCE FOR BUREAUCRATIC DELEGATION AS THE SOURCE OF GOAL INCONGRUENCE
	  ........................................................................................................................................	  147	  
The	  Pre-­‐occupation	  and	  Compliance	  Model	  ...............................................................	  149	  
The	  Bifurcation	  Of	  Interest	  Model	  ...............................................................................	  153	  
The	  Discretionary	  Gap	  Model	  ......................................................................................	  159	  
	   	  
	   	   	  
	  
viii	  
The	  Inadequate	  Comprehension	  Model	  ......................................................................	  162	  
Organisational	  Segmentation	  .....................................................................................	  165	  
The	  Performance	  Control	  Model	  .................................................................................	  166	  
CONCLUSION	  ...................................................................................................................	  168	  
CHAPTER 7	    PROFESSIONAL DIFFERENCE AS THE SOURCE OF GOAL 
INCONGRUENCE	  ......................................................................................................	  171	  
INTRODUCTION	  ................................................................................................................	  171	  
PROFESSIONAL DIFFERENCE AS A SOURCE OF GOAL INCONGRUENCE	  ...........................	  172	  
EVIDENCE FOR PROFESSIONAL ORIENTATION AS THE DETERMINANT OF GOAL 
INCONGRUENCE	  ..............................................................................................................	  174	  
PROFESSIONAL ORIENTATIONS, GOAL INCONGRUENCE AND INTEGRATION WITHIN THE 
DELIVERY NETWORK	  ......................................................................................................	  175	  
The	  Reinforced	  Predispositions	  Model	  ........................................................................	  180	  
The	  Communities	  of	  Practice	  Model	  ...........................................................................	  181	  
The	  Inter-­‐Professional	  Competition	  Model	  .................................................................	  184	  
CONCLUSION	  ...................................................................................................................	  185	  
CHAPTER 8	    THEORISING NETWORK INTEGRATION	  ..................................	  188	  
INTRODUCTION	  ................................................................................................................	  188	  
PROFESSIONAL INTEGRATION IN THE DELIVERY NETWORK	  ...........................................	  190	  
Integrated	  Victim	  Service	  Project	  ................................................................................	  190	  
Integrated	  Offender	  Management	  .............................................................................	  193	  
Violence	  Against	  Women	  &	  Girls	  (VAWG)	  Strategy	  ....................................................	  198	  
THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL  INTEGRATION	  ..................................	  202	  
Co-­‐operate	  to	  Compete:	  a	  response	  to	  performance	  control	  systems	  ........................	  202	  
The	  Experience	  of	  Work	  ..............................................................................................	  204	  
Institutional	  Benefits	  ...................................................................................................	  206	  
Professional	  Recognition	  .............................................................................................	  207	  
PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS TO THEORY	  ........................................................................	  210	  
The	  Causes	  of	  Co-­‐operation	  and	  Integration	  ..............................................................	  210	  
Rejecting	  the	  influence	  of	  professional	  control	  systems	  .............................................	  211	  
Recognising	  the	  Influence	  of	  Peer	  Groups	  ...................................................................	  211	  
CONCLUSION	  ...................................................................................................................	  212	  
CHAPTER 9	    CONCLUSION	  ..................................................................................	  215	  
INTRODUCTION	  ................................................................................................................	  215	  
THE RESEARCH APPROACH	  .............................................................................................	  216	  
EVIDENCE FOR GOAL INCONGRUENCE	  ............................................................................	  219	  
Goal	  Incongruence	  within	  the	  Strategic	  Core	  ..............................................................	  219	  
Goal	  Incongruence	  within	  the	  Delivery	  Network	  .........................................................	  220	  
Goal	  Incongruence	  between	  the	  Strategic	  Core	  and	  Delivery	  Network	  ......................	  221	  
HIERARCHY AS THE SOURCE OF GOAL INCONGRUENCE	  .................................................	  222	  
PROFESSIONAL DIFFERENCE AS THE SOURCE OF GOAL INCONGRUENCE	  .......................	  226	  
Network	  Integration	  and	  Professional	  Co-­‐operation	  ..................................................	  228	  
CONTRIBUTION TO THEORY	  ............................................................................................	  232	  
A	  Conceptual	  Framework	  for	  the	  study	  of	  Goal	  Incongruence	  ....................................	  232	  
Testing	  Hierarchical	  theories	  of	  Goal	  Incongruence	  ....................................................	  233	  
	   	  
	   	   	  
	  
ix	  
Testing	  Horizontal	  Theories	  of	  Goal	  Incongruence	  .....................................................	  235	  
IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS FOR PRACTICE	  .............................................................	  236	  
FURTHER RESEARCH	  .......................................................................................................	  238	  
REFERENCES	  ............................................................................................................	  239	  
	  
 
 
	   	  
	   	  
	   	   	  
	  
x	  
List of Figures 
	  
Figure 2.1 Overview of the Empirical Literature on Goal Incongruence ........  28 
 
Figure 2.2 Conceptual Models for the Expression of Goal Incongruence 
  Within a Network Context ........................................................... 55 
 
Figure 5.1 Description of Goal Incongruence in the Case Study Network ....  114 
 
Figure 6.1 Evidence for Sources of Hierarchical Goal Incongruence  ...........  148 
	   	  
	   	  
	   	   	  
	  
xi	  
Abbreviations 
	  
	  
CJS   Criminal Justice System 
CPS   Crown Prosecution Service 
CSP   Community Safety Partnership 
DV   Domestic Violence 
HMCTS  Her Majesty's Courts and Tribunals Service 
HO   Home Office 
IOM   Integrated Offender Management 
IVS   Integrated Victim Service 
LCJB   Local Criminal Justice Board 
MAPPA  Multi Agency Public Protection Arrangements 
MARAC  Multi Agency Risk Assessment Committees  
MoJ   Ministry of Justice 
NHS   National Health Service 
NOMS   National Offender Management Service 
SDVC   Special Domestic Violence Courts 
SR10   Spending Round 2010 period (extending from 2010 to 2015) 
TJC   Transforming Justice Committee 
TJP   Transforming Justice Programme 
VAWG  Violence Against Women and Girls 
VPS   Victim Personal Statement 
xCJS   Cross Criminal Justice [Efficiency Programme] 
	   	  
	   	   	  
	  
1	  
Chapter 1      Introduction 
It is broadly accepted that the presence of consistent goals makes a positive 
contribution to delivering public services. The extent to which actors in 
organisations and networks share goals is considered an important predictor of a 
variety of desirable organisational behaviours. That is, behaviours likely to 
increase the effectiveness and efficiency of public service provision. Shared 
goals ensure that limited resources are not dissipated in in incoherent and 
counterproductive programmes.  They are also held to reduce the transaction 
costs of public organisations and networks as the unity of purpose produced by 
shared goals increase employee commitment and reduce the need for 
investments in performance control systems (Cartwright 1965, Gibb 1969).  The 
literature suggests that goal congruence is positively correlated with a range of 
beneficial attributes. These include reductions in the negative effects of 
organisational politics (Witt1998), increases in job-satisfaction and reduction in 
intention to quit (Vancouver and Schmidt 1991; Vancouver, Millsap and Peters 
1994), increases in inter-organisational trust and cooperation (Lundin 2007) 
,reductions in the incidence of organisational cheating (Bohte and Meyer 2000). 
It has also been suggested that bureaucratic obedience implicit in goal 
congruence is considered a desirable attribute by hierarchical elites (Schofield 
2001).   
However, scholars of public management emphasise that public organisations 
are frequently characterised by the possession of ambiguous or conflicting goals 
(Bozeman and Kinsgley 1988, Boyne 2003a, Han Chun and Rainey 2006, 
Rainey 2011).  Public organisations must frequently cooperate with other 
organisations in network arrangements in order to deliver public services (Hall 
and O’Toole 2004, Percival 2009). Public organisations can also be reliant on 
staff who have strongly differentiated professional identities and perceived 
interests (Abernathy and Stoelwinder 1995, Kenis 2003).  These features of 
public service networks are argued to increase the difficulty of sustaining 
common goals, not least in terms of policy implementation (Schofield 2004, 
Sheaff et al 2010b). Instead they introduce tendencies toward goal incongruence.  
Goal incongruence is defined within this work as contradiction between 
organisational actors as to the legitimacy of specific goals in the planning, 
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conduct and control of work. Goal incongruence is most commonly associated 
with negative outcomes. Thompson (1967) has suggested that goal incongruence 
will encourage organizational actors to pursue individual goals at the expense of 
professed or official organizational objectives. Selznick suggests that 
incongruence leads to a situation where: "Actions are taken, policies adopted, 
with an eye more to the effect ... on the power relations inside the organization 
than to the achievement of its professed goals" (Selznick1943, p.52).   
Williamson has argued that discrepancies in de-facto goals can result in 
behaviours of  "Non-compliance and Opportunism  by sub-units which can lead 
to a significant negative difference between an organisation’s potential and 
effective opportunity set” (Williamson 1970, p. 50).  Meyers, Riccucci and Lurie 
(2001) found evidence that incongruent policy and operative goals can act to 
confuse and demoralise operational staff in their study of welfare reform in the 
USA. Finally Kochan, Cummings and Huber (1976) found that goal 
incongruence was correlated with increased conflict within public organisations.   
However the conceptions of goal incongruence that underpin the studies 
described above are frequently inconsistent with each other and occasionally 
contradictory.  There also appears to be little agreement as to the factors that 
determine the extent of goal incongruence within organisational contexts. The 
dissertation examines the sources of goal incongruence in a public network 
responsible for delivering aspects of the UK’s Criminal Justice System.  This 
study revisits the concept of goal incongruence with three objectives.  They are 
to address the questions described below: 
1. What is goal incongruence?  Are current conceptualisations of goal 
incongruence adequate? If not, how should goal incongruence be 
conceptualised? 
 
2. How extensive is goal incongruence in the case study network? 
 
3. What are the sources of goal incongruence?  Does the evidence provided 
by the case study validate existing explanations of the sources of goal 
incongruence? 
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The primary objective of the study was to contribute to the theoretical 
understanding of the sources of goal incongruence.  However the study was not 
solely of academic interest.  Reductions in the effectiveness and efficiency of 
criminal justice agencies caused by goal incongruence are of the utmost practical 
relevance.  Assuring operational effectiveness is an essential role for managers 
and staff within the Criminal Justice System (CJS). At a more fundamental level, 
goal incongruence within the CJS might be expected to reduce the public value 
that is generated by public confidence in the administration of justice.     
This study develops and tests a new conceptual framework for recognising goal 
incongruence. The conceptual framework takes established approaches to the 
description of goal incongruence - difference between formal and operative 
goals - and applies them within a network context.  Goal incongruence consists 
of contradiction between goals. Contradiction is indicated when there is 
evidence that goal orientated behaviour acts to disrupt, impede or deflect the 
attainment of formal or operative goals.  
Empirical accounts of goal incongruence are used to evaluate two theoretical 
explanations of goal incongruence.  The first is that incongruence is produced by 
the nature of downward delegation within bureaucratic hierarchies (the 
hierarchical explanation of goal incongruence).  The second is that goal 
incongruence is caused by conflict between different professional orientations 
(the horizontal explanation of goal incongruence).  
This study presents evidence that indicates that hierarchy produces goal 
incongruence. However the validity of a number of theoretical mechanisms for 
the hierarchical production of goal incongruence proposed in the established 
literature are questioned.  Evidence from the study indicates that professional 
difference does not produce goal incongruence within the case study network.  
Indeed the study delivers the empirical surprise that professional difference leads 
to reductions in goal incongruence as professionals pursued organic strategies of 
network integration. 
The remainder of this introduction will describe the research setting and the 
contributions each of the chapters makes to achieve the overarching objectives 
of the study.  
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The	  Research	  Setting	  
The author spent one year conducting ethnographic research in the Ministry of 
Justice Headquarters and in the local Criminal Justice delivery agencies of an 
English city.  The case study network was selected because its structure was 
capable of generating data that would reflect both hierarchical and horizontal 
interactions between network groups.  There was also a purposive element to its 
selection (Addicott, McGivern and Ferlie 2007) as senior managers in the 
participating organisations had an interest in developing their understanding of 
network cooperation and felt that the research would be broadly helpful to their 
operational agenda.  
The Network context is acknowledged but remains largely unexplored by goal 
incongruence research. At the same time the importance of networks in 
delivering public service is increasingly recognised  (Entwistle 2005, Boyne 
2003b Rhodes 1996).  The network perspective is defined by the insight that 
services can rarely be delivered by a single organisation operating in isolation 
(Hjern and Porter 1981, Keast et al. 2004). Network analyses emphasise the 
importance of inter-organisational information sharing and collaboration 
founded on a spirit of goodwill (Dore 1983, Sako 1992) that replaces the arms 
length opportunistic relationships, which are argued to characterise market 
transactions.   
One of the implications of de-facto network arrangements is that studies of goal 
incongruence that concentrate on single organisations might be considered 
partial accounts and therefore less compelling.  The consequence of accepting 
this view is that theoretical explanations of goal congruence should attempt to 
accommodate the network perspective by incorporating analysis of the 
interaction of goals at a network level. 
The case study was conducted within a public network responsible for delivering 
aspects of the Criminal Justice System within the UK.  In order to test the 
theoretical framework, observation was conducted at multiple points within the 
network that included different hierarchical levels and a number of network 
organizations with distinct task and professional orientations. 
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 The Strategic Core  
At the Headquarters level participant observation was conducted within one of 
the directorates of the Ministry of Justice.  The directorate selected was chosen 
on the basis that was heavily involved in transforming practice within the public 
network responsible for delivering criminal justice policy and practice within the 
UK. The directorate operated close to the strategic and policy apex of the 
Ministry.  It assisted Ministers and senior civil servants in developing and 
disseminating strategy and policy.  It also reported through various committees 
and boards on the activity of network agencies and the progress of specific 
programs and projects.  Following common usage within the Headquarters 
function of the MoJ, this part of the network will be referred to in the remainder 
of this article as the strategic core.  This was a term that was used informally by 
headquarters staff to distinguish themselves from their operational counterparts 
in local delivery agencies that will be referred to in this work as the delivery 
network.  
The organisational context within which the case study was conducted was one 
where the Ministry of Justice had embarked on a high profile programme of 
Transformational Change.  The Transforming Justice Programme (TJP) (Gash 
and McCrae 2010, McCrae, Page and McClory 2011) focused on achieving 
radical change in the culture and practice of the Criminal Justice System.  The 
public nature of the commitments by leaders at the most senior level of the 
Ministry of Justice ensured that the TJP, led by the Transforming Justice 
Committee (TJC) secured a high profile within the Ministry. Servicing the TJC 
(preparing papers for committee and implementing actions arising) was observed 
to be a primary operative goal within the strategic core.  The existence of the 
TJC reinforced hierarchical power relationships and aligned transformational 
change with the strategic core’s commitment to the reporting discourse. 
The TJP had been established before the SR10 period.  It had originally focused 
on transformative cultural change that would increase the effectiveness and 
customer service orientation of the Justice System.  However with the advent of 
the coalition Government transformational change had become synonymous 
with achieving the MoJ’s deficit reduction targets.  The TJP comprised three 
categories of action to achieve deficit reduction.  The first was a collection of 
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major projects inherited from the previous Government.  The business cases of 
these projects usually contained predictions that they would deliver significant 
savings.  In private these projects were seen as discredited and staff were 
frequently dismissive and occasionally scathing of their prospects for making 
any contribution to the deficit reduction targets.  The second category involved 
primary legislation to reduce the costs of operating the Justice System.  This 
included reducing the number of prisoners (rather than a projected increase from 
85,000 to 91,000 over the period a projected reduction to 81,000).  This would 
be achieved by legislation to increase the use of community sentences and stop 
the imposition of indeterminate sentences.  Reducing the workload of the Courts 
by offering 50% reductions for early guilty pleas, and reducing the Legal Aid 
budget by restricting eligibility.  The third category was executive action to 
reduce the number of staff employed in the strategic core and the delivery 
network by encouraging significant numbers to take voluntary redundancy. 
At the same time the MoJ and its agencies had long-standing commitments to 
developing an organizational culture around the practice of continuous 
improvement.  This included a significant commitment to training large numbers 
of employees throughout the network at all levels in continuous improvement 
tools and techniques.  The tensions between strategies of radical and incremental 
change were apparent throughout the period of participant observation.  While 
Continuous Improvement was represented in the TJP by the cross Criminal 
Justice Efficiency programme (xCJS efficiency programme) it appeared that 
operative goals of continuous improvement (along with the customer service 
orientated cultural transformations) had been marginalized within the strategic 
core in favour of achieving deficit reduction targets within the SR10 period. 
 
 The Delivery Network 
The case study collected data from four statutory agencies that were responsible 
for administering the Criminal Justice System within a specific English city.  
They included the Police, the Crown Prosecution Service, HMCTS (the Courts) 
and the local Probation Trust.  The case study focused on services that these 
agencies delivered to victims of serious crimes (those crimes covered by section 
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15 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003) that in practice meant crimes of violence 
and sexual violence.  
The clearest expression of operative goals in the delivery network consisted of 
those that related to meeting the operational imperatives of work demanded by 
the CJS. The dominant operative goals inferred from observation of the delivery 
network derive from the work necessary to meet the operational imperatives of 
the CJS. This included a wide range of activities from conducting criminal 
investigations, making decisions to charge (or not), creating case files, making 
legal arrangements, listing and conducting trials, ensuring that witnesses 
attended court to give evidence, providing information to victims and 
representing the views of victims in legal hearings following sentence.  It is vital 
to emphasise that this experience of immersion in the work of the CJS is a sine 
qua non of the delivery network but is simply unavailable to headquarters staff 
within the strategic core.  
Frequently tasks, which are regarded as routine and unexceptional, require a 
significant degree of coordinated endeavor across multiple agencies. For 
example in the UK Criminal Justice System the prosecution of relatively minor 
offences requires the coordinated participation of a network of local 
organisations which includes the Police, Crown Prosecution Service and the 
Courts and Tribunals Service. In addition evidence must be provided to the 
Defence and in practice a number of agencies from the voluntary sector that may 
or may not receive public funds provide support services to victims and 
witnesses of crime.  The process is choreographed within a statutory framework 
implemented and monitored at the national level by two Government 
Departments (the Ministry of Justice and the Home Office).  The performance of 
each agency is dependent on that of its counterparts within the Network. 
Collaboration between agencies in bringing a prosecution before the Courts 
required a degree of co-ordination that was at best balletic, at worst frantic but 
always intense. 
The operational imperative appeared to be experienced in two distinct ways.  
Firstly, it was experienced as an imposed set of obligations.  Secondly, it was 
experienced as a shared personal commitment to achieving the ends of the CJS.  
Operational performance data is collected and utilised to compare effectiveness 
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longitudinally, geographically and against national standards, statutory 
obligations and voluntary codes of practice.  It appeared that comparing local 
performance data to national performance was particularly important to local 
managers within the delivery network.  Being ranked at the bottom of national 
performance tables appeared to be a significant motivating factor for addressing 
performance issues.  This appeared to be the case whether it was believed that 
poor comparisons were a genuine reflection of performance or reflected other 
organizations ‘gaming’ the performance measurement system.  In either case 
action had to be taken to save face and protect professional reputations. 
At the same time providing services to the victims of crime was seen as ‘the 
right‘ thing to do. The use of morally unambiguous language to describe Agency 
commitments to victims appeared to derive from a personal and professional 
identification with the objectives of the CJS in general and the experience of 
victims of crime in particular.  This may be an example of what Rainey and 
Steinbauer (1999) have described as Mission Valence, the extent to which 
organisational purpose resonates with individual motivation. The proximity to 
and identification with the experience of the victim is another characteristic of 
work in the delivery network which is unavailable to staff operating in the 
Strategic Core except in abstract terms.   
   
Overview	  of	  the	  Thesis	  
This thesis develops a novel conceptual framework for the analysis of goal 
incongruence and applies it to empirical data obtained from ethnographic 
research in order to identify the incidence and sources of goal incongruence in a 
public service network.  Chapter two discusses how goal incongruence has been 
conceptualised by authors who have written on the subject.  It describes what 
those authors have thought goal incongruence is, the type of evidence that they 
have utilised and the criteria they have employed to judge its presence and 
warrant the claims they have made for its existence. The chapter argues that 
conceptualisations of goal incongruence found in the literature are inconsistent.  
The conception and identification of goal incongruence have changed radically 
over time.  They have tended to become simpler, have relaxed the criteria used 
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to test for the presence of goal incongruence and attach considerably less 
importance to drawing evidence from meaningful organisational contexts. 
The consequence of this longitudinal shift in the study of goal incongruence is 
that the test for the presence of goal incongruence has become conceptually, 
empirically and methodologically easier to satisfy. A more permissive 
conceptualisation and research approach might be expected to lead to a greater 
incidence of claimed incongruence. In addition the importance of grounding 
claimed incongruence within its organisational context has diminished over 
time.  The thick description and mixed methods of the early research has been 
replaced (with the exception of Vancouver Millsap and Peters 1994 and Meyers, 
Riccucci and Lurie 2001) by the completion of questionnaires that have a 
tenuous link to practice by small numbers of respondents.   
At the same time the fidelity of empirical research to the enacted practice of 
organisations (as opposed to accounts of intended, desired, claimed or expected 
practice) has become more open to question. Chapter two concludes by 
providing a more rigorous and less permissive conceptualisation of goal 
incongruence. The conceptual framework is utilized to evaluate the evidence for 
goal incongruence in a rigorous and systematic manner and warrant subsequent 
claims. It derives from three perceived gaps in the literature. The first is that 
recent literature defines goal incongruence on the basis of difference. This is 
perceived to be inadequate because goals may be different but complimentary.  
That is they different goals represent different means to attain common ends.  
Secondly the recent literature invites respondents to rank potential goals from 
menus of choices provided by researchers.  Thirdly the literature does not test 
for goal incongruence within network contexts. 
The discussion in chapter three clarifies the theoretical explanations of the 
sources of goal incongruence.  The chapter presents two alternative theories of 
the sources of goal incongruence. They are referred to in the text as the 
hierarchical model and the horizontal model. 
The hierarchical model argues that goal incongruence is caused by the nature of 
downward delegation necessary in bureaucratic organisations. It understands 
organisations as chains of command, transmitting orders downward through the 
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hierarchy from the strategic to operational level.  In the process aspects of the 
message can get lost in translation. Goal incongruence is therefore seen as the 
result of a bureaucratic version of the game of Chinese whispers.  It is the 
expression of an inevitable loss of meaning as goals are transmitted downward 
through the bureaucratic hierarchy.  
The Horizontal model of goal incongruence draws on the theoretical perspective 
that organisations should not be conceptualized as chains of command but as 
coalitions of interest (Cyert and March 1963). This theoretical frame suggests 
that organisations are comprised of coalitions of individuals, some of whom are 
organised into sub-coalitions.  Organizational goals emerge from the process of 
bargaining, both within and between sub-coalitions.  As such the question of 
goal incongruence is central to conceptual descriptions of organisational 
contexts.   
The discussion that will be developed in chapter three proceeds from the 
assumption that professional identities and commitments operate as a 
particularly significant locus for the development of organisational coalitions 
and sub-coalitions. Arguments that different professional orientations produce 
inter-professional relationships characterised by conflict and competition are 
reviewed and three shaping influences for professional conflict are identified and 
described.   
One of the recurrent themes developed by scholars of professionalization is the 
capacity for conflict and competition between distinct professional groups 
(Johnson 1972, Derber 1980, Abbott 1988). Indeed DiMaggio and Powell have 
defined the process of professionalization in inherently competitive terms, 
describing it as the: “collective struggle of members of an occupation to define 
the conditions and methods of their work” (DiMaggio and Powell 1991, p.70).  
The chapter will describe the essential aspects of each model.  It will then focus 
on a number of proposed mechanisms by which these models shape goal 
incongruence that are suggested in the literature. These proposed mechanisms 
will provide the analytical focus of the evaluation of the two models in the later 
chapters of this study.  
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Chapter four explains the study's research design.  The study investigates the 
sources of goal incongruence with a single qualitative case study that utilised 
participant observation to collect data.  It is generally believed that single case 
studies are suitable for generating hypotheses, but are less effective at testing 
hypotheses or making generalizable theoretical conclusions. Chapter four 
explores the countervailing argument that it is possible to generalise and test 
hypotheses with single case studies where those cases act as 'critical cases' 
(Goldthorpe et al 1968, Flyvbjerg 2006). Chapter four sets out how the case 
study meets the requirements of a critical case with regard to drawing warranted 
theoretical conclusions with regard to the sources of goal incongruence.  
The chapter goes on to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of participant 
observation as a data collection method compared to other methods of 
qualitative data collection.  It then explains how the researcher negotiated access 
to the research setting, the approach to collecting data and making research notes 
and the process for interpreting the data in order to draw theoretical conclusions 
regarding the sources of goal incongruence.  
In chapter five the study will present evidence for goal incongruence from three 
empirical contexts.  They represent goal incongruence within the strategic core, 
within the delivery network and between the strategic core and delivery network. 
Evidence is derived from the application of the study’s conceptual framework to 
data derived from participant observation. 
Analysis indicates that goal incongruence is present in some dimensions and 
contexts (formal – formal incongruence within the delivery network, formal – 
operative incongruence within the strategic core, within the delivery network 
and between the strategic core and delivery network, and operative – operative 
incongruence within the delivery network and between the strategic core and 
delivery network) but is absent in others  
It is important to stress that difference between goals (as opposed to 
contradiction) was identified in all dimensions of incongruence and 
organisational contexts.  Indeed had the study employed difference as the sole 
criterion of goal incongruence then findings of incongruence would have been 
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ubiquitous and the study would have been overwhelmed by endless and varied 
examples of the phenomenon.   
The application of the new conceptual framework appears to suggest that 
difference is, on its own, an inadequate indicator of incongruence.  It fails to 
differentiate between goals that are different and contradictory and goals that are 
different but complimentary. It might be suggested that this conclusion has 
significant implications for interpreting existing research on goal incongruence 
(and the corollary construct of goal congruence) and the claims for the presence 
of goal incongruence that they contain. This appears to have provided richer 
accounts of goal incongruence than are available from simple tests for the 
existence of difference.  The new conceptual framework provides descriptions of 
the contexts in which goal incongruence is present and absent rather than present 
or absent. This ability to provide more refined analytical perspectives might be 
considered to be of value in investigating the determinants of goal incongruence.   
Chapter six discusses how far the empirical descriptions of goal incongruence 
produced by the study support theoretical claims that goal incongruence is 
caused by the nature of bureaucratic delegation. In order to accomplish this 
purpose the chapter reviews the major elements of the bureaucratic delegation 
model of goal incongruence. The discussion will then consider whether each of 
the examples of incongruence identified in the case study is consistent with the 
bureaucratic delegation model of goal incongruence.  For each relevant example 
of claimed goal incongruence the chapter will describe what might be expected 
to constitute criteria for identifying convincing evidence for bureaucratic 
delegation within hierarchical arrangements as the cause of goal incongruence.    
The chapter suggests that evidence would consist in actors subverting, deflecting 
or contradicting practices aimed at achieving delegated formal and operative 
goals.  Furthermore the practice of subversion by intermediaries exercising 
bureaucratic discretion should correspond to one or more of the shaping 
influences described in the chapter three. A discussion of the empirical evidence 
drawn from the case study and the extent to which it supports one or more of the 
shaping influences for the hierarchical production of goal incongruence is 
presented below.   
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The chapter finds that the data provides considerable support for hierarchical 
explanations of the sources of goal incongruence.  That is downward delegation 
within bureaucratic hierarchies is a source of goal incongruence within network 
contexts.  The vertical explanation of the causes of goal incongruence provides 
six influences that shape goal incongruence.  The evidence drawn from the case 
study questions three of these (the pre-occupation and compliance, bureaucratic 
discretion and inadequate comprehension influences). It supports the remaining 
three mechanisms (the bifurcation of interests, performance control and 
organisational segmentation influences). 
Theory predicts that incongruence between formal and operative goals will be 
lowest at the apex of organisations and highest at the operational levels of 
organisations.  However the evidence of this study was the opposite. The 
operative goals of groups that were closest to the apex of the network hierarchy 
were more incongruent with formal network goals than those at the base.  
Chapter seven reviews the theoretical claim that goal incongruence is caused by 
patterns of interaction between different professional orientations. This 
analytical perspective rests on the assumption that organisations are coalitions of 
groups and sub-groups, and not chains of command.  Shared professional 
orientations operate as particularly significant loci for the development of such 
groups.   The discussion of theory presented in chapter seven isolated and tested 
three influences by which different professional orientations are claimed to 
shape goal incongruence. They are the reinforced pre-dispositions, the 
communities of practice and the intra-professional competition influence. 
The chapter argues that professional difference in the delivery network was not 
associated with goal incongruence.  On the contrary, the evidence indicated that 
individuals with different professional orientations attempted to reduce goal 
incongruence by implementing bottom-up programmes of network integration. 
This empirical surprise described in chapter seven raises a number of questions 
that are addressed in chapter eight. Does the evidence really show professionals 
attempting to co-operate? Why do they attempt to co-operate by integrating 
working practices? What modifications to we need to make to the theory of goal 
incongruence?  Chapter eight presents evidence that the case study does indeed 
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provide compelling evidence for inter-professional co-operation and integration 
within the delivery network.  The chapter provides four examples, the Integrated 
Victim Service project, two forms of Integrated Offender Management project 
and a cluster of co-operative practices organised around the local Violence 
Against Women and Girls strategy.  These initiatives are examples organic and 
local attempts to address perceived deficiencies in the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the local Criminal Justice System.   
Four theoretical models for professional co-operation and integration are 
described and evaluated. The most compelling theory of network integration is 
that it emerges from the connected nature of work and the similar demands that 
patterns of work make on professionals.  The theory argues that the complex and 
intense interactions demanded by the work of the criminal justice system acts as 
a centripetal force that overcomes the barriers of professional orientation and 
institutional affiliation. Network integration develops from professionals’ 
identification with and their commitments to their immediate peer group (Kidron 
1965). In network contexts the immediate peer group will frequently incorporate 
members from a variety of professional backgrounds and network agencies.   
The implication of this insight is that the professional experience of work acts to 
connect professionals rather then divide them. The close and meaningful 
interactions required by patterns of work gave rise to stable relationships that 
were characterised by intense collaboration and connected professionals in 
relationships of reciprocal obligation and dependency.  The study will argue that 
the emergence of integrated organisation reflects professional’s recognition that 
the outcomes and efficiency of their own work were dependent on the actions, 
behaviour and good will of other groups of professionals within the criminal 
justice system. In other words the experience of work created normative and 
cognitive systems of reciprocal obligation and dependency between 
professionals.  These systems were reinforced by shared commitments to the 
overall objectives of the criminal justice system and a strong identification with 
the experience of the victim.   
The study concludes by describing the theoretical and practical implications of 
the findings.  The revised conceptual framework produced a more refined and 
analytically detailed account of goal incongruence than would have been the 
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case with established conceptions of goal incongruence. The conceptual 
framework rejects difference as sufficient criteria for recognising goal 
incongruence. Goals may be different but complimentary, that is that despite 
their difference they act as separate means to the attainment of a common end.  
The conceptual framework replaces difference with contradiction as the criteria 
for goal incongruence. This acts as a higher test for recognising goal 
incongruence. The study found incongruence to be present in five network 
contexts. However had the criteria been difference, goal incongruence would 
have been ubiquitous. Indeed had the study employed difference as the sole 
criterion of goal incongruence then findings of incongruence would have been 
ubiquitous and the study would have been overwhelmed by endless and varied 
examples of the phenomenon.  The selection of contradiction as the marker of 
goal incongruence is theoretically significant. If the criteria of contradiction 
applied to the existing literature on goal incongruence it would be reasonable to 
assume that the empirical findings and the theoretical conclusions derived from 
them would be significantly modified. 
The study finds compelling evidence that goal incongruence was caused by the 
nature of bureaucratic delegation within hierarchies. Bureaucratic delegation was 
found to be responsible for goal incongruence within the strategic core, within 
the delivery network and between the strategic core and delivery network.   To 
this extent the study provides empirical support for hierarchical theories of goal 
incongruence.  
The study indicates that the Bifurcation of Interest model explains hierarchical 
goal incongruence, supported by organisational segmentation model and 
hierarchically imposed professional control systems. The necessary use of 
intermediaries creates a tendency to the bi-furcation of interests, in which 
intermediaries are concerned chiefly with their social positions as agents.  At the 
heart of the bi-furcation of interest model is the question of the benefits that 
individuals hope to acquire from their organisational associations.  Or, to express 
the issue in Perrow’s Terms: what do individuals and groups hope to gain from 
participating in affairs of organisation …what are the uses to which they put the 
organisation (1961). Empirical evidence indicates that hierarchical position 
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influenced the uses to which groups could put the organisation and the benefits 
that they could hope to gain from organisational membership. 
However theoretical accounts of the operation of bureaucratic authority and 
delegation do not provide adequate explanations of network arrangements.  
Theory predicts that the more junior staff should be most incongruent with the 
formal goals of the network.  This study finds that the contrary is true.  The most 
senior staff were found to be the most incongruent. What is theoretically 
surprising is that the uses that members of the strategic core put the organisation 
to, as evidenced by their commitment to the operative goal of Reporting, were 
further from the formal goals of the MoJ than were the operative goals of the 
delivery network.  That is formal – operative goal incongruence was greatest at 
the higher levels of bureaucratic hierarchy and diminished as you moved down 
through the hierarchy to operational levels within the delivery network. 
Finally, the study will argue that professional difference does not produce goal 
incongruence as predicted by theory.  On the contrary, professionals in the case 
study do not act as theory predicts, but actually co-operated to reduce goal 
incongruence. The study revealed that professional difference acted in subtle and 
complex ways.  However on balance professional difference did not produce 
goal incongruence. This thesis will provide empirical evidence that professionals 
overcame difference in professional orientations in order to address the negative 
outcomes of hierarchically produced goal incongruence by pursuing organic 
strategies of network integration. The empirical evidence for inter-professional 
co-operation contradicts theoretical predictions that difference in professional 
orientation will act to increase goal incongruence within network contexts. 
This empirical surprise, that professionals within the case study do not behave 
toward each other as theory predicts they should, raised the issue of why they 
chose to co-operate and reduce goal incongruence. The most important reason 
for network integration was professional’s experience of work.  This acted to 
connect individuals with different professional orientations in relationships of 
mutual dependency and obligation.  This suggests that peer group relationships 
were key in promoting network integration and reducing goal incongruence.  
The importance of peer groups is recognised in the goal incongruence literature.  
The theoretical implications of the study is to focus attention on the issue that 
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within network relationships, peer groups are likely to incorporate individuals 
with a range of professional orientations.  Secondly, the study suggests that the 
role of peer group relationships (as opposed to professional and organisational 
affiliations) is under-theorised in the goal incongruence literature.  
The practical implications of these findings are that hierarchical attempts to 
'control' the practice and performance of professionals, while having some 
policy benefits (legitimacy and accountability) are counterproductive and act to 
increase goal incongruence and reduce professional effectiveness. 
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Chapter 2  Conceptualising Goal Incongruence 
	  
Introduction 
This chapter will examine the manner in which goal incongruence has been 
conceptualised and identified in the literature.  It will describe what previous 
authors have thought goal incongruence is, the type of evidence that they have 
utilised and the criteria they have employed to judge its presence and warrant the 
claims they have made for its existence.  
The chapter will develop the argument that conceptualisations of goal 
incongruence found in the literature are inconsistent.  The conception and 
identification of goal incongruence have changed radically over time.  They have 
tended to become simpler, have relaxed the criteria used to test for the presence 
of goal incongruence and attach considerably less importance to drawing 
evidence from organisationally meaningful empirical contexts. 
This chapter will begin by describing how the theoretical and empirical literature 
has conceptualised goal incongruence.  It will then critically evaluate how 
authors have approached the empirical study of goal incongruence from 
quantitative and qualitative research perspectives, paying particular attention to 
qualitative case studies of goal incongruence.   
The chapter will go on to summarise these approaches and discuss their 
implications for the current study. It will then describe each of the models and 
the suggested pathways to goal incongruence.  The chapter will conclude by 
presenting the study’s conceptual framework for the analysis of goal 
incongruence within public networks.  
  
The Conceptualisation of Goal Incongruence 
The following discussion sets out to describe how goal incongruence has been 
conceptualised within the literature. It begins by clarifying the study’s concept 
of the organisational goal as the foundation on which discussion of goal 
incongruence rests.  It then describes what authors have thought constitutes the 
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phenomenon of goal incongruence that is how they have defined the 
phenomenon. 
Scott has argued that the: “concept of organizational goals is among the most 
slippery and treacherous of all those employed by organizational analysts” 
(1992, p.285).   This is because of the bewildering variety of ways those goals 
are manifested within organisational contexts and the equally bewildering 
variety of ways that they are categorised, analysed and identified by researchers.  
Scott provides an admirably clear definition of goals as: "conceptions of desired 
ends" (Scott 1987, p.18).  However this definition is not as straightforward as it 
appears on first reading.  There are at least three important areas of uncertainty.  
What sorts of desired ends might Scott be referring to? What is the ontological 
status of the desired ends? Who are the people (the constituencies) who share 
and carry these conceptions?  In practice there is very little consistency in the 
way in which authors have argued these questions should be answered.  
Consequently the published literature on goal incongruence defies easy 
comparison, making it almost impossible to identify those issues that have been 
resolved and those that remain open to question.  
Numerous authors have produced classifications systems for organisational 
goals. The research design employed by this study recognises four types of 
organisational goal.  The first is the teleological goal.  These goals relate to the 
beliefs held about the ultimate purpose of organisations and organisational 
actions. They may encompass outcomes, methods, principles or operational 
characteristics. A good example of a teleological goal is the principle that the 
NHS should provide medical care funded from general taxation, allocated on the 
basis of need and provided free at the point of use.  Of-course these principles 
are established by Statute. However it can be argued that many (although not all) 
actors within the NHS would also share the conception that professionals 
employed by the public sector should deliver services, and this belief establishes 
a fourth teleological goal of resisting private involvement within the NHS. 
The second type of goal has less to do with belief and more to do with practice. 
Habitus-derived goals (Alvesson 2013) emerge from the practice of individuals 
within their confined and restricted organisational contexts.  Goals do not derive 
from beliefs but from the routine completion of habitual processes   Goals reflect 
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what Blackburn has described as: "a matter of practical dispositions or a stance 
toward things." They represent: "A commitment to some practices and some 
permissions and some prohibitions: and immersion in a 'way of life' " (Blackburn 
2012, p.34). From this perspective principled belief in the purpose of 
organisational activity recedes to the point where it is no more than: "a vague 
and changing kaleidoscope of imaginings" (Blackburn 2012, p.35). 
The third type of goal can be described as accumulative goals.  Individuals and 
groups often exhibit a tendency to acquisitive action, sometimes described as 
pursuing self-interest. The focus of acquisitive behaviour can sometimes appear 
to be subordinate to its practice.  The objective of accumulation may be money, 
security, experience, status, prestige, authority or control. Finally the fourth 
category of goal is the hedonic goal (Lindenberg 2008).  Hedonic goal frames 
reflect the belief that individuals within organisations are motivated to position 
themselves to avoid dangerous, boring or difficult work (Lipsky 1982) and to 
attempt to avoid drudgery and even have some fun (Alvesson 2013).   
Another area of uncertainty is the ontological status of goals.  That is what is the 
nature of Scott's conception of desired ends?  The most profoundly realist view 
of goals is that they are conceptions of desired ends that are enacted.  A goal is 
only a goal if it is supported by action to realise it's objective.  This is a 
methodologically unproblematic definition of a goal as it should be possible to 
collect evidence for goal-orientated action within organisations. However 
insisting that goals must be enacted appears to be a difficult position to sustain. 
It is possible to propose an alternative ontological basis for goals, one in which 
they may not be enacted, but intended. The intended goal differs from the 
enacted in that some impediment exists to its implementation.  This may be a 
matter of insufficient resources or agreement, a lack of capacity or technical 
know how, of unavailable permissions, a lack of sufficient priority (it will be the 
next thing to be done) or simply because of an inevitable and reasonable delay 
between conception and execution. However from a methodological position the 
intended goal starts to introduce problems, as an intended goal may have no 
evidence to support its existence apart from talk.  
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A variation on this theme is provided by the third ontological basis for goals, the 
aspirational goal. Most people will be familiar with the ironical usage of the 
term aspirational. It is used in popular politics to indicate intentions that are 
desirable but practically difficult and therefore unlikely to be realised.  In this 
context, the value of the aspirational goal is its ability to form a desired  
'impression' in a target audience. It was, perhaps, the dark side of the aspirational 
goal, its ability to mislead, that Alexander Herzen was referring to with his 
criticism of the pursuit of utopias: "A goal if infinitely remote is not a goal, it is 
a deception" (Herzen, quoted in Ward 1973, p.136).   
However aspirational objectives are not inevitably devoid of merit.  They can 
shape the ethical landscape of organisation in a positive way, and guide 
behaviour by providing a strong sense of  'what ought to be'.  It is easy to dismiss 
the ontological validity of the aspirational goal on the grounds that its unlikely 
chance of being enacted means that it is just talk. Atkinson Coffey and Delemont 
(2003) remind us that talk itself can constitute social action:  
Forms of talk - including narratives and interview accounts - are 
themselves examples of social action.  People do things with words, 
and they do things with narratives" (Atkinson, Coffey and Delamont 
2003, p.117).  
The inscription of even an aspirational goal represents a social event that confers 
a definite ontological status.  However, this creates the methodological problem 
of defining and collecting evidence capable of distinguishing between talk as 
intention and talk as aspiration. Of-course the situation is more complex than 
that because there is a fourth category of goal that will be referred to here as the 
pretended goal. The pretended goal has as its objective the deception.  Its 
purpose is to secure the legitimacy associated with particular forms of principle, 
action or belief while avoiding practical compliance or even sustaining 
contradictory practices. In that sense the object of the pretended goal is to 
disguise organisational beliefs and practices in order to deceive and mislead.  
Brunsen (1989) and Pollit (2001) have both argued that organisational hypocrisy 
is beneficial in that separating talk, decision and action allows organisations to 
resolve contradictory expectations.  However a less charitable view would be 
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that pretended goals facilitate organisational actors efforts to put organisations to 
their own uses and benefits (Perrow 1961). 
  
Making Sense of Organisational Goals  
As we have already argued, organisational goals can be thought of as: 
“conceptions of desired ends” (Scott 1987, p.18) that act to provide direction and 
purpose to organisational activity.  For Scott, clear and specific goals are 
indispensable precursors to effective decision making within organisations:   
Specific goals not only supply criteria for choosing among 
alternative activities: they guide decisions about how the 
organization structure itself is to be designed.  They specify what 
tasks are to be performed, what kinds of personnel are to be hired, 
[and] how resources are to be allocated among participants. (Scott 
1987 p.32) 
The assumption that organisations possess consistent goals, clearly articulated 
and widely accepted across functions and operating levels has been contested on 
a number of grounds.  Boyne (2003b) argues that public sector organisations can 
exhibit   goal ambiguity as goals may not be clearly formulated.  Lipsky (1983) 
argues that where staff (including relatively junior staff) work in contact with the 
public they can enjoy significant discretion in the interpretation of formal 
policies and procedures.  
Goals serve as both a necessary tool to state and achieve corporate purpose 
through directing: the set of “conscious efforts to concert actors and resources to 
carry out established collective purposes” (O’Toole and Meier, 1999, p.510) and 
a powerful influence for motivating individuals and groups to persist in 
exhibiting behaviours and actions necessary to achieve agreed goals (Kristof-
Brown and Stevens 2001).   
Goals must satisfy different organisational requirements including 
communicating the purpose of an organisation (Scott 1992) and providing an 
objective and context for measuring organizational performance (Hall 1996).  
Goals can be utilized as a strategy for coping with environmental uncertainty by 
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imposing particular courses of action:  “Uncertainty creates problems for action.  
Actors... resolve these problems by following rules, of thumb, using rituals, 
relying on habitual patterns, or, more self-consciously, by setting goals and 
making plans to reach them” (Turner 1976, p.378).  Insofar as goals constitute 
simplifying assumptions about task and environment they act to restrict the 
range of ends which are constructed as legitimate and can therefore be 
understood as bounds for rationality (Simon 1957).  
Goals can also play an indispensable role in establishing the legitimacy of an 
organisation (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) particularly in securing claims to the 
democratic legitimacy of public organizations and actions as illustrated by 
Meyers, Riccucci and Lurie when they argue that: “In terms of policy 
delivery...implementation efforts should be directed toward the achievement of 
public purposes specified in advance by public officials” (Meyers, Riccucci and 
Lurie 2001, p.169).  
 
The Early View of Goal Incongruence 
Early research on goal incongruence tended to conform to the model of 
institutional analyses (Selznick 1948, Sills 1956, Perrow 1961, Street Vintner 
and Perrow1966).  These authors sought to identify goal incongruence in the 
discrepancies and contradictions between formal goal and operative goals 
inferred from participant observation and rich descriptions of organisational 
contexts.  
Selznick defined goal incongruence in terms of an inevitable dissonance 
between an organisation’s professed and operational goals:  
Running an organisation… generates problems, which have no 
necessary (and  often an opposed) relationship to the professed or 
“original” goals of the organization. The day-to-day behaviour of the 
group becomes centered around specific problems and proximate 
goals, which have primarily an internal relevance. Then, since these 
activities come to consume an increasing proportion of the time and 
	   	   	  
	   	   	  
	  
24	  
thoughts of participants, they are-from the point of view of actual 
behaviour – substituted for the professed goal” (Selznick1943, p.48).  
Perrow developed this distinction, suggesting two categories of organisational 
goals.  The first was the official or formal goals which: “represented the general 
purposes of the organization as put forth in the charter, annual reports, public 
statements and other authoritative statements” (Perrow 1961, p.855). The second 
type of goal, operative goals: “designate the ends sought through the actual 
operating policies of the organization. They tell us what the organization 
actually is trying to do, regardless of what the official goals say are their aims” 
(Perrow1961 p.855).   
Operative goals, unlike official, or formal goals: “are tied more directly to group 
interests and while they may support, be irrelevant to, or subvert official goals, 
they bear no necessary connection with them” (Perrow 1961, p.856). Street et al 
suggest goal incongruence consists in the “contradictions between goals and 
[the] structured conflicts [that] might arise” (Street et al 1966, p.16). The 
consequence of goal incongruence is that the professed goals of organisations 
are deflected, distorted or frustrated (Selznick 1943 p.1, 48-49), or subverted 
(Perrow 1961 p.338). 
 
The Later View of Goal Incongruence   
The majority of later research dispenses with institutional analysis and the 
investigation of difference between formal and operative goals.  Quantitative 
analysis of questionnaire responses is utilized to discern difference. The simplest 
measurement strategies ask respondents direct questions with regard to goal 
congruence.  For example: “Do you believe that the multiple agencies… are all 
working to achieve the same common goals or outcomes” (Percival 2009, 
p.812). 
Vancouver Millsap and Peters describe goal congruence as: “the agreement 
among employees on the importance of the goals the organizations could be 
pursuing” (Vancouver Millsap and Peters 1994, p.666). They extend the use of 
the constituency approach developed by Vancouver and Schmitt (1991) that 
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evaluates supervisor – subordinate goal congruence (the extent to which 
individual supervisors and subordinates share or agree on goal priorities), 
between constituency goal congruence (the degree to which everyone agrees 
with the boss) and member – constituency goal congruence  (the degree to which 
each member agrees with all the other members in his or her constituency).  
However more common is the practice of inviting respondents (whether from the 
same or different organisations) to rank a number of possible goals in order of 
priority. The resulting prioritizations are then used to statistically analyse the 
extent of agreement or difference. Goal priorities can be researcher selected 
(Jauch et al 1980, Lundin 2007), selected by senior managers (Witt 1998) or 
moderated by Delphi panels with the intention of increasing their practical 
relevance to respondents (Kristof-Brown and Stevens 2001, Vancouver and 
Schmitt 1991, Vancouver, Millsap and Peters 1994). 
The goal priorities offered to respondents can appear to have a somewhat 
general character.  Brief and non-comprehensive examples include: Achieve 
career growth, satisfy the customer, upgrade the physical work environment 
(Witt 1998); Reducing unemployment, reducing expenditure on social 
assistance, following central government rules and regulations (Lundin 2007), 
increase students’ basic skills, increase breadth of courses, and increase cost 
effectiveness (Vancouver, Millsap and Peters 1994).  The extent to which the 
goal priorities described above are relevant to organisational practice or reflect 
the actual choices experienced by organisational actors is open to question. It is 
also unclear whether utilizing experienced choices from organisational contexts 
would influence the identification of goal incongruence. 
The process by which operative goals are established is contested in the 
literature.  Hall (1996, p.262) argues that operative goals are a: “derivation and 
distillation” of official goals and Perrow feels that operative goals are 
constructed and implemented by what he refers to as dominant groups (Perrow 
1986).  However Lipsky (1983) argues convincingly for the role of “street level 
bureaucrats” who may occupy relatively unimposing positions in the 
organizational hierarchy but who nevertheless have the discretion to establish 
ad-hoc policy and operative goals that can effectively subvert and supersede 
official goals.   
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Lipsky argues that goal conflict at the operational level of public sector agencies 
arises within an organisational context of confusion, ambiguity and conflict.  
According to Lipsky the goals of complex public sector organisations tend to 
have an “idealised dimension which make them difficult to achieve and 
confusing and complicated to approach” (Lipsky 1983, p.40).  In Lipsky’s view 
agency goals may be ambiguous because they have accumulated over time and 
reflect different policy concerns or objectives, or for the reason that 
organisations are unsure that approaches to service delivery will be successful 
and therefore hedge their bets by retaining multiple goals. However Agency 
goals may also conflict with each other: “because there is such fundamental 
disagreement among constituents of ... policy that [government] has never been 
willing to address and resolve the conflict directly” (Lipsky 1983 p. 41). 
These issues lead Lipsky to reject the assumption that employees generally 
conform to organisational expectations and share organisational goals:   
What if workers do not share the objectives of their superiors? Low-
level participants in organizations often do not share the perspectives 
and preferences of their superiors and hence in some respects cannot 
be thought to be working toward stated agency goals. One can expect 
a distinct degree of noncompliance if lower-level workers interests 
differ from the interests of those at higher levels... (Lipsky 1983, 
p.16). 
Lipsky’s argument that the formally stated goals of public agencies may not 
coincide with the operative goals of the individuals and groups who are 
responsible for service delivery resonates with Scott’s emphasis on the 
distinction between professed and actual goals.  Scott describes two dimensions 
of goal congruence: 
First, there is frequently a disparity between the stated and the ‘real’ 
goals pursued by organisations – between the professed or official 
goals that are announced and the actual or operative goals that can be 
observed to govern the activities of participants.  Second...even when 
the stated goals are actually being pursued, they are never the only 
goals governing participants behaviour (Scott 1987, p.52). 
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 The distinction between formal and operative goals provides for three possible 
‘dimensions’ of goal congruence:  Firstly there is the extent of congruence 
between the formal goals of the organisation or network (formal-formal goal 
congruence), secondly the extent of congruence between formal and operative 
goals (formal-operative goal congruence) and finally the extent of congruence 
between operative goals themselves (operative-operative goal congruence).  In 
particular, as operative goals might not be constructed uniformly across all 
organisational or network constituencies there may be significant inter-
constituency discrepancies in operative goals which reduces inter-constituency 
operative-operative goal congruence.  
 
Empirical Analysis of Goal Incongruence  
How does the empirical literature approach the study of goal incongruence?  The 
section presents an overview of the qualitative literature. It then moves on to a 
detailed discussion of the way that empirical studies have conceptualised goal 
incongruence and the research designs that they utilised to study the 
phenomenon. The empirical literature (outlined in figure 2.1 overleaf) 
conceptualises goal congruence in two distinct forms.  The first recognised 
categorical differences between goals and attempts to incorporate these 
differences into their research designs, while the other does not consider the 
aetiology of organisational goals and conceptualises them in terms of 
undifferentiated menus of choices or values to which individuals can attach 
greater or lesser significance.  
The majority of quantitative authors also appear to conceptualise goal 
congruence as operating in a dyadic (or dualist) manner.  The dyads explored 
include organisation – organisation (Lundin 2007), supervisor – subordinate 
(Bozeman and Kingsley 2001), member – constituency (Witt 1998), and 
constituency – constituency (Abernathy and Stoelwinder 1994). Qualitative 
authors attempt to provide a pluralistic account of goal congruence that rests on 
thick descriptions of the meanings ascribed by organisational constituencies to 
formal and operative goals.   
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Figure 2.1 Overview of the Empirical Literature on Goal Congruence  
Source Definition of 
GI 
Conception of 
GI 
Indicators of 
GI 
Research 
Design 
Street, Vinter 
and Perrow 
(1966) 
Agreement 
between senior 
executives and 
staff on the 
goals of the 
organisation 
Congruence 
between goals 
as: 
-Official 
mandates 
- Outputs to 
external agents 
-Personal and 
group 
commitments 
-Essential 
constraints built 
into the 
organisation 
 
Inferred from 
observed 
behaviour and 
service 
provision and 
congruence of 
goals expressed 
in interview and 
survey 
Mixed method 
multiple 
longitudinal 
case study 
Sills (1957) Extent of 
agreement 
between the 
organisation 
and the 
individual 
member as to 
legitimate 
means and ends 
 
 
Congruence of 
the views of the 
organisation 
and individual 
members of 
legitimate 
means and ends 
Beliefs actions 
and statements 
of individuals 
and the formal 
policy 
objectives of 
the organisation 
Qualitative 
ethnographic 
case study of a 
single voluntary 
organisation 
Bozeman and 
Kingsley 
(1998) 
Extent of Goal 
Clarity within 
an organisation 
-Clearly defined 
goals, tasks and 
mission 
 
Opinions of 
Senior and 
Middle 
Managers 
Statistical 
analysis of 
survey results 
to test 
hypothesis 
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Source Definition of 
GI 
Conception of 
GI 
Indicators of 
GI 
Research 
Design 
Abernathy and 
Stoelwinder 
(1994) 
Extent of 
conflict 
between 
professional 
orientation and 
the control 
environment 
-Professional 
orientation 
-Control 
environment 
-Job satisfaction 
-Sub-unit 
performance 
-Role conflict Statistical 
analysis of 
survey results 
to test 
hypotheses 
Lundin, (2007) Extent of 
agreement 
between 
managers in 
separate dyadic 
organisations in 
the importance 
of certain goals 
13 specific 
societal, 
organisation 
centered and 
client centered 
goals selected 
by the 
researcher  
Differential 
ranking of the 
importance of 
research-
selected goals 
Statistical 
analysis of 
survey results 
to test 
hypotheses 
Meyers, 
Riccucci and 
Lurie, (2001) 
Extent of 
agreement 
between the 
formal goals of 
policy officials 
and the 
operating goals 
of 
implementing 
agencies and 
managers 
Local 
understanding 
of  
-Formal policy 
goals 
- Agency 
priorities 
- Operative 
performance 
goals used to 
judge the 
performance of 
front-line staff 
 Congruence 
between formal 
policy goals 
and: 
-Staff 
understanding 
of policy goals 
-staff 
understanding 
of the actual 
priorities of 
organisations 
-Operative 
goals against 
which front-line 
worker’s 
performance is 
judged 
Comparative 
case studies to 
address 
research 
questions 
 
Data collection 
by interview of 
multiple 
managers and 
staff within 
each case study 
organisations 
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Source Definition of 
GI 
Conception of 
GI 
Indicators of 
GI 
Research 
Design 
Witt, (1998) Extent of 
agreement in 
the goal 
priorities of 
supervisors and 
direct 
subordinates 
Congruence 
between the 
priorities of 
supervisors and 
their direct 
subordinates: 
Congruence 
between the 
priorities of 
direct 
subordinates 
and their peers 
Supervisors 
evaluation of 
subordinate’s 
performance 
 
Congruence of 
5-8 non-
operational 
goals suggested 
by survey 
respondents 
 
 
Statistical 
analysis of 
survey results 
to test 
hypotheses 
Vancouver, 
Millsap and 
Peters (1994) 
Agreement 
among 
organisational 
employees on 
the importance 
of the goals the 
organisations 
could be 
pursuing 
 
 
14 researcher 
selected 
societal, 
organisation 
focused and 
client focused 
goals 
moderated by a 
‘Delphi’ panel 
Goal 
congruence 
between 
Principal and 
teacher 
(Between 
constituency 
goal 
congruence) 
-Goal 
congruence 
between 
teachers 
(Within 
constituency 
goal 
congruence) 
Statistical 
analysis of 
survey results 
to test 
hypotheses 
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Source Definition of 
GI 
Conception of 
GI 
Indicators of 
GI 
Research 
Design 
Kristof-Brown 
and Stevens, 
(2001) 
The congruence 
between 
personal goals 
and the 
perception of 
the personal 
goals of team 
members 
-Congruence of 
Performance 
goals  
 
-Congruence of 
Mastery goals 
Self- reported 
personal goals 
compared to 
performance in 
social science 
experiment 
Statistical 
analysis of 
experiment  
 
 
Bohte and 
Meier, (2000) 
Goal 
Displacement 
(organisational 
cheating)  
 
Operative goals 
are congruent 
with attaining 
adequate output 
measures but 
are incongruent 
with attaining 
the formal goals 
of the 
organisation 
Discrepancies 
in the activity 
and output 
performance 
data which are 
consistent with 
organisational 
cheating 
Forensic 
analysis of 
published 
performance 
data (both 
activity and 
output) 
 
The exception to this dualistic / pluralistic conception of goal congruence is 
Rainey and Steinbauer (1999), who use their unusually comprehensive data set 
to present findings on patterns of goal congruence in multiple dyads embedded 
within specific organisations within a particular organisational field (within 
constituency, between constituency, member - constituency and supervisor-
subordinate goal congruence). 
The definitions of goal congruence in the empirical literature follow those 
described in the theoretical literature, that is the congruence of agreement with 
regard to possible organisational goals.  However it is important to note that a 
majority of empirical papers retain control of the definition of goal congruence 
by only allowing organisational actors to respond or react to researcher selected 
goals (Lundin 2007; Witt 1998). Bozeman and Kingsley (2001) imposed goals 
selected by senior management while Rainey and Steinbauer (1999) used a 
Delphi panel to moderate original research questions.  This raises the possibility 
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that the results gained by such a method bear no relation to the actual goals that 
direct and constrain behaviour within organisations. Such a research design may 
be able to identify a correlation between goal congruence and organisational 
performance / improvement, but not a causal relationship as it cannot 
demonstrate the goals analysed are those which motivate behaviours of actors 
which occur within organisational contexts.  
Abernathy and Stoelwinder (1994) utilised a research design intended to 
establish the degree of goal congruence between professionals and the 
organisation in a healthcare environment. Their method established professional 
orientation by asking five questions, three of which focused on respondents 
desire to publish research in peer reviewed academic journals.  Physicians and 
nurses who did not attach high importance to publishing research were marked 
as having a low professional orientation.   
Rather than impose an external measure of goal congruence, Witt (1998) asked 
senior managers in case study organisations to provide between 5 and 8 non-
operational goals which illustrated senior management’s view of organisational 
value priorities.  These formed the basis of the measurement of goal congruence 
among first-line supervisors and their direct reports. They included statements 
such as: “be seen by our customers as being the best at what we do; be an 
organisations that people want to work for; use supplies e.g. paper, pencils, 
paper-clips wisely; work as a team to get the job done” (Witt 1998, p.624).  
Lundin (2007), in surveying Swedish employment agency dyads only presents 
data collected from one manager in each organisation.  This research limitation 
is identified and its implications discussed. Rainey and Steinbauer (1999) 
collected a minimum of 76 responses per organisation surveyed (1 principal and 
at least 75 teachers).  
 
Qualitative	  Case	  Studies	  of	  Goal	  Incongruence	  
Qualitative case studies are utilised by Street, Vintner and Perrow (1966), Sills 
(1957) and Meyer Riccucci and Lurie (2001).  In each of these cases thick 
descriptions of inter constituency goal congruence are provided which discuss 
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the interaction of different categories of goals (formal and operative, or means-
ends chains) on organisational behaviour.  Measures of goal congruence derive 
from data collected by interview and participant observation that describes the 
meanings organisational actors attach to work and organisational life.  Street 
Vintner and Perrow (1966) triangulate interview and participant observation data 
with survey results to enable a more robust description of goal congruence’s role 
in organisational performance to be extended.  It is important to note that these 
qualitative studies appear to attach far more importance to establishing that 
accounts of goal congruence are authentic and reflect the experience of actors 
within case study organisations who may not enjoy senior or middle manager 
positions. 
 
 The Volunteers 
Sills (1957) presents a case study of a single voluntary organisation, the National 
Foundation for Infantile Paralysis, at the time the largest voluntary organisation 
in the United States measured by popular membership and annual budget.  The 
study focuses on the operation of the Foundation’s local organisations that were 
distinctive in that volunteers and not professional managers directed them, as 
would be the case in public and private sector organisations of a corresponding 
scale. 
In addressing this central concern Sills is interested to explore the interaction 
(and potential conflict) between the top-down goals of the organisations and the 
bottom-up goals of the volunteers and to describe how the implementation of 
top-down goals are moderated, subverted or otherwise influenced by the actions 
and behaviours of volunteers. Fundamental to Sills conception of goal 
congruence is the view that the downward delegation of responsibility in large 
organisations creates the generic problem of goal preservation that is, how can 
organisations maintain a commitment to their original goals and purpose.   
Sills suggests that in order to accomplish their goals, organisations establish a set 
of procedures or means. In the course of following these procedures, the sub-
ordinates or members to whom authority and functions have been delegated 
often come to regard them as ends in themselves, rather than as means toward 
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the achievement of organization [al] goals.  As a result of this process, the actual 
activities of the organization become centered around the proper functioning of 
organization procedures, rather than on the achievement of the initial goals (Sills 
1957, p.62). This process results in the “displacement” of the original 
organisational goals by a new set (or sets) of goals. Unless the displaced original 
goals are formally and explicitly repudiated then a condition of goal 
incongruence will be created between the organisations due to the disparity 
between professed and actual goals.  
The ultimate source of goal displacement is understood to be the necessity to 
delegate responsibility for action to local or operational parts of the organisation.  
The actors to whom authority and responsibility is delegated are exposed to the 
influence of a number of institutional processes which act to shape goal 
displacement.  The first potential influence is their status within the organisation.  
Actors may attach greater importance to the maintenance and progression of 
their own position, status and indeed salary than achieving the goals of the 
organisation.  Second is their interpretation of organisational rules.   
Sills (1957) suggests that the personal and professional commitments required to 
enforce bureaucratic rules and procedures go beyond that which is strictly 
necessary to the point that complying and enforcing rules becomes more 
important than achieving the official goals of the organisation.  Third is their 
“execution of organizational procedures”.  This leads actors to identify their 
responsibility with the proximate goals of conducting procedures in an approved 
manner rather than the professed goals of achieving defined outcomes as a result 
of those processes.   
Fourth is their “relationship with other participants”. Sills recognises that in 
addition to the formal structures of organisations informal structures (groups) are 
likely to form, which will, to a certain extent, “act to protect their entrenched 
interests rather than assist their clientele” (Sills 1957, p.68). Informal groups 
might develop norms that are contradictory to purposive action to achieve the 
formal or original goals of the organisation. Finally their relationships with the 
public might lead them to moderate behaviours and goals, either to the 
advantage of individual members of the public or groups, or with the objective 
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of protecting or enhancing perceptions of the legitimacy or status of the 
delegated individual. 
Sills is silent on the active measurement of goal congruence. Instead goal 
congruence (in Sills’ terms goal preservation) is inferred from the success of the 
National Foundation in sustaining its goals over time.  This inference leads Sills 
to propose a number of control mechanisms that must inhibit the universal 
process of goal displacement. Sills describes the research as an Institutional 
Analysis.  The objective of the research was to compare the empirical findings 
of the research with prevalent institutional theory. The main data collection 
methods of institutional analysis are listed as witnessing day-to-day operations 
(participant observation), interviews with key personnel and examining the 
organization’s records. 
 
 The Analysis of Goals in Complex Organisations 
The Analysis of Goals in Complex Organisations is a journal article that presents 
an institutional analysis of goals and their congruence.  The article, published in 
the American Sociological Review, presented a theoretical framework derived 
from empirical evidence collected during Charles Perrow’s Doctoral research.  
Perrow’s PhD thesis was submitted in 1960 under the title Authority, Goals and 
Prestige in a General Hospital.  It consisted of the institutional analysis of a 300 
bed voluntary general hospital in a US city that operated on a non-profit basis.  
The purpose of the research was to: “inquire into the social conditions that effect 
organizational goals” (1960, p.1).  Perrow felt that the prevalent organisational 
literature took goals as unproblematic, partly because it did not recognise the 
social (or institutional) nature of organisations.   
Perrow quotes his PhD supervisor, Phillip Selznick, in order to explain his view 
of the differences between the concepts of organisation and institution: 
Organisations are technical instruments; designed as means to definite 
goals... they are expendable. Institutions... may be partly engineered, 
but they have also a “natural” dimension. They are the products of 
interaction and adaptation; they become the receptacles of group 
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idealism; they are less readily expendable. (Selznick, quoted in 
Perrow 1960, p.4) 
Perrow argues that institutions develop a particular character that is produced 
over time as a result of the interaction of influences caused by natural social 
forces from within and outside the institution. Explanations of institutionalised 
behaviour cannot be meaningful unless they incorporate accounts of how 
informal structures and relationships exert considerable influence on the pattern 
of institutional preferences, decisions and actions.   
Perrow’s research proposed that in institutions the: “unambiguous pursuit of 
official goals is not likely to be common” (Perrow 1961, p.21).  This proposition 
led Perrow to pose the question: “Where and how will official goals be 
subverted” (Perrow 1961, p.23). The empirical evidence provided by his 
Doctoral research led to the contrasting of official and unofficial goals. In his 
1961 publication unofficial goals had been renamed operational goals in 
recognition of the disproportionate influence unofficial or operative conceptions 
of ends have on the planning, conduct and control of work in institutional 
settings.  
Perrow explored the congruence between official and unofficial goals by 
analysing the policy-making levels of the case study organisation.  In essence 
this meant the leadership of the hospital.  In this Perrow appears to be consistent 
with the top-down view of goals expressed by the other authors reviewed in this 
work. However there are two important differences. Perrow argues that the 
hospital has multiple sources of leadership (the board of trustees drawn from the 
local community, senior physicians represented by the medical board and the 
director of the hospital whom the research refers to as the administrator).  
Therefore leadership and authority is not vested in a monolithic executive or 
executive core as it is in the other studies.  
Additionally, actors in a leadership position cannot act without regard to the 
values, norms and interests of their ‘constituents’ or without consideration of the 
response their actions might elicit from the leaders and constituents of other 
institutional groups. Perrow conceives institutional goals as being the: “product 
of complex interactions within and between the organization’s social structure, 
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leadership groups and environment. ... They are never static but subject to 
continual pressure and changes over time” (Perrow 1961, p.2). 
The phenomenon of goal congruence derives from the differential expression and 
outcomes of those complex interactions in particular institutional groups.  Perrow 
established the distinction between two types of organisational goal.  The first was 
the official goal that represented the: “general purposes of the organization as put 
forth in the charter, annual reports, public statements and other authoritative 
statements” (1961, p.855).  The second type of goal identified by Perrow was the 
unofficial or operative goals.  In order to identify unofficial (operative) goals 
Perrow suggests that researchers consider: 
What do individuals or groups of similarly hope to gain from 
participation in the affairs of the organization? Or, to use an 
awkward phrase we shall reiterate frequently, what are the uses to 
which they put the organisation? (Perrow 1960, p.16). 
Any uses that deviate from the official goals of the organisation (identified for the 
case study as patient care, medical teaching and medical research) are described as 
unofficial (1960) or operative (1961) goals.  It is important to realise that for 
Perrow unofficial and operative goals describe the same phenomenon.  The 
difference in words between the 1960 and 1961 publications represent a 
development in exposition rather than conceptualisation. 
 In order to illustrate how unofficial (read operative) goals might be identified by 
research Perrow suggests that: 
Some of these by-products [of official goals] may become so 
important to the participants who make up the institution as to 
constitute unofficial goals.  “I would not be interested in this hospital 
unless it...” did something or other.  “The trouble with this place is 
everyone is so concerned with” this or that pursuit. Where these 
blanks are not filled in with good patient care, teaching and research 
we have unofficial goals of some group or individual, and thus we 
have uses to which the institution is put other than the avowed ones. 
(Perrow 1960, p. 15.  Emphasis in the original). 
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Perrow conducts a qualitative case study of a single organisation.  However, due 
to the belief that institutions develop a character over time, the case study 
incorporates a detailed history of the organisation (from its inception in 1887) 
that describes the evolution of the official goals of the hospital and how they 
reflect internal and external events.   Such a history might seem unusual from a 
modern perspective but Perrow is insistent that the past:  
Covers the history and tradition, the precedents and established 
commitments involved in all past action.  These limit, though not 
determine, the present actions that any one group may take.  If any single 
thing deserved the designation “the institution” or “the hospital” it would 
be this.”  (Perrow 1960, p. 14) 
 In this statement Perrow appears to suggest the institutional history as the 
dominant discourse in establishing institutional behaviour. 
 
 Organization for Treatment 
A similar approach is presented by Street, Vintner and Perrow (1966) in their 
book, Organization for Treatment. These authors set out to evaluate the 
effectiveness of juvenile correctional institutions in the United States. The 
research on which conclusions are drawn was conducted in six separate 
institutions over a period of two years.  As such it attempts to operate at two 
levels of institutional analysis (Scott 1981), the single organisation and the 
organisational field.  The authors describe their research purpose as the: 
“evaluation of the effects of those institutions that have the goal of changing 
human personality and human values so that their clients can participate 
effectively in the larger society” (1966, p.v).  Effectiveness is measured on the 
basis of the ability of ‘people changing organisations’ to prepare inmates for a 
successful return to society.  The evaluation is between organising correctional 
institutions around concepts of treatment and rehabilitation versus custody and 
correction.   
The authors openly acknowledge that they are far from neutral on the most 
appropriate method for organising people-changing organisations and advocate 
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organisation around conceptions of treatment and rehabilitation as a matter of 
principle and pragmatism.  The research focuses on the congruence of goals 
values and norms within and between organisations and the influence of such 
congruence on the success (in the author’s terms) of study institutions in 
implementing and sustaining humane regimes organised around the treatment 
and rehabilitation of inmates.  In particular the empirical research strategy 
focuses on the role of the executive in conceiving particular (treatment) ends and 
then implementing the means to achieve that end within an organisation where 
‘rank and file’ staff may not share a commitment to selected ends or means 
(formal and operative goals).   
Street Vintner and Perrow define goal incongruence as the: Possible contradictions 
between goals and [the] structured conflicts [which] might arise as new goals are 
introduced. (Street, Vintner and Perrow 1966, p.17). 
Goals rooted in value and belief systems that have the ability to influence the 
behaviour actions and decisions of individuals and organisations.  As we have 
already described, the authors perceive a contest between values and beliefs 
centered on treatment and those that emphasise custody.  Such values and beliefs 
incorporate societal discourses with humane, political religious and professional 
strands.  The authors perceived that treatment values and beliefs were spreading 
among correctional institutions, but with disappointing speed due to the 
resistance encountered from individuals, groups and institutional practices which 
acted to resist the change.  Goal consensus, which might predict organisational 
performance, therefore depended on the values and beliefs of those within the 
organisation.  Goal consensus might exist within executive groups and staff 
groups or between those groups.  Equally the goals of policy makers, external 
institutions (such as the police, courts etc.) and the values and local public 
opinion might also exert an influence on the competition of ideas between 
treatment and custody. 
The research design is intended to: “examine and explain the variations within 
and among residential institutions” (Street Vintner and Perrow 1966, p.vii). The 
study was intended to be comparative and comprehensive.  Comparative because 
six organisations were studied, each at two points in time, and comprehensive 
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because the goals norms and values of senior executives, rank and file staff and 
inmates were collected. 
The analysis of the institutions utilised a number of methods.  The data 
collection began with a preliminary period of observation and interviewing of 
executives, rank and file staff members and inmates. This led to the development 
of separate questionnaires for executives, staff and inmates. These 
questionnaires were administered twelve months apart in each organisation, but 
were not used to provide longitudinal data.  Formal and informal interviewing 
and lengthy informal conversations supported the questionnaires with 
executives, participant observation and the coding of evidence provided by 
relevant organisational documents. In addition, a training seminar was organised 
in each organisation to provide interim feedback on the initial questionnaire and 
to increase staff commitment to the completion of the second questionnaire.  
The study adopts a phenomological theoretical perspective.  The research 
attempts to describe the goals, norms, values and practices of correctional 
institutions as an experienced social phenomenon.  The authors seek to:  "present 
the definitions of the situation as seen by the actors involved.  The richness of 
detail is designed...to represent the institutional context" (Street, Vintner and 
Perrow 1966, p. viii).  
 
Achieving Goal Congruence in Complex Environments 
Meyers Riccucci and Lurie (2001) conduct a similar qualitative analysis of 
welfare services in three counties in separate US states (Michigan, Georgia and 
Texas) in order to address the questions:  
Is it possible to achieve and maintain congruent goals among actors 
in complex, intergovernmental and multi-organizational policy 
systems? If so, what conditions foster greater congruence in goals? If 
not, what are the consequences for the performance of public 
programmes and for the achievement of policy objectives? (Meyers, 
Riccucci and Lurie 2001, p.166) 
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The background to the research is provided by the 1996 Personal Responsibility 
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act that reformed the US welfare delivery 
system by delegating responsibility for establishing welfare policy goals from 
Federal to State governments, creating what the authors describe as a natural 
experiment.  The experiment is particularly relevant to an investigation of the 
role of goal congruence as one of the motivations for the reform legislation was 
the perception that local delivery of welfare services had become uncoupled 
from welfare policy devised at the federal level. The delegation of goal setting to 
state governments was intended to facilitate the effective implementation of 
policy goals.  
The research develops the earlier institutional literature in that it recognises that 
public services are frequently delivered not by single organisations but by 
networks of cooperating organisations (referred to as multi-organizational policy 
systems). Networks were selected to participate in the research on the basis of 
two characteristics; the perceived complexity of their policy goals, and their 
institutional complexity.  Policy goal complexity was defined by the presence of 
consistent and stable policy goals established at the State level.  Institutional 
complexity was defined by whether welfare services were delivered by multiple 
agencies in a loosely coupled system (high) or a single agency or a tightly 
coupled system (low).  The three networks selected each described a different 
possible configuration of policy goal and institutional complexity.  
The research was unable to present meaningful performance data for the three 
networks.  In consequence the third research question, what effect does goal 
incongruence have on organisational performance, was not addressed, although 
some inferences are tentatively suggested.  This issue will be developed in the 
critical evaluation of the paper. 
Meyers Riccucci and Lurie present two complimentary definitions of goal 
congruence.  The first is intended to explicate the purpose of researching goal 
congruence.  They suggest that:  “the congruence of the goals that motivate and 
direct the efforts of actors within organisational systems as a criterion for 
comparing and evaluating the organisation of multiple interests within public 
sector organisations” (Meyers Riccucci and Lurie 2001, p.169).  Goal 
congruence should be recognised empirically by: “the extent of agreement by the 
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official or formal policy goals of political officials and the operative goals of the 
organisations or networks charged with delivering that policy” (Meyers, 
Riccucci and Lurie 2001. p.170).  Thus Meyers et al appear to adopt Perrow’s 
theoretical framework of official and operative goals.  This provides continuity 
with the early institutional literature on the influence of goal congruence in 
determining organisational performance.   
Meyers, Riccucci and Lurie cite the academic literature to support three 
propositions concerning goal congruence.  Firstly goal congruence is positively 
related to network performance.  Secondly the presence of goal congruence is 
more likely in simple institutional arrangements.  Thirdly the presence of goal 
congruence is more likely where policy objectives are consistent.  As we have 
indicated the second and third, but not the first of the propositions are tested by 
the research design.  Meyers, Riccucci and Lurie provide comprehensive 
information with regard to the bases employed for the measurement of goal 
congruence.  Their objective in measuring goal congruence was to identify the: 
“extent of congruence between formal policy goals and operative goals at the 
network and agency level” (Meyers Riccucci and Lurie 2001, p.173).  This was 
achieved by evaluating four aspects of goal congruence:  
Formal goals espoused by policy officials described in state statutes, 
policy documents and public pronouncements of formal policy makers 
at State and County level.  
Local understanding of formal policy goals which were tested by 
questioning officials, managers and workers as to their understanding of 
the formal goals espoused by policy officials. 
Agency Priorities, defined as operational priorities that are believed to 
drive the day-to-day work of the agency.  
Operative Goals, defined as the standards against which staff members 
judge, and are judged, with regard to performance.  (Meyers,  Riccucci 
and Lurie 2001, p. 177) 
The study appears to adopt, but then modify, Perrow’s definition of official (here 
referred to as formal) and operative goals. For Meyers et al. the goals of external 
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policy makers are ‘formal’ and the goals of agencies are ‘operative’. Perrow is 
more likely to have argued that both policy makers and delivery agencies would 
possess official (formal) goals and those directly involved in organising the work 
of welfare delivery (managers and workers) would also possess operative goals.  
This distinction has significant implications for the design of goal congruence 
research. 
The final point to be discussed here flows from the last.  Meyers et al make no 
attempt to describe the extent or nature of intra-organisational goal congruence 
by examining between constituency goal congruence.  They are explicit that they 
are concerned with: “goal congruence at the organisational level” (Meyers, 
Riccucci and Lurie 2001, p.175). Their research is therefore unsuited to 
exploring the role of differential values, beliefs, norms and practices that occur 
within organisations. The research seeks to present a monolithic, unitary view of 
organisations that is explicitly and implicitly criticised by Perrow, Sills and 
Street et al.    
Meyers, Riccucci and Lurie adopt a comparative case study research design.  
The unit of analysis is the network, not the organisation. The network 
incorporates those responsible for formulating and communicating policy goals 
at the state level and the agencies (private or public) responsible for organising 
the work of finding employment, providing cash assistance and organising and 
funding child care for individuals who are eligible for welfare support. The 
studied networks are categorised by the complexity of their institutional 
structures and the stability of the overarching policy goals selected at state level.  
The data collection method was comprised by semi-structured interviews with 
officials, managers and front line workers within welfare agencies.  
The research was successful in identifying different degrees of goal congruence 
in the case study networks.  In addition lower institutional complexity and lower 
policy goal complexity were associated with higher levels of goal congruence 
(although the small sample size limits the generalisations which can be sustained 
by these findings).  The impression gained in reading the paper is that the 
authors had formed the view that goal congruence was linked to performance: 
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These differences [in goal congruence] suggest that the congruence of 
operative goals may matter, not only for the achievement of policy 
objectives but for the achievement of effective and innovative public 
organisations. ... These cases do suggest ... that conditions that support 
greater congruence between formal policy and operative goals at the 
agency level may have payoffs in terms of staff morale and 
commitment (Meyers, Riccucci and Lurie 2001, p.199). 
However the research does not establish a link between goal congruence and 
organisational performance.  This is due to the unavailability of performance 
data for the case study organisations. 
 
A Conceptual Framework for Goal Incongruence  
This section will present the study’s conceptual framework for the analysis of 
the sources of goal incongruence within a network context. It will begin by 
describing the challenges inherent in the conceptualisation, identification and 
analysis of goal incongruence.  It will then summarise the perceived limitations 
of existing research on the subject of goal incongruence and discuss how the 
conceptualisation of goal incongruence developed by the study addresses those 
limitations. 
The identification and analysis of goal incongruence demands that a number of 
foundational questions are answered before the researcher can have any 
confidence that their empirical enquiry or theoretical analysis is robust.  The first 
question is to ask; what is meant by the term organisations goal? This work has 
used Scott’s definition of goals as: “conceptions of desired ends” (Scott 1987, 
p.18). However, as has been described, this definition glosses over problems 
caused by the imprecise ontological status of organisational goals. Imprecise 
because goals may refer to both enacted and intended or desired ends.  How can 
conceptions of organisational goals and the research that rests on those 
conceptions make meaningful distinctions between latent, aspirational and 
enacted goals?   If organisational actors possess access to a wide repertoire of 
goals then isn’t it likely that only a sub-set of this repertoire will be enacted? 
Those goals that are attain an objective facticity in the behaviours and practices 
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intended to realise conceptions of desired ends. However organisational actors 
may still experience a profound commitment to those goals that are not enacted 
but remain potential or aspirational.  This reflects the enduring issue of how to 
distinguish between sentiment and action (Mitchell 1996, 2002). 
Secondly what, specifically, constitutes incongruence between organisational 
goals?  In chapter two we described contradictions in the literature between early 
authors who generally found goal incongruence established in contradiction and 
later authors who favoured the more easily satisfied test of difference. Whether 
difference or contradiction is taken as the criteria of incongruence, it still 
remains for the researcher to explain how they will recognise evidence of 
difference or contradiction.  In other words what do they count as convincing 
evidence that the criteria of incongruence have been met?  
Third is the issue of how to draw boundaries around goals.  A convincing theory 
of goal congruence should rest on a coherent definition of organisational goals 
that is both theoretically consistent and empirically meaningful.  However the 
vast literature on organisational goals is characterised by a wide variety of 
approaches to description and categorisation. Perhaps the most persistent 
categorical distinction is that of  “professed and operational goals” suggested by 
Selznick (1943) and developed by Perrow (1960, 1961, 1967, 1976).  This 
distinction has been explained in the following terms;   
There is frequently a disparity between the stated and the ‘real’ goals 
pursued by organisations – between the professed or official goals that 
are announced and the actual or operative goals that can be observed 
to govern the activities of participants (Scott 1987, p.52).   
However the literature is almost over-burdened with competing categorisations 
of organisational goals, which jostle for attention and seem, in aggregate, to 
reduce rather than increase clarity and understanding of the issue. 
Finally, if we are to avoid reifying organisational goals, how are we to draw 
convincing boundaries around the individuals who carry those goals within 
organisations?  Responses to this question have included comparing the goal 
preferences of the individual with other individuals, comparing individuals to a 
group (in which they may or may not have membership status), making 
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comparisons between groups and finally comparing the degree of congruence 
between either individual or group goals with overarching organisational goals.  
How should research frameworks accommodate the multiplicity, complexity and 
ambiguity of goals expressed by individuals and groups in complex and 
extensive public networks?   
This is the shifting ground on which theories of goal congruence must present 
convincing accounts of the extent of agreement on the importance of specific 
goals between groups of organisational actors. Against this research background 
it has been vital to develop a conceptual framework capable of testing whether 
empirical evidence indicates the presence of goal incongruence. The conceptual 
framework is utilized to evaluate the evidence for goal incongruence in a 
rigorous and systematic manner and warrant subsequent claims. 
The conceptual framework developed by this study addresses four perceived 
limitations found in later research on goal incongruence in public organisations.  
The suggested limitations are that: 
1. Goal Incongruence is defined by difference 
2. Evidence for Goal Incongruence does not derive from organisationally 
enacted behaviours and therefore its relevance to organisational practice 
cannot be assured 
3. Accounts of goal incongruence do not recognise categorical differences 
between formal and operative goals. (there is generally no analysis of the 
nature of incongruence, merely that it exists or otherwise) 
4. Research on goal incongruence is grounded within an organisational 
perspective and does not address the network context 
The conceptual framework addresses these perceived limitations by: 
1. Defining goal incongruence as contradiction  
2. Drawing evidence for goal incongruence from secure organisational 
contexts   
3. Reinstating the earlier convention of the categorical description and 
analysis of incongruence between formal and operative goals 
4. Presenting representations of goal incongruence within a network context 
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Each of these four components of the conceptual framework will be dealt with in 
subsequent sub-sections 
 
 Incongruence is Contradiction 
In chapter two we traced the transition from conceptions of goal incongruence 
based on the criteria of contradiction to conceptions of contradiction based on 
the criteria of difference. A great majority of later research dispenses with the 
need to establish contradiction (meaning that action to achieve a particular goal 
impedes, deflects, alters or subverts the attainment of others) in favour of 
adopting difference as the test of incongruence. Difference is usually established 
by inviting respondents to rank possible goals in order of importance and 
comparing results. Findings of difference are assumed to be sufficient to infer 
incongruence.   
However this study suggests that difference is an unsatisfactory and unreliable 
indicator of incongruence.  In the context of the case study network members of 
the Police Service may focus on operative goals of detecting crimes while 
members of the Crown Prosecution Service may concentrate on making 
charging decisions and prosecuting trials. From a nominal and textual 
perspective these goals clearly exhibit difference.  If we were to apply the most 
common method for establishing goal incongruence employed by the literature – 
asking respondents to rank goals which include detecting crimes, making 
charging decisions, prosecuting trials etc. in order of importance – we might 
reasonably expect differential prioritizations and infer the existence of goal 
incongruence.  Members of the police might be expected to exhibit a preference 
for detecting crimes, while their counterparts in the Crown Prosecution Service 
might promote the importance of effective and efficient charging.  
Does this speculative example really provide convincing evidence for 
incongruence?  This study suggests that far from establishing that difference is 
an adequate and sufficient indicator of goal incongruence it demonstrates its 
unsuitability as a criterion for identifying goal incongruence.  In the example 
given above difference between the Police and Crown Prosecution services may 
be real, but complimentary. That is difference is produced by a variation in 
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means that are intended to achieve (at least to some extent) the common ends of 
the Criminal Justice System. Empirical difference in this case reflects no more 
than professional and task specialisations within the public network responsible 
for the delivering the Criminal Justice System.  
To utilise to a more prosaic metaphor to explore the issue of task specialisation 
more thoroughly, the incongruence is difference school are likely to find a 
symphony orchestra highly incongruent. They would doubtlessly find evidence 
for dissonant priority ordering between woodwind, strings brass and so on.  
Analysis might further probe difference within and between the instrument 
groups, possibly finding complex empirical patterns that hint at the sources of 
ubiquitous dissonance. Those findings might well be empirically valid. They 
would not be imagined or contrived but would reflect real differences in the 
priority orderings of the orchestra’s members.  However what the data would not 
do is indicate incongruence. It would merely show that in order to meet the 
common purpose of the orchestra to the greatest possible extent, individual 
members are required to follow a strategy of task specialisation.          
For this reason the conceptual framework developed and applied in this work 
does not accept that difference is synonymous with incongruence.  It goes 
beyond established conceptions in insisting that difference between goals must 
also be demonstrated to be contradictory.  Contradiction is confirmed when it 
can be demonstrated to give rise to organisational consequences whereby action 
to attain particular goals impedes, deflects, alters or subverts action to attain 
other formal or operative goals of organisations with the effect of moderating or 
subordinating organisational purposes.  
That may occur where an organisation, in the attempt to optimize its own 
efficiency, takes decisions and actions that have negative consequences for the 
efficiency of other network organisations.  Of-course it is perfectly possible that 
professional and task specialisation may lead to contradiction. The goals of the 
Police and Crown Prosecution Services described in the example on the 
preceding page might quite possibly lead to decisions and actions that are indeed 
experienced as contradictory.  The police might allocate resources in such a way 
to maximise the number of crimes that are detected but minimise the quality of 
the files that are transferred to the Crown Prosecution Service.  
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However the study contends that this potential contradiction is just that, 
potential.  Incongruence is not an inevitable implication of difference.  Therefore 
difference on its own cannot by taken to be synonymous with or evidence of 
goal incongruence. Furthermore difference is an unreliable indicator of goal 
incongruence. It tends to overstate the degree of incongruence where task 
specialisations are a feature of the empirical context.  As task specialisation is so 
frequently encountered in modern organisation it could be argued that adopting 
the incongruence is difference approach to the study of goal incongruence would 
create an almost ubiquitous account of the presence of goal incongruence.  Such 
an account would be empirically incorrect and theoretically misleading.  The 
‘noise’ produced by task specialisation would drown out the ‘signal’ of 
meaningful (that is contradictory) goal incongruence. 
Existing conceptions of goal incongruence accept difference between goals as a 
sufficient for establishing incongruence.  The conceptual framework developed 
and applied in this work does not accept that difference is synonymous with 
incongruence.  Instead it rejects the ‘incongruence is difference’ view as being 
unsatisfactory and unreliable.  It replaces it by reinstating the earlier position of 
Selznick and Perrow that ‘incongruence is contradiction’.  That is it insists that 
difference between goals must also be demonstrated to be contradictory to 
support claims of incongruence. Contradiction is confirmed when it can be 
demonstrated to give rise to organisational consequences whereby action to 
attain particular goals impedes, deflects, alters or subverts action to attain other 
formal or operative goals of organisations with the effect of moderating 
organisational purposes.   
 
 Incongruence is Enacted 
Identifying contradiction as the signifier of goal incongruence requires an 
explanation and a justification of how contradiction between goals should be 
recognised empirically. One approach would be to allow organisational actors to 
self-report perceived contradiction.   
This is indeed the approach for identifying goal congruence adopted by the 
majority of quantitative studies of the phenomenon.  They seek to establish the 
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consistent prioritisation / selection of goals by organisational actors from a menu 
of goals or values provided by the researchers.  The dyads explored include 
organisation – organisation (Lundin 2007), supervisor – subordinate (Bozeman 
and Kingsley 2001), member – constituency (Witt 1998) and constituency – 
constituency (Abernathy and Stoelwinder 1994).  The exception to this strictly 
dualistic conception of goal congruence is Rainey & Steinbauer (1999) who 
present findings on patterns of goal congruence in multiple dyads embedded 
within specific organisations within a particular organisational field (within 
constituency, between constituency, member – constituency and supervisor-
subordinate goal congruence). 
However, this approach gives rise to two methodological concerns. The first is 
that organisational actors are responding to a menu of goals that are researcher-
selected. The preference orderings respondents are asked to furnish have an 
unclear relationship to organisational practice. Secondly it remains unclear 
whether respondents are indicating their preferences for goals that they are 
pursuing, would like to pursue, believe that they should pursue, or believe that 
others believe they should pursue. In short the relevance of order rankings to 
organisational contexts and practices is open to question.  It is not clear whether 
preference rankings are intended to reflect the enacted, intended, desired or 
expected domains of organisational practice.  
Once again an earlier generation of authors exhibited a very different approach 
to the identification of goal incongruence. They recognised different categories 
of goal, for example professed and operative goals (Selznick) and Formal and 
Operative goals (Perrow). Rather than simply asking respondents to prioritise the 
importance of a range of potential goals these researchers established actual 
differences between formal and operative goals. This enabled a richer empirical 
description and theoretical analysis of the phenomena of goal incongruence.  
Authors could describe and explain multiple dimensions of goal incongruence. 
Their research was also firmly placed within secure organisational contexts, 
descriptions of what organisational actors actually do (operative goals) and what 
organisations claim they do (formal goals). 
This study suggests that it is preferable for contradiction to be evidenced by 
descriptions of operational consequences within organisational contexts.  That is 
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contradiction and therefore goal incongruence is established when it is 
demonstrated to impede, deflect, alter or subvert organisational purposes. As 
such contradictions between organisational goals must attain an objective 
facticity (Berger and Luckman 1967) expressed in organisational practice.    
This empirical strategy marginalizes latent contradictions between possible, 
potential or aspired-to organisational goals. For example, contradictions between 
goals rooted in ideological commitments to conceptions of punitive or 
restorative justice, or between professional adherences to the practice of 
particular task specialisations. These latent differences and potential 
contradictions will only constitute evidence for goal incongruence where they 
are enacted in organisational practice and produce evidence that they deflect, 
impede, alter or subvert organisational purposes, that is they create operational 
consequences.  
The conceptual framework articulates criteria for recognising contradictory goals 
and a methodological approach for inferring operative goals. Contradiction is 
indicated when there is evidence that goal orientated behaviour acts to disrupt, 
impede or deflect the attainment of other formal or operative goals. Operative 
goals and their consequences are inferred from observed behaviour. Operative 
goals are only inferred when they attain an “objective facticity”. This was 
empirically and theoretically relevant because it ensured that the conceptual 
framework screened operative goals that are not enacted (but are intended, 
desired or claimed).   
The conceptual framework eliminated operative goals that were aspirational or 
potential. For example ends that were deemed desirable but were not enacted, or 
self-reported goals intended to present individuals and groups in favourable 
terms, either to themselves or others. This grounded empirical claims within 
organisational practice and secure network contexts. We respectfully suggest 
that limiting the analysis of goal incongruence to enacted goal-orientated 
behaviours has the potential for significant influence on empirical and 
theoretical accounts of goal incongruence. 
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 Dimensions of goal incongruence 
The conceptual framework adopts the established categorisation of formal and 
operative goals. Perrow developed this distinction, suggesting two categories of 
organisational goals, formal goals and operative goals.   
The advantage of this approach (over nominal prioritisations of specific goals) is 
that it grounds goal incongruence within organisational practice. The recognition 
of formal and operative goals also enables conclusions to be drawn not simply 
for the binary presence of incongruence, but for the nature of that incongruence.  
Adopting the categories of formal and operative goals gives a tripartite 
conception of the possible  ‘dimensions’ of goal incongruence.  These are: 
1. Incongruence between formal goals 
2. Incongruence between operative goals 
3. Incongruence between formal and operative goals 
 
 The Network Context    
The multiple conception of goal incongruence (formal – formal incongruence, 
formal – operative incongruence and operative – operative incongruence) does 
not take into account the organisational contexts that frame the empirical 
phenomenon of goal incongruence. This work suggests that the framing 
empirical context is a particularly important component of goal incongruence in 
the complex organisational contexts encountered in network arrangements. 
It has been argued that the increasing focus on the importance of network 
arrangements is a response to: “the emergence of a class of problems whose 
causes are so complex, and whose solutions are so multi-factorial, that they 
require a multi-agency response" (Ling 2002 p.622).  Whilst the author accepts 
that the complexity of some public services provides a rationale for network 
arrangements, this work suggests that complexity of service is not an exclusive 
cause for the development of network arrangements.    
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Frequently tasks, which are regarded as routine and unexceptional, require a 
significant degree of co-ordinated endeavour across multiple agencies.  Research 
conducted by the author in the UK’s Criminal Justice System illustrates this 
point. The prosecution of relatively minor offences requires the coordinated 
participation of a network of local organisations that includes the Police, Crown 
Prosecution Service and the Courts and Tribunals Service.  In addition evidence 
must be provided to the Defence and in practice a number of agencies from the 
voluntary sector that may or may not receive public funds provide support 
services to victims and witnesses of crime.  The process is choreographed within 
a statutory framework implemented and monitored at the national level by two 
Government Departments (the Ministry of Justice and the Home Office).   
Even within a single agency, separate groups may be responsible for delivering 
widely differing services to the public.  For example the police may have 
different teams responding to incidents, building files of evidence to support 
prosecution and providing on-going support and information to victims and 
witnesses of crimes.  
If collaboration under network arrangements is the de-facto and necessary 
response not only for complex but also for 'routine' services, what are the 
implications for the study of goal congruence?  One possible implication is that 
studies of goal congruence, which concentrate on particular organisations, might 
be considered partial accounts and therefore less compelling.  The consequence 
of accepting this view is that theoretical explanations of goal congruence should 
attempt to accommodate the network perspective. Accounts of the determinants 
of goal congruence should be capable of incorporating inter and intra-
organisational determinants of goal congruence within their theoretical 
frameworks. In particular it might be argued that propositions for the role of 
group and organisational boundaries and the spheres of practice and interest, 
which they delineate, will be of special interest in explaining the determinants of 
goal congruence. 
The current study achieves this by including organisational context within its 
conceptual framework for identifying goal incongruence.  Two contexts are 
recognised, the strategic core and the delivery network.  As with the conception 
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of goal congruence, this gives rise to three contexts for goal incongruence.  They 
are: 
1. Goal incongruence within the Strategic Core 
2. Goal incongruence within the Delivery Network 
3. Goal incongruence between the Strategic Core and the Delivery Network 
The case study was conducted within a public network responsible for delivering 
aspects of the Criminal Justice System within the UK.  In order to test the 
theoretical framework observation was conducted at multiple points within the 
network that included contexts from different hierarchical levels and within a 
number of network organizations with distinct task and professional orientations.  
At the Headquarters level observations were made within the Strategy and 
Change Directorate of the Ministry of Justice.  This directorate operated close to 
the strategic and policy apex of the Ministry.  It assisted Ministers and senior 
civil servants in the Ministry to develop and disseminate strategy and policy.  It 
also reported through various committees and boards on the activity of network 
agencies and the progress of specific programs and projects.  Following common 
usage within the Headquarters function of the MoJ this part of the network will 
be referred to in the remainder of this article as the ‘Strategic Core’.  This was an 
imprecise term that was used informally to distinguish between the actions of 
Headquarters staff from that of operational staff within network organizations 
that were commonly referred to as the ‘Delivery Network’. 
At the operational level the researcher observed a collaborative project 
conducted between the Police, Crown Prosecution Service, Probation Trust, 
Court Staff and representatives of various voluntary groups.  The project aimed 
to improve the services offered to victims of serious crime by integrating inter-
agency processes and communication within a single English city.  
The combination of three modes of goal incongruence with three empirical 
contexts gives nine possible expressions of goal incongruence.  This conceptual 
model for the expression of goal incongruence within a network context is 
described in figure 2.2 overleaf. 
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Figure 2.2    Conceptual Models for the Expression of Goal Incongruence 
within a Network Context 
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In summary, the greater part of the literature takes difference to be an adequate 
indicator of goal incongruence.  However for reasons described above we take 
difference alone to be inadequate to establish incongruence.  In order to establish 
goal incongruence organisational goals must not only be different but also 
contradictory.  Claims of contradiction should be supported by evidence that that 
contradiction has attained an objective facticity within organisational practice 
such that the purposes of network organisations are impeded, deflected, altered 
or subverted.  In short that actions and decisions taken to achieve specific goals 
reduce the network’s ability to achieve other formal or operative goals. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the manner in which goal incongruence is 
conceptualised in the relevant academic literature. It has sought to describe how 
previous authors have defined goal incongruence; the types of evidence they 
have collected; and the criteria they applied to that evidence in order to establish 
the presence of goal incongruence. 
The chapter has described how the conceptualisation and analysis of goal 
incongruence has changed significantly over time. The insistence of the early 
institutional analysts on categorising goals as formal or operative that enabled 
the use of analytical frameworks capable of discussing different dimensions of 
goal incongruence has been superseded.  It has been replaced by a preference for 
comparing rankings from lists of possible goals provided by researchers.   
Furthermore the criterion of contradiction (meaning that action to achieve a 
particular goal impedes, deflects or subverts the attainment of others) has been 
replaced by the criteria of difference. In the overwhelming majority of later 
research, it is not necessary to demonstrate contradiction in order to establish 
goal incongruence, but merely difference.   
In addition the importance of grounding claimed incongruence within its 
organisational context has diminished over time. The thick description and 
mixed methods of the early research has been replaced for the most part (with 
the exception of Vancouver, Millsap and Peters; and Meyers, Riccucci and 
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Lurie) by the completion of questionnaires that have a tenuous link to practice 
by small numbers of respondents.   The consequence of these changes is that the 
test for goal incongruence has become easier to satisfy.  The implications of 
these conclusions are that the conceptualisation of goal incongruence in the later 
research is unsatisfactory for the reasons summarized above.  This work will 
return to this subject at the end of chapter three where the current study’s 
conceptual framework for the analysis of goal incongruence is presented and 
discussed. 
Finally the chapter presented a novel conceptual framework for the analysis of 
the sources of goal incongruence within a network context. The conceptual 
framework takes established approaches to the description of goal incongruence 
– dissonance between the operative goals of different groups and between formal 
and operative goals – and applies them within a network context.   
The conceptual framework developed by this study addresses four perceived 
limitations found in later research on goal incongruence in public organisations.  
It addresses these perceived limitations by defining goal incongruence as 
contradiction, drawing evidence for enacted goal incongruence from secure 
organisational contexts and reinstating the categorical analysis of goals. Finally 
the framework is capable of being applied to accounts of goal incongruence in 
two dimensions of a network context.   
The application to network contexts constitutes a novel contribution to a 
theoretical literature that has described goal incongruence within single 
organisations, organisational dyads and organisational fields. The ability to 
describe the presence and absence of goal incongruence within specific network 
contexts contributes to the theoretical literature on goal incongruence and to the 
analysis of public networks.   
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Chapter 3  Explanations of Goal Incongruence 
 
Introduction 
The previous chapter clarified the concept of goal incongruence.  The discussion 
in this chapter seeks to perform the same task for theoretical explanations of the 
sources of goal incongruence. This chapter will present two alternative 
conceptions of the sources of goal incongruence.  These models were developed 
following the review and critical evaluation of explanations of goal 
incongruence found in the literature.  They are referred to in the text as the 
hierarchical model and the horizontal model. 
The hierarchical model argues that goal incongruence is caused by the nature of 
downward delegation necessary in bureaucratic organisations. It understands 
organisations as chains of command, transmitting orders downward through the 
hierarchy from the strategic to operational level.  In the process, aspects of the 
message can get ‘lost in translation’, either accidentally or deliberately.  Goal 
incongruence can be thought of as the result of a bureaucratic version of Chinese 
whispers.  It is the expression of a loss of meaning as goals are transmitted 
downward through the bureaucratic hierarchy. 
The horizontal model provides a quite different explanation of goal 
incongruence.  Its advocates generally prefer to understand organisations as 
coalitions of interest rather than chains of command. Goal incongruence is an 
expression of the range of goals that different individuals, groups and sub-
groups are committed to attaining. Coalitions, groups and sub-groups may form 
around a number of axes.  However the literature pays particular attention to the 
role of professionalization and professional identity as a particularly important 
locus for group formation. Horizontal explanations therefore emphasise 
differences between professional groups as the source of goal incongruence.        
The chapter will begin by describing the essential aspects of each model.  It will 
then focus on a number of proposed influences by which these models cause 
goal incongruence that are suggested in the literature. These proposed influences 
will provide the analytical focus for contributing to the evaluation of the two 
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models in the later chapters of this study. The remainder of this chapter will first 
describe how the two theoretical models were developed from the literature.   
 
Developing The Explanatory Models 
This section will describe the process that led to the distillation of two 
explanatory models for the sources of goal incongruence, the Hierarchical and 
Horizontal models that were described in the introduction to this chapter.  Its 
purpose is to explain how an extensive range of explanations was distilled into 
two overarching theoretical explanations of incongruence.  Development of the 
models began with a literature review of the terms goal congruence and goal 
incongruence.  The initial literature review produced a wide range of sources, 
some of which dealt with the subject of goal incongruence directly, and others 
that included theoretical descriptions of goal incongruence as peripheral to their 
main research theme or as an interesting empirical consequence of their main 
theoretical concern.   
The initial result of this literature review was a collection of sometimes similar, 
sometimes very different explanations for the sources of goal incongruence, 
frequently made by authors with startlingly different conceptions of 
organisational behaviour and theoretical purposes. What followed was a 
prolonged attempt to make sense of this list by a process of critical evaluation. It 
involved attempting to identify fundamental relationships between their 
arguments.  Several possible organising themes were applied to the literature but 
proved unsuccessful. Gradually however a unifying theme did begin to emerge.  
It had been, perhaps, the obvious theme from the start; that incongruence was 
generated by hierarchical difference. As an example, Simon and March’s 
concept of means – ends chains, Lipsky’s description of street level bureaucrats’ 
role in determining de-facto policy and Meyer and Rowan’s argument for 
decoupling between the operational and strategic levels of organisations 
approach the study of organisations from very different theoretical perspectives 
and explain the empirical reality of organisations in very different ways.  
However they all agree that organisations have tops and bottoms and that the 
cardinal feature of organisational life is that what happens at the top is very 
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different to what happens at the bottom.  That hierarchical difference in desired 
ends can be described as goal incongruence.  
However there were also a number of explanations of goal incongruence that did 
not conform to the hierarchical model.  These explanations described differences 
between individuals and groups that either had no hierarchical component or did 
not allocate hierarchy an instrumental role in producing goal incongruence.  The 
majority of these explanations concentrated on the role of professional identity 
as a carrier of goals. Goal incongruence reflected different preference orderings 
preferred by different professional groups. Of course some professions are noted 
for producing pronounced hierarchical distinctions between their members.  
However the argument made by the horizontal model of goal incongruence is 
that differences between different professional groups, or between professional 
constituencies and managerial constituencies are greater than the differences 
within those groups.  
Having identified and delineated the two models a similar process began to 
discern the specific pathways by which each was claimed to act as a source of 
goal incongruence. As with the identification of the models themselves, a range 
of claimed pathways were isolated from the source texts.  Critical evaluation of 
the proposed sources led to the combination of explanations wherever possible.  
What remained were explanations that did not appear amenable to combination 
or where combination appeared to entail a significant loss of analytical value.  
The conclusion was that each of the explanatory models contained a number of 
proposed influences capable of shaping goal incongruence. These will be 
discussed in the subsequent two sections.  
 
Hierarchical Explanations of Goal Incongruence 
The following section sets out to clarify Hierarchical explanations of goal 
incongruence.  It describes the development of the idea that goal incongruence 
can be explained in terms of hierarchy.  It then goes on to discuss a number of 
shaping influences that act as a source of goal incongruence within hierarchical 
arrangements. 
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The earliest theoretical analyses of goal incongruence locate the cause of the 
phenomena in the downward delegation of responsibility necessary in large 
organisations. Goal incongruence is viewed as a consequence of the difficulty of 
sustaining common commitments and shared purposes across the span of the 
bureaucratic hierarchy. Selznick (1943), Sills (1957) and Simon and March 
(1958) all present theoretical analyses of goal incongruence which emphasise the 
role of bureaucratic delegation in the production of the phenomenon.  In each of 
these theoretical frames subordinate actors to whom authority and responsibility 
must be delegated in bureaucratic organisations are exposed to a number of 
factors that influence their orientation to formal and operative goals.  In each 
explanation the task of executing organizational procedures and achieving 
proximate ends leads intermediary and subordinate actors to identify with the 
achievement of operative goals rather than the professed formal goals of 
achieving defined outcomes as a result of those processes.  Goal incongruence is 
therefore explained as a function of an organisations’ ability (more accurately 
perhaps inability), to replicate goals accurately as they are deployed downward 
through the bureaucratic hierarchy. This top-down understanding of the 
aetiology of goal incongruence is illustrated in the assertion that operative goals 
are a: “derivation and distillation of official goals” (Hall 1996, p. 262).  
With reference to the top down transmission of organisational goals, Selznick 
describes what he refers to as the organizational paradox of professed or original 
goals of organisation being displaced by operative goals: “In every organisation, 
the goals of the organisation are modified (abandoned, deflected or elaborated) 
by processes within it” (1943, p.47). The internal processes referred to above are 
the necessary delegation of responsibility in large organisations to 
intermediaries. This creates the generic problem of goal preservation that is how 
can organisations maintain a commitment to their original goals and purpose.  
Selznick’s explanation of the causal determinants of goal incongruence within 
bureaucratic hierarchies is of such central importance to the argument presented 
in this chapter that it deserves to be quoted comprehensively:  
 (1) Co-operative effort, under the conditions of increasing number 
and complexity of functions, requires the: “delegation of functions”.  
Thus action which seeks more than limited, individual results 
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becomes “action through agents”. (2) The use of intermediaries 
creates a tendency toward a “bifurcation of interest” between the 
initiator of the action and the agent employed.  This is due to the 
creation of two sets of problems: for the initiator, the achievement of 
the goal which spurred him to action, and for the intermediary, 
problems which are concerned chiefly with his social position as 
agent.  The character of the agent’s new values are such as to 
generate actions whose objective consequences undermine the 
professed aims of the organization. … (3) This bifurcation of interest 
makes dominant, for initiator and agent alike, the issue of “control”.  
What is at stake for each is the control of the conditions (the 
organizational mechanism), which each group will want to 
manipulate (not necessarily consciously) toward solving its special 
problems. … (4) Because of the concentration of skill and the 
control of organizational mechanisms in the hands of intermediaries, 
it becomes possible for the problems of the officials… to become 
those, which operate “for the organization”.  The action of the 
officials tends to have an increasingly “internal relevance”, which 
may result in the deflection of the organization from its original 
path, which, however, usually remains as the formally professed aim 
of the organization (Selznick 1943, p.51).  
In the description of causation given above the conflict inherent in the 
appointment of agents and consequent bifurcation of interests leads to the 
generation of contradictory (incongruent) goals that act to: “deflect 
organisational purposes” (Selznick 1943, p. 48).    
Simon (1957) and March and Simon (1958) describe the operation of similar 
processes in terms of the adoption of rational organisational goals or ends and 
the instrumental operational means for achievement of those ends.  They suggest 
that formal organisational goals, while they may be vague in themselves, serve 
an important function as initiators of means –ends chains whose operation is 
described in the following manner:  
(1) Starting with the general goal to be achieved, (2) discovering a 
set of means, very generally specific for accomplishing this goal, (3) 
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taking each of these means in turn, as a new sub-goal and 
discovering a set of more detailed means for achieving it (March and 
Simon, 1958:191).   
Such means-ends chains create hierarchies of goals where each level is: 
“considered as an end relative to the levels below it and as a means relative to 
the levels above it.  Through the hierarchical structure of ends, behaviour attains: 
"integration and consistency” (Simon 1957, p.63). This indicates an iterative 
process where general goals are translated into particular means that give rise to 
sub-goals that in turn enable a set of more detailed means for achieving them.  
Thus the perception of what constitutes an organisational goal and what 
constitutes means to achieve such goals is dependent on the position of specific 
actors.  
Sills echoes these arguments by suggesting that:  
In order to accomplish their goals, organisations establish a set of 
procedures or means.  In the course of following these procedures, 
the sub-ordinates or members to whom authority and functions have 
been delegated often come to regard them as ends in themselves, 
rather than as means toward the achievement of organization [al] 
goals.  As a result of this process, the actual activities of the 
organization become centered around the proper functioning of 
organization procedures, rather than on the achievement of the initial 
goals. (Sills, 1957  p.62). 
This confusion of ends and means results in the displacement of the original 
organisational goals by a new set (or sets) of potentially contradictory goals.  
Unless the displaced original goals are formally and explicitly repudiated then a 
condition of goal incongruence will be created due to the disparity between 
professed and actual goals. Again the ultimate cause of goal incongruence is 
understood to be the necessity to delegate responsibility for action to local or 
operational parts of the organisation. The actors to whom authority and 
responsibility is delegated are exposed to the influence of a number of 
institutional processes which act as causal factors for goal displacement.   
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Sills (1957) explains that the first potential influence is their status within the 
organisation.  Intermediary actors within the organisation may attach greater 
importance to the maintenance and progression of their own position, status and 
indeed salary than achieving the goals of the organisation.  Second is their 
interpretation of organisational rules.  The personal and professional 
commitments required to enforce bureaucratic rules and procedures go beyond 
that which is strictly necessary to the point that complying and enforcing rules 
becomes more important than achieving the official goals of the organisation.  
Third is their execution of organizational procedures.  This leads actors to 
identify their responsibility with the proximate goals of conducting procedures 
in an approved manner rather than the professed goals of achieving defined 
outcomes as a result of those processes.   Fourth is their relationship with other 
participants. In addition to the formal structures of organisations informal 
structures (groups) are likely to form that will exhibit a tendency act to protect 
their entrenched interests rather than assist their clientele (Sills, 1957, p.68). 
Finally their interactions with the public might lead intermediaries to moderate 
behaviours and goals, either to the advantage of individual members of the 
public or particular groups, or with the objective of protecting or enhancing 
perceptions of the legitimacy or status of the delegated individual.  
The process by which operative goals are established is contested in the goal 
congruence / incongruence literature.  We have already referred to the fact that 
the bureaucratic delegation model takes operative goals to be a: “derivation and 
distillation of official goals” Hall (1996, p.262).  Among others Perrow (1966) 
feels that operative goals are constructed and implemented by what he refers to 
as dominant groups, with the assumption that dominant can be taken to be 
synonymous with superior or senior. However Lipsky (1983) argues 
convincingly for the role of street level bureaucrats who may occupy relatively 
unimposing positions in the organizational hierarchy but who nevertheless have 
the discretion to establish ad-hoc policy and operative goals that can effectively 
subvert and supersede official goals.  Adopting the perspective of operational 
staff rather than executives might appear to sit uneasily within the bureaucratic 
delegation model.  However Lipsky’s theoretical contribution is located within 
the tradition that emphasises the difficulty or inability of downward delegation 
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within hierarchical bureaucracies to influence or control the actions of 
intermediary actors or operational staff.   
Lipsky (1983) argues for the role of workers he describes as street level 
bureaucrats in producing goal congruence.  Street level Bureaucrats may occupy 
relatively unimposing positions in the organizational hierarchy. Nevertheless the 
significant discretion they enjoy in delivering services to clients enables them to 
establish ad-hoc policy and operative goals that can effectively subvert and 
supersede official goals.   
Goal conflict at the operational level of public sector agencies arises within a 
general organisational context of confusion, ambiguity and conflict.  The goals 
of complex public sector organisations tend to possess an:  ‘idealised dimension 
which make them difficult to achieve and confusing and complicated to 
approach” (Lipsky 1983, p.40).  
Such arguments appear to resonate with Down’s concept of the self-interested 
application of bureaucratic discretion within contexts of discrepant cognitive 
frames, asymmetric access to information and uncertain outcomes (Downs 
1966).  Downs (1966) provides compelling support for the argument that the 
determinants of goal incongruence are to be found in the nature and practice of 
bureaucratic delegation.  
Downs advocates the view that the fundamental objective of hierarchies is the 
realisation of its formal goals but that: “in any large, multi-level bureau, a very 
significant portion of all the activity being carried out is completely unrelated to 
bureau goals, or even to the goals of its topmost officials” (1966, p. 270).   
The reason for this contradictory and sub-optimising position is, once again, the 
need for bureaucratic delegation: 
If bureaus were really monolithic, control over nearly all their 
activities would be concentrated in the hands of their topmost 
officials.  However, those officials must always delegate some of 
their power to their sub-ordinates. (Downs 1966, p.133).   
However Lipsky develops these concepts to the point where the orders, policies 
or means and ends that are delegated downward through bureaucratic hierarchies 
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are marginalised to the extent that they become inconsequential. In their place 
the discretion of bureaucratic subordinates who operate at the lowest levels of 
hierarchies and the challenges of meeting their operative goals are privileged as 
the effective determinants of de-facto policy.    
This position explicitly rejects the assumption that employees generally conform 
to executive expectations and share in formal organisation goals. It locates goal 
incongruence in the conflict, tension and discordant discourses of individuals 
separated by hierarchical distance. Lipsky’s contribution to the discussion of 
bureaucratic delegation demands that theoretical explanations of goal 
incongruence accommodate the desire of (ultimate) subordinates to avoid 
dangerous, difficult, or boring work and contexts in which workers are unable to 
distance themselves emotionally from the negative consequences of their 
decisions and actions for organisational clients. 
While adopting a radically different perspective to the treatments of bureaucratic 
delegation already discussed, Lipsky’s argument does not amount to a rejection 
of the bureaucratic delegation model.  Rather it presents hierarchical interactions 
as separating rather than connecting actors who occupy different levels of the 
organisation.  While Lipsky’s perspective of bureaucratic delegation is from the 
bottom rather than the top of organisational hierarchies, it nevertheless presents 
goal incongruence as being determined by inadequacies in bureaucratic 
delegation within those hierarchies. In many ways the marginalisation of 
authority in favour of concentrating on the de-facto goals of operational staff can 
be regarded as the logical conclusion of theories that emphasise deficient aspects 
of the process of bureaucratic delegation to transmit goals downwards through a 
hierarchy.   
A number of shaping influences for hierarchical goal incongruence can be 
discerned from study of the literatures. The conceptual attributes of the principal 
models of those shaping influences are described in the following sub-sections. 
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 Preoccupation and Compliance  
The simplest and most straightforward shaping influence is described in the 
propensity for the operational behaviours of intermediaries to become centred on 
specific daily problems and proximate goals that are effectively substituted for 
the professed goals of the organisation. This presents the most ‘innocent’ 
explanation of the shaping influences for goal incongruence.  Intermediary and 
subordinate actors become pre-occupied with their work and ultimate ends and 
goals are forgotten, or at least recede from consciousness. The propensity to 
become pre-occupied with daily problems is re-enforced by the tendency for 
office holders to identify with the importance of bureaucratic rules and 
procedures and the necessity of securing compliance with those rules and 
procedures even at the expense of achieving the formal goals or ultimate ends of 
the organisation.  The hallmark of the preoccupation and compliance mechanism 
is that goal incongruence is produced by a passive forgetting of formal and 
operative goals delegated within hierarchical contexts. 
 
 Bifurcation of Interests 
Selznick (1943) argued that the use of intermediaries creates a tendency toward 
a bifurcation of interests, under which intermediaries are concerned chiefly with 
their social positions as agents: 
The use of intermediaries creates a tendency toward a bifurcation of 
interest between the initiator of the action and the agent employed. 
This is due to the creation of two sets of problems: for the initiator, the 
achievement of the goal which spurred him to action, and for the 
intermediary, problems which are concerned chiefly with his social 
position as agent. The character of the agent's new values are such as 
to generate actions whose objective consequences undermine the 
professed aims of the organization. (Selznick 1943, p. 48). 
 This introduces the possibility of operative goals aimed at advancing the status 
of intermediaries (Sills 1957) and their relationships with individuals outside the 
hierarchical chain of delegation (Sills 1957, Lipsky 1983), general self-interest 
	   	   	  
	   	   	  
	  
68	  
(Downs 1966) and self-aggrandizement and illegitimate functions (Bozeman 
1993). Lipsky contributes to this debate by reminding us that intermediaries’ 
conception of self –interest will extend to avoiding dangerous, difficult or boring 
work and that work which is destructive of the individual’s ability to maintain a 
positive representation of self. 
At the same time the discretion enjoyed by intermediary or subordinate actors 
render organisational rules vulnerable to being appropriated by individuals and 
groups in order to achieve objectives of: “self-aggrandizement and illegitimate 
functions” (Bozeman 1993, p.286) . Bozeman assumes that rules should: “serve 
a legitimate, organizationally sanctioned functional object, either for the focal 
organization or for a legitimate external controller…” (Bozeman 1993, p.286).   
Rules that are put to the parochial advantage of individual or groups but 
contradict organizational purposes reflect the improper and opportunistic 
misappropriation and consequent subversion of bureaucratic authority.   
The Bifurcation of Interests model presents a far more active explanation of 
hierarchical goal incongruence. The model allows groups that operate at 
particular levels of the hierarchy far more agency in actively choosing to ignore, 
substitute and shape goals that promote their own parochial interests. Goal 
incongruence is not produced by impersonal discourses such as the experience of 
work, misunderstandings on both sides of the hierarchical communication of 
means and ends or the well-intentioned application of discretion required in 
complex operational environments. Instead incongruence is the outcome of 
decisions and actions intended to benefit specific groups. 
It is also vital to recognise that individuals that are concerned chiefly with their 
social position as agents take these decisions. This means that the ends on which 
they focus are unlikely to be the same as the official ends articulated in the 
formal goals of the organisation. They are far more likely to reflect the 
individual's social position within their constituency and their constituency's 
position within the organisation or network.  This is probably best summed up 
by repeating Perrow's foundational questions: 
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What do individuals or groups of similarly placed individuals hope to 
gain from participation in the affairs of organization? ... What are the 
uses to which they put the organization?  (Perrow 1960, P. 16) 
The Bifurcation of Interest model suggests that individuals and groups forming 
their own answers to Perrow’s questions produce goal incongruence. 
 
 The Discretionary Gap  
The discretionary gap associated with the iterated downward delegation of 
goals within hierarchies is experienced within a context characterised by 
differential access to information and perceptions of reality and uncertain 
outcomes (Downs 1966) and the misapplication of policies due to genuine 
misunderstanding of their nature by subordinates (Bozeman 1993). In 
consequence a rule entropy operates for downward delegation within 
hierarchical arrangements in which the greater the number of occasions on 
which the realisation of goals must be delegated the greater the loss of 
meaning (Bozeman 1993) and resultant authority leakage (Downs 1966).  
This delegation proceeds from the need for topmost officials who wish to 
implement particular policies to formulate those policies in “general terms”.  
Details must necessarily be left to sub-ordinates. When proximate sub-
ordinates receive orders from above they must be translated into more 
specific terms. However this detailing can only be conducted up to a point, 
before the policy must be once more delegated downwards through the 
hierarchy.  Within this iterative process, orders must be: “expanded and made 
more specific as they move downwards” (Downs 1966, p.134).   
At each stage of delegation officeholders enjoy “leeway” and “discretion” 
over implementing orders and suggesting alternative means to achieve 
delegated ends:  
At every level, there is a certain discretionary gap between the orders 
an official receives from above and those he issues downward, and 
every official is forced to exercise discretion in interpreting his 
superiors’ orders. (Downs 1966, p.134).   
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Downs argues that divergence between formal and operative goals are not 
caused by delegation per se but by the actions of officials who do not faithfully 
reproduce imposed goals but instead exercise discretion in their implementation 
or further delegation. Bureau officials exercise discretion under conditions of: 
“differential self interest, differential modes of perceiving reality, access to 
differential information and uncertainty with regard to the outcomes of particular 
courses of action” (Downs 1966, p.50).  It is this discretion that is the precise 
cause of goal incongruence. However to the extent that Downs argues 
persuasively that the conditions of discretion are strongly associated with 
hierarchical forms of organisation it is possible to perceive his defence of 
bureaucratic delegation as perhaps overly generous. 
Downs describes a form of rule entropy, that consists of an almost inevitable 
loss of fidelity as organisational rules are transmitted within bureaucratic 
hierarchies: “The more organizations, organizational levels, and jurisdictions 
involved in rule promulgation and application, the more likely the meaning will 
be lost” (Bozeman 1993, p.288).  Rule entropy appears as a structural 
component of hierarchical delegation and is the product of imperfections and 
vulnerabilities in the downward transmission of goal orientated action within 
bureaucracies. The result is likely to be the adoption of increasingly 
contradictory goals as ends are delegated downward through successive 
hierarchical levels. 
 
 Inadequate Comprehension 
The operation of the discretionary gap is reinforced by the inadequate practice of 
superiors, particularly top-most officials, who may not appreciate the difficulty 
involved in implementing the policies that they formulate. This issue is 
described by Bozeman in terms of the inadequate comprehension of office 
holders at the apex of bureaucracies of the difficulties involved in applying 
policies (polices which Downs tells us are frequently formulated in general 
terms).  Lipsky expands on this theme with by characterising formal goals as 
idealised, difficult to achieve and confusing to approach. Thus goal 
incongruence is caused by the inability of superiors, particularly top-most 
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officials, to formulate policy and goals that can be articulated clearly and 
implemented effectively.  
Inadequate comprehension refers to the practical inability to organised effective 
means – ends chains due to the: “persons designing the rules have insufficient 
understanding of the problem at hand, the relationship of the rule to the 
perceived problem, or others’ likely application or response to the rule” 
(Bozeman 1993, p. 286).  In other words individuals in superior hierarchical 
positions do not appreciate the constraints under which subordinates operate or 
their propensity to put delegated rules to their own ends.  The corollary of 
incomprehension on the part of those in superior positions originating 
organisational rules is the Misapplication of rules by individuals in subordinate 
positions. Misapplication derives from various types of ineffective 
communication between superiors and those in subordinate positions who: “ are 
expected to comply with a rule do not understand it or its purposes” (Bozeman 
1993, p.289). 
 
 Organisational Segmentation 
The proposed mechanisms discussed up to this point describe vertical sources of 
goal incongruence within single hierarchies. However the network context 
introduces the issue of vertical expressions of goal incongruence within clusters 
of multiple hierarchies. Under network arrangements institutionally bound 
professionals possess organisational commitments articulated in contracts of 
employment, normative systems of behaviour and self-interest. It has been 
suggested that this organisational segmentation of workers into distinct 
hierarchies can act as a mechanism for producing goal incongruence  
Organisational commitments are not distributed uniformly across or within 
professional orientations; simply put professionals are employed to practice their 
skills by and on behalf of different organisations. The resultant organisational 
allegiances and obligations they experience act as brute facts imposed on 
patterns of intra and inter professional relationships. 
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Organisational segmentation acts as a shaping influence of goal incongruence in 
three ways.  At the most obvious level differential organisational commitments 
will result in professionals prioritising goals that are perceived to promote the 
interests of their employing organisations.  
Furthermore identifying with the interests of organisation might be expected to 
lead to goal-orientated action that not only promotes the interest of the 
employing organisation but also damages that of rivals (Forster 1952). This 
potential tendency might be articulated in framing measurement of effectiveness, 
efficiency and economy in organisational terms.   
The second manner in which organisational segmentation might cause goal 
incongruence is the way in which it will influence the professional’s experience 
of practice.  Organisational membership will entangle professionals with a wide 
range of institutional commitments.  These include their physical location, 
working environment, production and information technologies, patterns and 
forms of communication, working hours, dress codes, language use and 
management and financial reporting.  These organisationally authored practices 
act to establish distance and reinforce difference between professionals, 
particularly from different professional orientations.  This facilitates representing 
other professional orientations as an‘out-group’. This process frames inter-
professional cooperation as a transgressive boundary- spanning activity 
(Vancouver, Millsap and Peters 1994) rather than a normal and routine aspect of 
professional practice. 
Thirdly, as Larson (1997) reminds us organisational boundaries act as protective 
institutional boundaries. Organisational boundaries not only distance but also 
protect professionals. Organisations act as refugia in which professionals can 
shelter from the depredations of more powerful counterparts. Professions that are 
relatively weak and could not expect to withstand the influence of more 
powerful professionals groups if they inhabited a single organisation can use 
organisational boundaries as a shelter that enables them to maintain control over 
their work.  In this way goal incongruence that would be resolved if it occurred 
within an organisation is maintained by the protection afforded by organisational 
boundaries.  
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By these influences goal incongruence is caused by the organisational 
segmentation of professional environments and the differential commitments 
this segmentation encourages and facilitates.  While organisational segmentation 
causes both intra and inter professional goal incongruence it is particularly 
relevant to inter-professional contexts where professional interactions are 
distributed across organisational boundaries where differential professional and 
organisational commitments will reinforce each other. 
  
 Performance Control 
Professional orientations differ on whether their performance is measured or not 
and if so, what measures are used and what use is made of those measures, for 
example are their results shared with other professionals or even members of the 
public.  Performance control can be defined as "the process of monitoring 
performance, comparing it with some standards, and then providing rewards and 
adjustments" (Ouchi 1977, p.97). Professional groups in the UK Criminal Justice 
System are generally subject to performance measurement and control systems 
(Chenhall 2003, Kenis 2006). These systems typically measure the conduct of 
particular aspects of professional practice and the outcomes that practice secures.   
Systems of performance measurement and control exhibited within case study 
organisations are characterised by: concentrating on only a sub-set of potential 
measures, that is they are selective rather than comprehensive; concentrating on 
the discreet performance of professionals, organisationally segmented, rather 
than the integrated performance of networks; results are made available to other 
professionals or members of the public; and results are used to compare 
professionals against their peers, frequently in the form of explicit league tables.   
Perhaps most importantly, performance control systems are externally and 
hierarchically imposed (Ashworth, Boyne and Walker 2002).  Evidence from the 
case study appeared to indicate that control systems appear to have significant 
influence on the actions of professionals, particularly when they are compared to 
their peers.  Professionals appear to care about their published performance 
results, even where they doubt their veracity or validity.  Professional integrity 
expressed in the ability to withstand the influence of dubious measurement 
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appears to be somewhat fragile.  It may be objected that performance 
measurement and control is a hierarchical expression of bureaucratic 
management as the basis of the systems are, to an extent, imposed on 
professionals by bureaucratic and policy elites.  However that is to ignore both 
the role of senior professionals in sanctioning and enacting performance control 
systems and the pervasive influence such systems have on the experience of 
professional work.  That is an experience where to be a professional is to be 
exposed to external scrutiny, to be judged and to have that judgement made 
public. 
How do systems of performance control act as shaping influence for goal 
incongruence?  The answer is that performance control systems are operate as 
carriers of explicit and implicit operative and formal goals.  These measurement-
defined goals are constructed around professional articulations of practice.  They 
emphasise professional orientations as being discreet entities rather than 
constitutive elements of wider systems and networks (for example the Criminal 
Justice System). This is reinforced by the introspective comparison of individual 
and small groups of professionals to peers who share their orientation at the 
expense of peers from alternative professional orientations with whom they must 
cooperate in organisational or network contexts.  In that sense professionally 
discreet performance control systems that encourage intra-professional 
comparison and competition deploy coercive, normative and mimetic pressures 
that lead to institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983).  Members 
of professional orientations become pre-occupied with the introspective 
consideration of their relation to exclusive bases of measurement that acts to 
isolate them form other orientations.  This facilitates the maintenance of 
different and potentially contradictory goals. 
 
Horizontal Explanations of Goal Incongruence 
The following section sets out to introduce and clarify an alternative explanation 
of the sources of goal incongruence.  The Horizontal model suggests that 
differences in professional orientation and not hierarchical distinctions are the 
source of goal incongruence.  This section will describe the idea that goal 
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incongruence can be explained in terms of differences between different 
professional groups.  It then goes on to discuss a number of shaping influences 
for goal incongruence derived from the relevant literature. 
The professional orientation model of goal incongruence draws on the 
theoretical perspective that organisations should not be conceptualized as chains 
of command but as coalitions of interest (Cyert and March 1963). This 
theoretical frame suggests that organisations are comprised of coalitions of 
individuals, some of whom are organised into sub-coalitions.  Organizational 
goals emerge from the process of bargaining, both within and between sub-
coalitions.  As such the question of goal incongruence is central to conceptual 
descriptions of organisational contexts.  As Cyert and March explain:  
Individual participants in the organization may have substantially 
different preference orderings (i.e., individual goals).  That is to say, 
any theory of organisation must deal successfully with the obvious 
potential for internal goal conflict inherent in a coalition of diverse 
individuals and groups.  (Cyert and March 1963,  p.31).  
This study argues that professional identities and commitments operate as a 
particularly significant locus for the development of organisational coalitions 
and sub-coalitions. Arguments that different professional orientations produce 
inter-professional relationships characterised by difference and contradiction are 
reviewed and three shaping influences for horizontal production of goal 
incongruence are identified and described.  
There is a vast and multi-faceted literature on professionalization (Scott 2010).  
A comprehensive discussion of the competing definitions of a professional 
worker is beyond the scope of this work. However one of the recurrent themes 
developed by scholars of professionalization is the capacity for conflict and 
competition between distinct professional groups (Johnson 1972, Derber 1980, 
Abbott 1988). Indeed DiMaggio and Powell have defined the process of 
professionalization in inherently competitive terms, describing it as the 
“collective struggle of members of an occupation to define the conditions and 
methods of their work” (DiMaggio and Powell 1991, p.70).  
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Abernathy and Stoelwinder (1995) develop the theme of professional self-
reliance and introspection when they emphasise the discretion and independence 
with which professionals utilise knowledge derived from professional 
experience in making decisions. They quote Derber and Schwartz’s contention 
that professionals are: “trained to perform complex tasks independently and to 
solve problems that arise in the performance of these tasks using their 
experience and expertise” (Abernathy and Stoelwinder, 1995, p.2).   
Empirical support for this explanation of how professional orientation is 
responsible for the production of goal incongruence is provided by Kirkpatrick, 
Ackroyd and Walker who suggest that in the case of welfare delivery in the UK: 
“professional groups exercised considerable de facto control over both the 
means and (sometimes) ends” (Kirkpatrick, Ackroyd and Walker 2005, p.1) and 
that the ability of professional groups to “negotiate and capture reform in ways 
that minimise disturbance to their day-to-day activities should not be 
underestimated” (Kirkpatrick, Ackroyd and Walker 2005, p.3).   
This quote draws on the professional versus management control debate.  This 
debate privileges the relationship between professionals and managers by taking 
as its central issue the “extent to which professionals and quasi-professionals 
subscribe to the goal priorities of management” (Jauch, Osborne and Tarpening 
1980, p.544).  Various authors argue that conflict between professionals and 
managers is grounded in fundamental differences between the experience of 
membership of a professional rather than management group and the dissonant 
commitments which professional orientations generate. However the 
professional orientation perspective questions whether managers should be 
regarded as categorically different to professionals.  Instead of regarding 
management and professional constituencies as dichotomous, management 
constituencies are understood as one more professional group.  
The professional control perspective locates the determinants of goal 
incongruence in the contest for control conducted between different professional 
constituencies.  This contest is an expression of the pursuit of group interest and 
derives from the ability of professions to establish and maintain group identities 
that can extend across or be reinforced by formal organisational boundaries.  
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The empirical expression of goal incongruence will be determined by the extent 
of agreement between professional norms and goals and their organisational (or 
network) counterparts (Harrison and Rosenzweig 1972). Individual professionals 
will have the propensity to be more or less congruent with professional or 
organisational goals. Kenis argues that: 
 Some organisations are characterised by the fact that they have staff 
who have precise ideas about the criteria they use in their work and on 
which the organisation should be assessed.  The most common 
example is the one in which professionals play an important role.  
Professionals do not usually relate to the organisation’s criteria for 
success, but more commonly to the criteria that are central to their 
profession (Kenis 2003, p.119).  
Commitments to professional goals may also override commitments to identify 
with the goals and interests of peer groups, either within organisation or network 
contexts.  Peer groups are likely to incorporate individuals with multiple 
professional orientations, particularly within Network contexts.  In the case 
study network peer groups will incorporate members of other criminal justice 
professions and / or organisations in complex patterns. From a study of 
collaborative public management conducted within the Criminal Justice system 
Geddes quotes a manager’s view that: “it’s almost hard to think of settings to 
manage that aren’t multi-agency…you have to have a multi-agency perspective 
in mind…partnership working is a massive part of my work today…” (Geddes 
2012, p.954).   
 Despite such public claim of commitment to inter-professional cooperation, the 
professional orientation model suggests that commitments to differential 
professional orientation and the goal incongruence generated as a result acts as 
an effective barrier to inter-professional collaboration and instead promotes 
competition between professional groups.  Individual actors prioritize goals that 
are produced by and reflect the interests of the professional groups (sub-
coalitions) to which they are affiliated.  
A number of shaping influences of inter professional competition are proposed 
within the relevant literature that attempt to explain why inter-professional 
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relationships should produce goal incongruence.   These shaping influences are 
described in the following section. The proposed influences emphasise the 
discreet nature of professional organisation and identity. Certain forms of formal 
communication are denser within professional groups than between them. As a 
result of such professional introspection differences emerge that can lead to goal 
incongruence.  A common method for discussing this phenomenon is to present 
professions as 'communities' that exhibit different and potentially contradictory 
conceptions and preference orderings of desired ends, in other words express 
incongruent goals.  Different aspects or elements of professional 'communities' 
are described below. 
 
 Reinforced Pre-dispositions 
For professional communities to emerge and sustain themselves individuals must 
desire (with varying levels of encouragement) to become a part of the 
community, and they must then be socialised into the values, norms and 
practices of the community. The reinforced predispositions model suggests that 
the extensive training individuals must receive in order to acquire the 
knowledge, expertise and credentials necessary for professional membership and 
practice produces goal incongruence.  
Simon (1944) argued that training constitutes an effective means of 
organisational control: “Training prepares the organisation member to reach 
satisfactory decisions himself, without the need for authority or advice” (Simon 
1944, p.24). Professional training programmes represent processes of 
socialisation where goals are inculcated both explicitly and implicitly as 
professional norms and legitimate means and ends. Training produces and 
epistemic community (Knorr-Certina 1999) organised around the knowledge 
required to operate in a professional capacity in a predictable manner that 
conforms to established norms, values and practices. 
It is essential to remember that systems of professional training are not imposed 
on random or representative samples of the population.  Individuals make more 
or less active choices to join or avoid particular professions.  In other words 
aspirant professionals are attracted to the professional identities they select and 
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the professions that they attempt to join.  This is especially true for those 
professions that hold out the prospect of status, prestige or financial rewards.  
Therefore professional training builds on or reinforces the individuals pre-
disposition to professional values, ideologies, goals and practices.   
For many professionals, the process of socialisation through training begins 
when they embark on technically specialised university training, or pre-service 
training (Simon 1944).  The consequence of these formal systems of 
socialisation of the willing is that training acts to reduce variability among a 
group of aspirant professionals who have self-selected on the basis of their 
attraction to the values goals and practices of their chosen profession.  
Such systems of socialisation through training are organised within “professional 
networks that span organisations and across which new models diffuse rapidly” 
and produce “a pool of almost interchangeable individuals who… possess a 
similarity of orientation and disposition” (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, p.152).  
Goal incongruence is produced by the introspection of these professional 
systems of training and their inconsistencies with parallel systems produced by 
other professional groups present within organisational or network contexts.  
The implications of the reinforced pre-dispositions model are that goal 
incongruence is produced by three factors.  Firstly certain types of person will be 
motivated to seek membership of particular professional communities.  Goal 
incongruence, at least to a certain extent, reflects the commitments held by 
individuals prior to becoming members of a professional community. Secondly 
individuals are socialised by explicit and implicit training programmes intended 
to reinforce commitments to certain goals.  Crucially these systems are 
professionally introspective.  
 
Communities of Practice  
The second proposed shaping influence of horizontal goal incongruence is the 
specialised nature and experience of professional work and the consequent 
manifestation of professional groups as communities of practice.  
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Simon suggests that to:  
Gain the advantages of specialized skill at the operative level, the 
work of an organization must be so sub-divided that all process 
requiring a particular skill can be performed by persons possessing 
that skill.  Likewise, to gain the advantages of expertise in decision-
making the responsibility for decisions must be so allocated that all 
decisions requiring a particular skill can be made by persons 
possessing hat skill. (Simon 1944, p.17). 
The consequence of this specialisation is that professionals engage with the 
technical requirements of their work and the development of expertise necessary 
to achieve proximate ends and means. The corollary of this outcome, less 
frequently discussed, is that professionals are distanced or excluded from 
engaging with work that is outside their jurisdictional domains.  In itself this 
differential experience and consequent preoccupation with the technical 
demands of work might be considered sufficient to produce goal incongruence 
between workers with different professional orientations.  
The community of practice model emphasises the constraints placed on 
professional's operative goals by their engagement with the practice of their 
work: "Each profession is bound to a set of tasks by ties of jurisdiction ... " 
(Abbott 1988, p.33).   These constraints may be regulative, in the sense of the 
constraint to work within prescribed jurisdictions or to comply with the demands 
of statutory obligation or contract.  They may be normative constraints imposed 
by patterns of technology, process, custom and the need to develop and 
demonstrate skills and experience vital to professional identity.  However they 
can also be cognitive in the sense that they can come to be taken for granted by 
individual professions.  This is Berger and Luckman's (1967) contentions that 
cognitive orientations are embedded in rituals and routines that we referred to in 
the previous sub-section.   
Communities of practice also incorporate conceptions of professions as 
knowledge carrying communities, what Knorr-Certina has referred to as 
epistemic communities (Knorr-Certina 1999).  Professions are organised around 
systems of formal knowledge.  These systems of formal knowledge have two 
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aspects.  Firstly, and most instrumentally, they are focused on solving particular 
problems.  Torstendahl suggest that: "most professions are centered on typical 
problem solving systems of knowledge... " (Knorr-Certina 1990, p.4).   Secondly 
they act as: "conceptual frameworks" within which "problems are posed and 
solved" (Torstendahl 1990, p.4).   
The incorporation of knowledge systems into concept of the community of 
practice implies that goal incongruence is caused by differences in the systems 
of knowledge operated by particular professional groups.  This will include 
differences in the proximate problems that the knowledge intends to solve.  It 
can also encompass different conceptual frameworks / ideologies within which 
problems and solutions to those problems are defined and evaluated.  
Additionally, incongruence can be ascribed to differences in the structure of the 
apparatus for creating and curating problem solving knowledge. The recognition 
that knowledge operates as a discourse also raises the issue that knowledge has 
symbolic as well as instrumental value (Torstendahl 1990) and is socially 
organised (Collins 1990). This wider discourse of professional knowledge: 
"provides a basis of mutual understanding among professionals which is not 
shared by others" (Torstendahl 1990, p.2).  
Shared practice can also encourage professions to develop shared systems of 
meanings. It is vital to recognise that organisational goals have social meanings. 
From the institutional perspective the individual’s conception of desired ends are 
mediated by: “cognitive frameworks that guide organisation members’ thoughts 
and actions” (Misangyi, Weaver and Elms 2008:753).  That means that 
professional groups are inclined to develop shared interpretations (ascribe 
similar meaning) to conceptions of desired ends.  
Under such circumstances the individual’s relationship to organisational goals 
can become entangled with shared understandings of and commitment to 
identities and practices within cognitive communities (Porac and Rosa, 1996; 
Porac, Wade  and Pollack, 1999).  Berger and Luckman argue that the 
individual’s cognitive orientation, or what they refer to as the reality of their 
everyday life: “maintains itself by being embedded in routines” (1967:169).  
They note that the characteristic of modern society and the organisation of work 
is the plurality of systems of meanings that they refer to as life-worlds.  Berger, 
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Berger and Kellner contend that individuals experience “vastly different and 
often severely discrepant worlds of meaning and experience” and that: “different 
occupations have constructed for themselves life-worlds that are not only alien 
but often totally incomprehensible to the outsider” (Berger, Berger and Kellner 
1973, p.63).   
Professional's goals emerge from the nature and experience of professional work 
within their community of practice.  Differences in professional practice and the 
social meanings attributed to that practice ensure that the goals produced by 
professional groups are different and potentially contradictory and therefore 
incongruent.  The social meanings and significance ascribed to professionally 
produced goals act to reinforce and entrench professional commitments to those 
goals and consequent patterns of goal incongruence. 
 
 Inter-Professional Competition 
The shaping influences discussed above may be considered persuasive.  
However they appear to provide a somewhat passive explanation of the sources 
of goal incongruence rooted in impersonal discourses and alternative systems of 
shared meanings.  Viewed through their lenses, goal incongruence can appear as 
an unfortunate accident of diversity.  However the inter-professional competition 
model concentrates on the intended and deliberate nature of goal incongruence.  
It emphasises that the objective of professions is to contend with out-groups in a 
struggle for survival, dominance and control.   
Scott describes inter-professional competition as: “contests among contending 
occupations for professional status and the obvious rewards – money, status, 
influence – accruing to winners” (Scott 2010, p.220) and quotes Freidson’s 
argument that: “The process determining the outcome [one’s position in the 
medical division of labor] is essentially political and social rather than technical 
in character — a process in which power and persuasive rhetoric are of greater 
importance than the objective character of knowledge” (Freidson 1970b, p.79).  
Cousins sets out in detail how power and rhetoric are employed in these political 
and social struggles conducted by particular professions to marginalize, exclude 
	   	   	  
	   	   	  
	  
83	  
and subordinate professional ‘out-groups’ by pursuing “strategies of solidarism 
and exclusion” (1987, p.109). 
However perhaps Abbott provides the clearest and least forgiving description of 
professional conflict: 
Control of knowledge and its application means dominating outsiders 
who attack that control. Control without competition is trivial. ... each 
profession has its activities under various kinds of jurisdiction. 
Sometimes it has full control,  sometimes control subordinate to 
another group. Jurisdictional boundaries are perpetually in dispute, both 
in local practice and in national claims. It is the history of jurisdictional 
disputes that is the real, the determining history of the professions 
(Abbott 1988, p. 2). 
For professional groups whose members are generally employed by 
organisations and can therefore be described as being institutionally bound 
(Hughes 1958), the tendency toward inter-professional competition is reinforced 
by the intersection of organisational commitments. The literature recognises that 
when the boundaries of public organisations coincide with professional 
organisation the contest or struggle between professional groups can be further 
entrenched.  Larson argues that in such cases: “a protective institutional barrier 
is erected around occupations…when the organisation itself asserts its monopoly 
over a given functional area” (Larson 1977, p.180). 
Abbott goes on to argue that professional jurisdiction consists of acquiring rights 
(ideally exclusive rights) to solve particular problems.  The fundamental concept 
in acquiring and protecting jurisdictional rights is that of audience.  
Professionals are involved in a constant process of influencing pubic opinion, 
both as an end itself and as a way of influencing legal and political 
constituencies: 
Jurisdictional claims can be made in several possible arenas.  One is the 
legal system, which  can confer formal control of work.  Another is 
the related arena of public opinion, where professions build images that 
pressure the legal system. ... A jurisdictional claim made before the 
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public is generally a claim for the legitimate control of a particular kind 
of work." (Abbott 1988, p. 59) 
According to the inter-professional competition model, the source of goal 
incongruence is the contest between professional groups that it inherent in the 
professionalization project.  The competition may be for the resources of power, 
prestige, status and financial rewards, or may be an existential contest for 
jurisdictional rights.  Goal incongruence is both an outcome of that struggle and 
a means by which it is conducted. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has clarified the theoretical explanations of the sources of goal 
incongruence. It has critically evaluated a variety of explanations found in 
disparate literatures and organised and incorporated those explanations into two 
explanatory models. The Hierarchical model of goal incongruence locates the 
cause of the phenomena in the downward delegation of responsibility necessary 
in large organisations. It understands organisations to operate as ‘chains of 
command’. Goal incongruence is viewed as an inevitable consequence of the 
difficulty of sustaining common commitments and shared purposes across the 
span of the bureaucratic hierarchy.  
The chapter proposed six influences by which goal incongruence might be 
produced under conditions of bureaucratic delegation.  The simplest and most 
straightforward shaping influence is described in the propensity for the 
operational behaviours of intermediaries to become centred on specific daily 
problems and proximate goals that are effectively substituted for the professed 
goals of the organisation.  This presents the most ‘innocent’ explanation for the 
shaping of goal incongruence.  Intermediary and subordinate actors become pre-
occupied with their work and ultimate ends and goals are forgotten, or at least 
recede from consciousness. The propensity to become pre-occupied with daily 
problems is re-enforced by the tendency for office holders to identify with the 
importance of bureaucratic rules and procedures and the necessity of securing 
compliance with those rules and procedures even at the expense of achieving the 
formal goals or ultimate ends of the organisation. 
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The use of intermediaries creates a tendency toward a bifurcation of interests, 
under which intermediaries are concerned chiefly with their social positions as 
agents.  This introduces operative goals of advancing their status (Sills) 
relationships with individuals outside the hierarchical chain of delegation (Sills 
1957, Lipsky 1983), general self-interest (Downs 1966) and self-aggrandizement 
and illegitimate functions (Bozeman).  
The discretionary gap associated with the iterated downward delegation of goals 
within hierarchies is experienced within a context characterised by differential 
access to information and perceptions of reality and uncertain outcomes (Downs 
1966) and the misapplication of policies due to genuine misunderstanding of 
their nature by subordinates (Bozeman 1993). The fifth and sixth shaping 
influences apply to hierarchies in network arrangements.  They describe 
situations where organizational segmentation leads individuals to advocate 
parochial organizational interests and the hierarchical imposition of different 
performance control systems on professional groups.  
The organisational segmentation model focuses on the organisational allegiances 
of professionals as the shaping influence for goal incongruence. Differential 
organisational membership intensifies inter and intra professional competition 
and goal incongruence. Organisational affiliation acts to encourage professionals 
to identify with and promote goals that reflect the interests of their organisation.  
It also influences patterns of inter and intra professional interaction, tending to 
ensure that interactions within organisation boundaries are denser than 
interactions across organisational boundaries. Finally organisational boundaries 
act to protect and maintain goal commitments that would be resolved to the 
satisfaction of dominant professional groups without the influence of such 
‘protective institutional boundaries’ (Larson 1977). 
The performance control model locates the cause of goal incongruence in the 
different systems of performance measurement used to control professional 
practice. Performance control systems prioritise action to achieve the goals they 
contain at the expense of those that they omit.  They can also act as powerful 
goals in themselves as professionals strive to achieve comparative advantage in 
performance comparisons.  Performance measurement and control systems tend 
to be co-terminus with professional orientations.  They therefore operate as 
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discreet systems that concentrate on professionally introspective measures of 
practice and outcomes.  The result is that professional performance measurement 
and control systems tend to act against the tendencies toward inter-professional 
co-operation. They act to establish and maintain inter-professional goal 
incongruence while reducing intra – professional goal incongruence.  
The Horizontal model of goal incongruence draws on the theoretical perspective 
that organizations should be conceptualized not as chains of command but as 
coalitions of interest. This theoretical frame suggests that organizations are 
comprised of   coalitions of individuals, some of whom are organised into sub-
coalitions.  Organizational goals emerge from the process of bargaining, both 
within and between sub-coalitions. Professional identities and commitments 
operate as a particularly significant locus for the development of organisational 
coalitions and sub-coalitions. 
The chapter proposed described three influences by which goal incongruence 
might be shaped by differing professional orientations. The first is the reinforced 
pre-dispositions model. New entrants to professionals are not selected at 
random, but self-select on the basis of attraction (their pre-disposition) to the 
values, goals, practice and benefits of their chosen profession.  This expression 
of fundamental difference in the commitments of prospective professionals is 
reinforced by the pre-and in service training those individuals received. 
The communities of practice model emphasises the differential nature of 
professional work as the shaping influence of goal incongruence.  Professional 
orientations are defined around the control and conduct of specific categories of 
work that define professional identities and experience.  The inter-professional 
competition model argues that a foundational aspect of professional identity is 
conflict with professional out-groups. This competition is articulated in struggles 
for jurisdictional control and authority.  Control is understood to derive from the 
perceived legitimacy of particular professional groups in the eyes of professional 
audiences, generally the public, other professional constituencies or policy / 
political elites.  The inter-professional competition model regards conflict as 
being intrinsic to the professionalization project.  Goal incongruence therefore 
arises in consequence of professional's need to define themselves and their 
interests and their status in opposition to other professional constituencies. 
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Chapter 4  Research Design 
 
Introduction 
The purpose of the research was to identify goal incongruence within a public 
network in order to further develop the understanding of theoretical models of 
the sources of goal incongruence. An investigation’s Research Design can be 
understood as the process selected for the collection and analysis of data in order 
to test, develop or generate theory.  The selection of a research design requires a 
range of decisions which at the operational level will include selecting the 
research questions, deciding what data to collect, by what method, from whom 
and in what form. Selecting a particular research design will also involve 
decisions of a more fundamental nature.  For example: Should the research be 
situated within the qualitative or quantitative research paradigms?  Should the 
purpose of the research be exploratory, descriptive or explanatory?  Should the 
investigation be conducted on an inductive or deductive basis? 
The principal aspects of the investigation's research design were that it was a 
single, qualitative case study in which the primary method of data collection was 
participant observation. The decisions to adopt this approach was taken as the 
author wished to study incongruence between enacted operative and formal 
goals within a meaningful organisational context, that is an empirical context 
where goal preferences could be clearly linked to organisational actions and 
consequences. The specific research questions were those discussed in the 
introduction: What are the empirical expressions of goal incongruence? How 
much goal incongruence is there and of what form? What are the sources of goal 
incongruence?  How do those sources shape goal incongruence? 
One of the issues that relate to qualitative case studies and participant 
observation is that it privileges the role of the researcher in collecting, 
interpreting and presenting data. Conclusions can appear, as if by magic, without 
reference to the innumerable decisions involved in reducing a lived experience 
to a single text, the auto-interrogation of which constitutes analysis that produces 
conclusions that are; "warranted or otherwise" (Orr 1996, p.144).  Under these 
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circumstances the researcher's intimacy with the data can put readers at a 
considerable disadvantage.  
The chapter will advocate the use of single case studies to evaluate theory.  It 
will discuss the motivation for and benefits of participant observation as a 
method for collecting data.  It will then go on to describe how access to the 
research settings was negotiated, how the researcher engaged (and refused to 
engage) with the social settings of the case study and how data was collected and 
interpreted.  In describing these activities the purpose of the chapter is to dispel 
the mystery that can surround participant observation and ensure that the 
practical arrangements and compromises inherent in composing ethnographic 
cases are not placed beyond scrutiny. 
 
Critical Case Studies 
The research questions were investigated using a single qualitative case study.  
Bryman and Bell describe qualitative research methods as those which: "rely on 
words to convey meaning and are characterised as being; inductivist, 
constructionist and interpretivist" (Bryman and Bell 2003, p.279). Case studies 
differ from other forms of research designs (surveys, experiments and histories) 
in that they are a form of empirical research design that: "Investigate a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident" (Yin 2003 
p.13). The advantage of the case study is that: "it can 'close in' on real-life 
situations and test views directly in relation to phenomena as they unfold in 
practice" (Flyvbjerg 2006, p. 235).   
Case study research suffers from a number of claimed drawbacks and 
disadvantages. Perhaps the most fundamental is the objection that it is 
impossible to generalise from single case studies, and that as a result their 
scientific utility is limited to developing hypotheses (Popper 1957) that might be 
tested by 'more rigorous' research methods. These positions are articulated in 
statements such as: 
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A case study cannot provide reliable information about the broader 
class, but it may be useful in the preliminary stages of an investigation 
since it provides hypotheses, which may be tested systematically with 
a larger number of cases (Abercrombie, Hill and Turner 1984, p. 34). 
And more succinctly: "Such studies [single cases] have such a total absence of 
control as to be of almost no scientific value"  (Campbell and Stanley 1966, p.6). 
Despite this view it has also been argued that it is possible to generalise from 
single case studies and, indeed, that single case studies can be used to test as 
well as develop hypotheses.  These claims rest on the concept of the 'critical 
case' (Goldthorpe et al 1968, Entwistle 2005, Flyvbjerg 2006).  A critical case 
possesses a: "Strategic importance in relation to the general problem under 
study" (Flyvbjerg 2006, p.229).  The objective of the critical case is to: "achieve 
information that permits logical deduction of the type, 'if this is (not) valid for 
this case, then it applies to all (no) case [sic]" (Flyvbjerg 2006, p.230). From this 
perspective, the characteristics possessed by some empirical contexts are 
especially relevant to the analysis and evaluation of the predictions made by 
theoretical models of social phenomena.   
The analytical justification for the critical case study is provided by Goldthorpe 
et al's description of their approach to studying the embourgeoisment of affluent 
workers: 
In planning the field investigations, which formed the major part of 
the research, our first concern was to find a locale for these, which 
would be as favourable as possible for the validation of the 
embourgeoisment thesis. ... we felt it important that our test of the 
thesis should, if possible, be made a critical one in the following 
sense: that if, in the case we studied,  a process of embourgeoisment 
was shown not to be in evidence, then it could be regarded as 
extremely unlikely that such a process was occurring to any 
significant extent in British society as a whole. (Goldthorpe et al 1968, 
p.2). 
These arguments suggest that it is possible to generalize from single case studies 
where those case studies are drawn from social contexts that approach ideal 
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conditions for the expression of the phenomenon that is the object of research.  
The Ministry of Justice was selected as a suitable critical case, or to use 
Goldthorpe et al's (1968, p. 2) phrase an 'ideal locale' for research on the sources 
of goal incongruence for a number of reasons: 
 (i). The case study presented clear vertical (hierarchical interactions 
 between a clearly defined strategic / policy core (the strategic core) and 
 operational agencies (the delivery network). 
 (ii). Hierarchical interactions between core and network were made 
 empirically visible due to the organisational and geographic patterning 
 of those interactions. 
 (iii). The case study presented clear expression of horizontal difference 
 (in professional orientations) within the delivery network that was 
 expressed independently of hierarchical relationships.  
 (iv). The operational work and statutory obligations of the CJS demanded 
 intense inter-professional interaction. Inter-professional interactions were 
 consequently not experienced as ephemeral and optional, but as 
 inevitable and critical to professional effectiveness. 
In summary the MoJ represented a critical case for the analysis of goal 
incongruence because the intense vertical and horizontal interactions provided 
an ideal incubator for goal incongruence.  The nature of horizontal and vertical 
relationships, particularly the fact that the network arrangement allowed the 
influence of the two vectors to be empirically isolated provided the opportunity 
to draw conclusions as to the source of goal incongruence.  Furthermore the 
stability of the horizontal and vertical relationships, for example the agencies 
were statutorily and practically precluded from 'exiting' vertical or horizontal 
relationships provided a compelling context fro the development of goal 
incongruence.  Finally the nature of the work (both in terms of its intrinsic 
importance and its demand of co-operative action) meant that goal incongruence 
was not a peripheral issue, but a feature of organisational behaviour that 
mattered to actors within the case study. 
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In order to establish empirical accounts of goal incongruence it was necessary to 
identify formal and operative goals within the case study network. Formal goals 
have been defined as those goals that:  “represented the general purposes of the 
organization as put forth in the charter, annual reports, public statements and 
other authoritative statements” (Perrow, 1961, p. 855).  The research identified 
formal goals from the business plans published by each of the case study 
organisations. These sources were selected because they were consistently 
available (all of the case study organisations published documents described as 
Business Plans or Strategic Business plans for the 2011-15 period and for 
specific years within that period).  They also fulfilled the requirement of being 
formal documents whose content might reasonably be expected to be the 
considered product of reflective thought and therefore to meet Perrow’s criteria 
of being authoritative public statements. 
Formal goals were therefore taken from analysis of the selected documentary 
field. The Strategic Business Plans of the Ministry of Justice and each of the 
statutory agencies within the Delivery Network were obtained from the web sites 
of those organisations.  The documents were then analysed and the formal goals 
set out in those documents were identified and recorded.  
Operative goals within the case study network were inferred from observed 
behaviour. The objective of the data collection methodology has been the 
provision of narrative accounts that are sufficiently ‘thick’ (Geertz 1983) to 
provide convincing evidence that those representations of observed behaviour 
and the subsequent inference of operative goals are trustworthy (Lincoln and 
Guba 1985).   In the present case study participant observation was conducted 
for a prolonged period of time (over twelve months) on an intensive basis that 
involved the researcher in more than one hundred days of participant observation 
at various points within the case study network.  Detailed field notes were 
compiled concurrently with observation.  These notes provided the evidence for 
subsequent interpretive analysis.   
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Participant Observation 
The primary method of data collection was participant observation.  Participant 
observation involves: "establishing a place in some natural setting on a relatively 
long-term basis in order to investigate, experience and represent the social life 
and social processes that occur in that setting" (Emerson, Fretz and Shaw 1995: 
352).  Another definition of participant observation is that it is a:  
Research practice in which the investigator joins the group, 
community or organisation being studied, as either a full or partial 
member, and both participates  in and observes activities, asks 
questions, takes part in conversations and reads relevant documents. 
[Participant observation] is a practice in which the researcher engages 
with the people being studied, shares their life as far as possible and 
converses with them in their own terms (Watson 2011:5). 
Participant observation is a form of ethnographic enquiry. Watson has defined 
ethnography and participant observation in the following terms: 
[Ethnography is] a style of social science writing which draws upon the 
writer’s close observation of and involvement with people in a 
particular social setting and relates the words  spoken and the practices 
observed or experienced to the overall cultural framework within which 
they occurred" (Watson 2011:4). 
The advantages of participant observation to the study of goal incongruence are that 
it is a research method that is capable of generating rich and meaningful data of how 
organisations actually work (Geertz 1973, Orr 1996, Jarzabkowsky 2005).  It also 
allows data to be collected from other qualitative methods (such as interviews, and 
qualitative questionnaires) to be ‘situated’ within knowledge of the organisational 
context (Watson 2011).   
Research based on participant observation generally conforms to the following 
features: 
People's actions and accounts are studied in everyday contexts. ... Data 
are gathered from a range of sources ... . Data is, for the most part, 
relatively unstructured. The focus is usually on a few cases... , this is to 
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facilitate in-depth study.  ... The analysis of data involves interpretation 
of the meanings, functions, and consequences of human actions and 
institutional practices.  (Hammersley and Atkinson 2003:3) 
This tension between interviews and observation, sentiment and action, claims 
and practice is recognised by Atkinson, Coffey and Delamont when they record 
that: "part of the reported comparison between participant observation and 
interviewing has revolved around the ironic contrast between what people do 
and what people say they do" (2003:106).  This simple dichotomy is criticised 
by the authors for being reductionist and failing to understand the empirical 
value of narrative accounts where individuals choose what to say and what not to 
say.  Nevertheless interviews are seen as a "performance" and a "collaborative 
act of identity construction" (Atkinson Coffey and Delamont 2003:111) rather 
than a straightforward, reliable and uncontested description of social action. 
Indeed Atkinson, Coffey and Delamont conclude that:   
While conventional distinctions between 'what people do' and  'what 
people say' are often overdrawn, we should not lose sight of the 
importance of what people do.  The practices of everyday life, the 
performance of social selves, or the conduct of social encounters will 
not be documented through the collection of interview data.  If we wish 
to understand the forms of life and the types of social action in a given 
social setting, then we surely cannot escape the kind of engagement that 
is implied by participant observation. (Atkinson Coffey and Delamont 
2003:116). 
Thus participant observation holds the promise of allowing the researcher to go 
beyond superficial, misleading or legitimising representations of practice in 
order to apprehend the 'hidden' and elusive reality of that practice  
    
 Defining the Goal Carrying Constituency: Who to Observe? 
A question of significant methodological importance for participant observation 
of goal incongruence is: Precisely who shares the conception of the desired end:  
Cyert and March (1963) point out that organisations cannot have goals, only 
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people can.  So how can a research design place boundaries around groups of 
people who can be shown to hold shared conceptions of desired ends.  This work 
recognises six types of constituency. At the most basic level there is the 
individual, the constituency of one. Much research in the field of goal 
incongruence does actually concern itself with the individual, defining goal 
incongruence as disagreement between individuals.  Increasing in scale from the 
individual you arrive at the peer group.  The peer group refers to the small group 
of individuals with whom the individual engages in co-operative (although not 
necessarily conflict free) working relationships. The important point to 
remember about the peer group is its potential heterogeneity. Lawyers may 
spend their careers in peer groups comprised of police officers, court officials, 
probation staff and administrators and only rarely have meaningful work based 
co-operation with their fellow professionals. In the case described the peer group 
will include individuals with different professional and organisational 
experience, different financial, cultural capital and status and different seniority 
within their respective hierarchies. However it is within these peer group 
relationships that the work of the individuals is likely to be conducted. 
The third constituency is the professional orientation. The important point to 
make is that the profession will almost always be supra organisational.  Indeed 
some professions can extend across several organisational fields. This means 
that the organisational view can fall away from studies of goal incongruence.  In 
this approach research attempts to show how the goals of different professional 
groups are more or less congruent. The fourth constituency is represented by 
organisational membership.  This is particularly relevant in the study of goal 
incongruence within networks where the goals of different organisations might 
be incongruent.  
The fifth approach is to focus on hierarchical position. This assumes that 
individuals who operate at equivalent levels within a hierarchy are more likely to 
share goals with their equivalents. This assumption is expressed in the number of 
studies of goal incongruence that seek to compare the congruence of goals 
between superiors and subordinates. 
The final constituency is described as the informal interest group. This is a 
constituency that is ignored in the goal incongruence literature.  They consist of 
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informal social networks that form to advance shared interests.  An excellent (if 
somewhat parochial) example of this type of constituency is provided by the 
Cardiff University Bicycle Users Group.  This group formed to advance the 
interests of staff who cycled to work and despite having no formal basis or 
cohesive identity beyond a commitment to cycling nevertheless proved 
extremely effective in organising and presenting their views within the 
University.  More significant examples might include networks formed around 
gender politics, employment practices or various respect agendas.  Despite 
having little formal basis such informal interest networks can display a high 
commitment, influence, motivation and can prove to be surprisingly effective in 
influencing organisations.  They represent the intrusion of societal institutions 
(cycling, equality, employment rights, fair working practices respect gender 
fairness) into the organisational landscape. 
The case study set out to infer operative goals from observed behaviour. In one 
sense this ensured that the method was open to each of the goal carrying 
constituencies described above if their conceptions of desired ends were 
manifested in the social setting for research.  In practice the nature of the case 
study and the particular way in which participant observation was undertaken 
marginalised individual commitments and those of informal interest groups. 
Participant observation was organised around inferring the operative goals of 
shared conceptions of desired ends with different professional orientations and 
hierarchical positions.  However in practice it also developed to encompass peer 
group membership, particularly in the delivery network, as the social settings 
emphasised attempts to reduce inter-professional barriers by developing 
integrated working practices. 
 
Negotiating Access to the Research Settings 
One of the first (and potentially the last) challenges faced by researchers 
conducting participant observation is how to gain access to the social settings to 
be researched (Feldman 2003).  Numerous ethnographic texts discuss the 
difficulties encountered in negotiating access to the settings of social action.  In 
my case I was aware that I wanted to conduct participant observation research on 
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goal incongruence within a public sector organisation, preferably in a network 
context.  This meant that I would need to gain access that permitted me to 
observe social action from several perspectives or positions within the social 
setting of the research. The process by which I gained access is described below. 
I used my own contacts, and those that were made available trough the offices of 
the Lean Enterprise Research Centre of Cardiff Business School. I had meetings 
with managers from organisations within the NHS, voluntary organisations, a 
social services department of a local authority and central government 
departments.  In the event the most effective contact proved to be an individual 
within the Ministry of Justice, which ultimately proved successful in generating 
research access. This person was a member of the Senior Civil Service and 
effectively acted as a sponsor to the research project, taking responsibility for 
presenting the research to more senior gatekeepers and piloting the proposal 
skilfully through the process of gaining authorisation. 
Reference to 'negotiating' access is common in the ethnographic literature.  
However frequently explanations do not explicitly refer to what is being 'traded'.  
The host organisation clearly offers access, and the connected permission to 
publish narrative accounts of the events and access observed.  However the 
question of what the researcher has to trade in the negotiation is often less 
clearly described.   
The obvious answer may be that the host organisation is interested in and will 
benefit from the product of the research.  In my case the result of the research, a 
better theoretical understanding of the sources of goal incongruence in a public 
network, was of limited interest to the host organisation.  Another reason that is 
less frequently discussed is the opportunity ethnographic research holds for 
generating positive representations of host organisations and sponsors.  One 
might go so far as to describe them as hoping to be the subjects and beneficiaries 
of, if not hagiographies, then at least the co-production of heroic identity as a 
person or group that deserve to be talked and written about, that being the 
subject of research might offer.  In this understanding of the access negotiation 
the observer can offer themselves as a status symbol for particular managers or 
groups, similar to an exotic pet or an expensive foreign car, an example of 
ostentatious managerial display through the conspicuous consumption of 
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academic interest.  While I can't discount this motivation entirely it did not 
appear particularly relevant in my case.  The display value of a PhD student is 
easy to overstate.  It did not appear to be a primary motivation of the sponsor or 
to outweigh the potentially career limiting damage that participant observation 
could cause if negative narratives were publicised, a possibility that individuals 
within several potential host organisations indicated was of concern to them.   
What I had to trade was supposed experience and claimed competence.  In the 
mid 1990's I worked for four years as a research fellow for Professor Daniel T. 
Jones in Cardiff Business School's Lean Enterprise Research Centre.  Professor 
Jones was one of the authors of the Machine That Changed The World, a book 
that introduced the concept of Lean Production.  Over the thirteen years between 
my employment and negotiating access the Lean paradigm had been widely 
institutionalised within the public sector in various forms. This provided me with 
excellent credentials and credibility with the project sponsor within the MoJ.   
What I could offer in the negotiation around access was the possible contribution 
I could make in areas of public service improvement and continuous 
improvement within the MoJ network.  In addition I had spent time after my 
employment at Cardiff University working on consultancy and training projects 
for various government departments including the Treasury, Home Office, 
Office of the Deputy Prime Minister and Department for Transport in addition to 
teaching a wide variety of civil servants at the National School for Government.  
In this way I had gained extensive knowledge of public sector issues and had 
learned to model vocabularies and behaviours that enabled me to pass 
convincingly as an insider within public sector organisations. 
 
 Limiting Engagement in The Research Setting 
Despite, or perhaps because of my experience, I was extremely firm not to over-
promise with regard to my contribution within the research settings.  I explained 
carefully in written briefs and oral communication that the principles of 
participant observation precluded me from leading projects or fulfilling a 
business development role.  I was happy to work as an 'extra set of hands', 
particularly as this would make being part of a working environment more 
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natural and less obviously intrusive.  However I could do no more as to do so 
would threaten the integrity of my research. 
There were two reasons for my insistence on limiting engagement within the 
research setting. Firstly I had become disillusioned with the simplistic, 
superficial and (in my opinion) largely unsuccessful manner of the majority of 
improvement initiatives that I had been involved in.  I believed (and still believe) 
that the most important responsibility of actors in public organisations is to build 
organisational cultures around the practice of continuous improvement and that 
developing organisational effectiveness is of prime importance.  At the same 
time I didn't want to be personally involved with the extravagant claims, raised 
worker expectations and subsequent disappointment that I had come to associate 
with improvement projects that appeared only to succeed in improving the CV's 
and career opportunities of project leaders and owners.   
At the same time I was concerned that if I strayed from a strict interpretation of 
participant observation I would be accused by academics of conducting action 
research or even worse, consultancy attempting to pass itself off as action 
research.  I was concerned that academics who prefer: "to look at journals such 
as Organization rather than Harvard Business Review" (Alvesson 2013, p. 79), 
would dismiss the value of my inquiry if they believed it to be a form of action 
research or consultancy.   
I believed that this was a real and not imagined threat to the project because I 
was aware of an antipathy held by many academics to the Lean paradigm.  This 
was exemplified in comments that Lean was prescriptive, simplistic, 
breathtakingly arrogant and its: "analysis of workplace relations ... trite" 
(Delbridge 1995 p33-34).  Given my background in training and consultancy 
(which had been explicitly raised as a concern) I felt particularly vulnerable.   Of 
course the irony was that I had come to share their academic doubts about the 
implementation of operational effectiveness paradigms and had come to be 
repelled by the opportunism of consultancy practices.  Nevertheless, I was 
concerned that they would: 'shoot first and not bother to ask questions later'. 
My response to dealing with this perceived threat was to talk endlessly within 
academic circles (at every opportunity) about ontology and epistemology, social 
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constructionism, phenomenology, interpretivist research and thick description.  
This was partially due to genuine intellectual exhilaration at encountering ideas 
that I found 'good to think' (with apologies to Claude Levi-Strauss), and partly to 
establish my bona fides with regard to academic intention.  I suspect that several 
individuals found this somewhat tiresome, and I received some feedback that I 
was being excessively theoretical.  Such comments were welcome, because I felt 
that being criticised for being too theoretical protected me from accusations of 
being an action researcher or consultant that I worried might prove fatal to my 
research ambitions. 
My approach proved successful in gaining access to the MoJ.   I discussed with 
my sponsor my need to move into conducting participant observation in the 
delivery network as the second phase of the research.  However because I lacked 
a clear understanding of what social settings would be appropriate or necessary 
we agreed that we would decide on an appropriate approach at a later stage when 
appropriate situations had emerged. 
Some months later, my original sponsor having moved to another role, I 
negotiated access to the delivery network with a different and less senior 
individual within the MoJ.    Again the basis for participant observation rested 
on my experience and my ability to make a contribution as another set of hands.  
I felt that my new 'sponsor' was far less committed to my involvement than the 
original sponsor. I sensed that they were far more concerned about managing 
risks to the organisation of unwanted publicity. I was also far more sensitive 
about negotiating access for the second phase because I was concerned that 
without observation in the delivery network I wouldn't have a research project 
and my significant investment of time and effort would be wasted.   
In the event I was fortunate to be in the right place at the right time.  A group of 
senior individuals from organisations in the delivery network had been 
persistently requesting resource to support a project to develop an integrated 
victim service in their area.  Members of the strategic core either did not wish, or 
were unable, to provide a resource at a time when staff numbers were 
undergoing significant reductions.  My presence provided a solution, it suited the 
centre and network for me to provide the resource. Again I insisted on my role 
as a participant observer, not a project leader.  In other words I made my 
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involvement conditional on being an additional set of hands and no more. The 
value of my labour, and the lack of alternatives, overcame reluctance in both 
quarters (core and network) to: "air their dirty laundry in public" (participant 
observation notes).  
Despite having a clear conscience, at least from a research ethics perspective, 
having been clear at all times about my contribution, as participant observation 
progressed it became clear that sponsors expected me to do more work than I 
was doing.  Particularly in the delivery network I sensed that I was expected to 
do more work than had been agreed and to take more responsibility for project 
implementation than I was comfortable with or prepared to do.   This reflects 
Atkinson and Hammersley's reminder that the difficulties associated with 
negotiating access: "persist, to one degree or another, throughout the data 
collection process" (Atkinson and Hammersley 2003:41).   
 
Collecting Data 
Data was collected in two research settings.  Altogether I spent more than one 
hundred days over the course of a little over a year collecting data.  The first 
social setting was located at the MoJ HQ in Westminster.  This was a pleasant 
and modern office environment complete with atrium, coffee areas and 
conference facilities opposite St. James Park underground station.  Following a 
major refurbishment he building was light, open and airy and provided an 
extremely pleasant working environment.  This was a big difference to the 
gloomy and dour offices that filled the building as I remembered it prior to the 
refurbishment when I had visited it to provide training programmes for the 
Home Office. 
Being based in Cardiff, having family commitments and being relatively short of 
funds, I chose to commute to central London by train.  Obtaining the cheapest 
tickets meant leaving Cardiff on the 5.15 am train and returning on trains that 
left after 6.30 pm.  This generally involved setting the alarm for 4.30 in the 
morning and arriving home at around 9.30.  My field notes from the time make 
constant reference to the fatigue I constantly experienced.  My day involved 
driving into Cardiff railway station, sleeping as best as I could in a business suit 
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on the train to London, arriving in Paddington at 7.30.  I would then walk to 
Westminster through Hyde Park, Green Park and St. James' park.  This was a 
pleasant walk in the summer that gave me the opportunity to recover from the 
stupor of the train.  It was an enormous relief when the second phase of 
participant observation, in an English City that was closer to home, reduced the 
time spent travelling and gave me some respite from early starts and late returns.    
In some ways it cold be argued that travelling to the research setting each day 
reduced the opportunity for collecting data in social settings after work.  
However I did 'stay in town' on a number of occasions to attend social occasions.  
In addition many of the Civil Servants that I worked with also commuted long 
distances on a daily basis.  So in a way the experience of long commutes was an 
authentic component of the social setting. 
The environment in which observations were made in the first research setting 
was an open plan office.  As a refurbished and modern workspace the 'working 
environment' complied with the now near ubiquitous 'long-bench' hot-desking 
system.  Work teams were allocated a space on a floor, but sat at desks as they 
became available.  There were no personal files.  Each worker had his or her 
own locker for personal effects.  Each floor area had kitchen facilities, meeting 
room suites and photocopying equipment and also had various round tables at 
which informal meetings and conversations could be convened.  In addition to 
working within MoJ headquarters I also conducted participant observation at 
MoJ activities in HM Treasury, the Cabinet Office, Royal Courts of Justice and a 
number of other Headquarters buildings in Central London and Magistrates' 
Courts in various parts of England. 
In the second research setting I was loosely based in a variety of settings 
connected to the Local Criminal Justice Board (LCJB).  This started with being 
located in an office shared with the Crown Prosecution Service that was rather 
tired and shabby.  However part way through the period of observation the 
location moved to a newly refurbished Police building that conformed to the 
increasingly common 'long bench' form of open plan working environment.  I 
also spent a considerable amount of time in various police stations, probation 
buildings and Magistrates' and Crown Courts.  
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The sense that you can take from superficial accounts of participant observation 
is that the observer gains access to a research setting. They then wait to watch 
what happens and as a series of distinct and theoretically relevant of events 
occurs they document (inscribe) those events for future reference and analysis. 
However my experience of conducting participant observation is far more 
occluded, fragmented and complex.  In particular participant observation is 
comprised of a number of connected but separate methods by which 'data' is 
produced.   
Participant observation took two forms. In the first the emphasis was on the 
researcher as a participant.  That is as a team member and fellow worker 
engaged in co-producing the work of the team.  In the second the emphasis was 
on researcher as observer, access to the social setting allowed the researcher to 
watch while others worked.  However this form of participant observation could 
prove quite unsatisfactory.  Watching, from an oblique angle, a person typing at 
a computer or even less informatively staring inertly at a screen (what I came to 
refer to in notes as 'screen peering') was less than informative.  Were they 
engrossed in contemplating the latest strategy for privatising the UK Criminal 
Justice System, browsing Wikipedia or wrestling with their on-line grocery 
order?  It was usually impossible to tell. 
In part I came to view participant observation as an opportunity to initiate 
informal conversations.  These conversations could be attempts to pass the time 
and establish relationships or at least common ground.  They could also evolve 
toward informal and terribly unstructured interviews. I was a researcher 
interested in collecting relevant information.  The 'conversee' knew this and most 
of the time understood the rules of the game.  That is we both understood that we 
were engaged in a joint production of narrative (and at a push culture and 
identity).  In that sense these 'informal conversations' frequently took on a 
performative aspect.  For example one intelligent and erudite individual 
commented; "this place is like Gormenghast and people either fit in or leave" 
(Participant Observation Notes).   As the comment was made I envisaged it on 
the page in the final dissertation. In retrospect I suspect that the person was, at 
least to an extent, 'feeding' me those lines and at the same time deriving some 
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satisfaction from giving voice to their opinion and co-opting the authorship of a 
small part of 'my' thesis. 
The open plan nature of the research setting also gave consistent opportunities 
for eavesdropping on the conversations of others. At its most innocent this 
involved listening to the conversations between other team members who were 
aware of my presence and my intent.  Alternatively a member of staff from a 
different floor of the building might begin a conversation with a team member 
within my hearing.  The most interesting of these conversations were generally 
conducted with members of the Ministerial private office or press office, both 
because of the cachet of the content and also because of the panache of the 
performance delivered by the 'actors' employed in those offices.  Thirdly, other 
teams from our floor would occasionally hold informal meetings not in closed 
meeting rooms but at the round tables scattered across the office.  Their 
conversations were often audible and eavesdropping provided valuable 
information about what was going on outside of your team. 
I did everything in my power to avoid conducting formal interviews because I 
did not want to 'contaminate' participant observation data with the dubious 
sentiments that were to be found in the province of formal and 'artificial' 
interview performances.  In retrospect my prejudice against interviews appears 
overstated and excessively cynical.  In my field notes for the 20.7.2012 I wrote: 
Another point is that #3 was keen that I do interviews, with #14 [a very 
senior member of the MoJ].  I’m not really pushed on doing this, 
because I will ask some questions and they will say some things. I’ve 
become quite dismissive, bored with the game of public claims and 
suspicious of my intellectual ability to ask the right questions and ‘get 
to the heart of the matter’. (Participant Observation Notes)   
However as part of my work I was required to interview a number of people in a 
variety of organisational contexts.  For example about the organisation of 
services for victims of serious crime or progress in improving the operational 
effectiveness of Court and Police processes.  Again I informed all interviewees 
of my dual role as a MoJ 'worker' and a doctoral researcher.    While I mistrusted 
interview data I was always astonished at how much more productive (at least in 
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terms of quantity) conducting an interview was when compared to conducting 
participant observation. 
One of the advantages of participant observation was the access it provided to 
official documents, often restricted.  In fact the sheer volume of documentary 
evidence could be a significant problem.  On the other hand the use of such 
documents could be severely limited.  In the first research setting the restraint 
was confidentiality, the restricted status of many of the documents and the 
restrictions of the Official Secrets Act.  In the second research setting IPR was of 
far more interest than confidentiality to the sponsors of the research.  However I 
was also acutely aware of the criminal implications of mis-using police 
computers and data. 
 
 Writing Field Notes 
Many participant observers make reference to the difficulty encountered in 
writing field notes.  It is surprising how many describe disappearing into the 
nearest toilet to write their notes.  I was spared that indignity because I was 
conducting participant observation in an office environment.  I could sit at my 
computer and type my notes in close to real time without drawing attention to 
myself.  I rarely had so much work that I had no time to write up notes.  When I 
did I completed notes while waiting for the train at Paddington Station or sitting 
on the train.  This allowed my desk time to be devoted to analysis.  However on 
occasion I was sufficiently upset by my experiences of participant observation 
that it was many days before I could face documenting my experiences. 
My experiences of conducting participant observation were generally positive. I 
built many good relationships and established friendships that continued beyond 
the period of active data collection.  However the experience of being an 
outsider pretending to be an insider is fundamentally uncomfortable and 
sometimes unpleasant.   I frequently felt a sense of being an imposter and 
intruding into a private situation where I did not belong. I also could not lose an 
uneasy sense that I was acting somehow in bad faith.  That is I was pretending to 
be part of the team, but only so that I could capture their stories for my own 
purpose without committing to share their fate. This created a conflicting sense 
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of professional and personal fulfilment in conducting ethnographic research and 
disdain for the element of pretence and in a sense exploitation that such research 
demanded.   
Delbridge (1995) described how he developed a facial tick during the early 
stages of fieldwork.  I don't believe that I exhibited physical signs such as that.  
However I did feel excruciating embarrassment at the voyeuristic and 
exploitative aspects of my research activity and the relationships that were 
essential to it.  I felt that I was essentially a "mere spectator" (Thesiger 1959, 
p.6).  Worse, I intended to appropriate the experience and stories of the people I 
was observing for my own purposes, hence the concern over the exploitative 
nature of the research relationship. 
Anxiety also emerged from the fear of having my outsider status recognised and 
acted upon.  It is not clear why I should be fearful of this event.  There was no 
threat to my safety as can sometimes be the case in ethnographic research.  What 
concerned me was the social embarrassment that might arise from a challenge to 
ethnographic conventions and the insult to my competence that would result 
from such a challenge.  In other word's I was concerned to establish and 
maintain my ability to 'carry-off' the contrived normalcy of observation.    
In both research settings I was tremendously aware of the nuanced behaviour of 
my key sponsors. I was acutely conscious of my dependence on them, 
particularly as time went on and my investment in the project increased.  I was 
constantly looking for small changes in body language, tone of voice, favourable 
dispositions and invitations to participate in activities that would indicate my 
position.  Looking back I am surprised at how neurotic I became on this point. 
This focus on key sponsors meant that I was constantly pre-occupied in 
cultivating my relationship with them. However I was also cultivating 
relationships with almost every individual that I met.  This was emotionally 
exhausting and also alienating as I adopted different roles and personas for 
different interactions. It was also, of course, impossible to satisfy all individuals.  
While I found the practice of observation enormously rewarding I also found it 
to be a dislocating experience. 
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On a number of occasions my attempts to foster 'obliviousness' and pass as an 
insider became difficult to sustain.  On those occasions it became necessary to 
decide when to press on with observation and when to withdraw.  The example 
below is taken from participant observation notes and describes an occasion 
where the decision was made to gamble on remaining  'within the social setting'.   
I was looking forward to today because the second benefits tracking 
workshop was scheduled for 9.30am to 11.30am on the 9th floor 
conference room.  The first workshop had concentrated very heavily on 
behaviours and values and the second workshop was convened very 
much to address the perceived inappropriateness of the outcomes of the 
first. 
On arrival I found an e-mail from #10 cancelling the meeting.  At 
9.25am I went down to the room anyway, and sure enough #10 was 
there preparing for the meeting.  I was unsure whether I was ‘crashing’ 
the workshop.  I asked if the meeting had been cancelled and they 
mumbled something about a mistake, but that I could stay, and in the 
end I was volunteered to write up notes of the informal discussions. It 
was an uncomfortable situation.  It may be that there was a genuine 
error, but more likely I suspect that #6 had indicated that my presence 
was undesirable.  (Participant Observation Notes).  
Usually reference to my outsider status was less acute.  For example: "when #4 
took their team across to the project table she said in a weary sort of a way "you 
can come too Owen".  She didn’t seem to be very keen, and also was pointing 
out my position as not really part of the team" (Participant Observation Notes). 
Observation of the meetings described in the examples produced a significant 
quantity of high quality data.  However there is no way of knowing how many 
meetings or events that I was excluded from without my knowledge.  It is also 
the case that on a small number of occasions I was explicitly and publicly 
excluded from social contexts: 
As this was occurring the ... team were led off by #4 to one of the 
meeting rooms.  #3 suggested that I follow them. Anyway, I followed 
along, was almost last into the room, and as I walked in saw [from 
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their expression] that #4 didn’t want me there.  I asked if it was ok for 
me to be there, that #3 suggested that I tag along (which they had). #4 
said that it ‘no not really because it’s not that sort of meeting’.  I said 
something like "fine, no problem" in an attempt at a genuine and 
understanding voice and left.  
My first time to be explicitly denied access as an ethnographer – no 
participant observation now. It was fairly embarrassing, although no 
doubt #4 was correct to do what they did in order to protect the dignity 
/ integrity of the other team members.  I felt uncomfortable going into 
the room, I sensed that I was intruding in a meeting at which I was not 
welcome, and I sensed that #3 knew what the meeting was going to be 
about. I should have checked that I was welcome or at least acceptable 
before walking into the room.. (Participant Observation Notes) 
In the event it emerged that the meeting had been to inform the team that they 
would be taken over by another manager but that the future roles of the affected 
individuals had not been finalised.  In this case #4 had clearly drawn a 
distinction between allowing me to observe 'normal business' and not allowing 
me to observe a private meeting that related to the future employment and career 
prospects of their team. In retrospect #4's actions appear reasonable, responsible 
and correct.     
On other occasions I became aware that ‘informants’ were guiding me away 
from practices within the network.  One memorable instance of this is described 
below: 
As we were talking #61 started telling me about multiple listing 
[organising multiple cases to run at the same time in the expectation 
that most of them would not go ahead] and how it had got much worse 
over the past couple of years.  She said that it was very frequently the 
case that domestic abuse victims would attend court only for the case 
to be rescheduled. They would often complain vociferously and it was 
a lot of work to get them to attend for a second or third time, which 
might require a summons, which itself took a lot of additional work 
and was frequently ineffective.  I was quite keen to find out how 
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frequently was frequent. I asked how often it was likely to occur.  #61 
said that if you took 10 victims of domestic violence, 7 of them would 
be ‘bumped’ on the first occasion.    
#61 was telling me over their computer screen of a case that cracked 
because the judge refused to reschedule a planned game of golf. #49 
smiled and shook their head and said that they didn’t think that those 
stories were true.  #61 was insistent that this wasn’t a story, but had 
actually happened to them, recently.  #49’s head dropped down below 
their computer screen, out of my line of sight.  #61 looked at them, 
stopped talking and said, "what, I shouldn’t say?" (Participant 
Observation Notes). 
Despite these inevitable difficulties of collecting data and writing field notes 
over the course of a year's participant observation I had hundreds of pages of 
detailed notes describing various empirical contexts.  I had also collected a small 
library of documents and e-mails that were relevant to the analysis of 
contradictory conceptions of desired ends within the case study network.  These 
texts constituted a body of data that could be analysed and interpreted in order to 
draw empirical and theoretical conclusions. 
 
Interpreting The Data 
During the period of participant observation there was no systematic analysis of 
the accumulating data. In fact there was a deliberate attempt to allow the data to 
develop without being 'contaminated' by the reflexive perspective of the 
researcher.  However there was a reflective engagement with the notes that 
represented an attempt to both make sense of the emergent data and assure and 
refine the conduct of participant observation. 
Following the active collection of data analysis began in earnest. The objective 
of data collection, its purpose and usefulness for analysis was the identification 
of operative goals.  As has been explained in earlier sections of this work, 
operative goals were inferred from observed behaviours.  In order to do this the 
notes were interrogated for evidence capable of providing convincing narrative 
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accounts of operational goals.  It might be desirable at this point to suggest that 
the researcher cleared their minds and interpreted the data with an unbiased 
mind.  It is difficult to see how this can be the case in practice.  Field notes are 
an expression of the lived experience of the ethnographic researcher.  The 
analysis of researcher-produced notes by the author can never be an entirely  
'clean' process.   
Coding encompasses a range of approaches to the organising of qualitative data 
in order that data can be subject to rigorous analysis. (Coffey and Atkinson 
1996, p.27).  To that extent codes provide the: "decisive link between the 
original 'raw' data... and the researcher's theoretical concepts..." (Seidel and 
Kelle 1995, p.52).  Most usually, coding is initiated following data collection.  
Researchers attribute themes, outcomes, motives and descriptive key words to 
particular elements of qualitative data. These organising themes and emergent 
narratives develop from the researchers interaction with collected data as a text, 
but also as a lived experience.   
Despite qualitative research generally being held to be inductive, there was a 
clear deductive element to the coding conducted in the case study. The coding 
system did not emerge from engagement with the data.  Instead the coding 
system was taken into the field as an observational framework.  The conceptual 
framework described in chapter three effectively provided the coding system. 
There were three levels of coding. The first involved data being organised into 
evidence of Formal and Operative goals, expressed by members of the Strategic 
Core and Delivery Network. The second organised evidence for contradiction, 
the test of goal incongruence.  The third categorised evidence for the sources of 
goal incongruence (vertical or horizontal) and the specific shaping influences 
claimed for each explanation of goal incongruence.  
The formal coding of participant observation notes and computerised statistical 
analysis was rejected because of a wish to avoid disguising the role of the 
researcher in constructing narrative accounts of ethnographic data  (ethnography 
means, after all, writing about people) and to avoid the practice of reifying 
participant observation notes as opposed to the practices being observed.  
Computerised analysis packages were not used because it was felt that they 
would count the researchers words (written in the participant observation notes) 
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and that these words would be likely to be heavily influenced by the researchers 
frame of reference.   
In that sense statistical analysis of participant observation notes would constitute 
research into the researcher and not the social setting.  Identifying patterns of 
behaviour in the notes, supported by the lived experience of participant 
observation, while still subject to the dangers of reflexivity, places the analysis 
back into the social settings and reduces the danger of reifying the researchers 
choices in translating lived experience into a text.  
	  
Conclusion 
In this chapter the author has sought to reveal the sequence of talk, decisions and 
actions that comprise (and potentially compromise) the research process.  The 
chapter began with a discussion with the motivation for the research and the 
selection of participant observation as the primary data collection method due to 
its perceived advantages over other forms of qualitative inquiry. While the 
researcher remains committed to the method of participant observation and feels 
that it has succeeded in providing evidence for interpretation in this study, 
inevitably what emerges from practice is knowledge of the limitations of the 
method. 
A number of limitations of participant observation emerged during the 
fieldwork. The view that participant observation allows researchers to 
distinguish between what people do rather than what they say they do was a 
gross simplification in my research.  In my case what people did was to talk or 
write.  As a result there was an unavoidable blurring between talk and action.  In 
addition talk was far more productive of data than participant observation.  A 
five-minute conversation would usually produce more notes than a day of 
participant observation.   
Interviews, where individuals were intent on producing dense and relevant 
answers produced quantities of data that were 'off the scale' compared to most 
days spent observing what people did.  Indeed whole days of participant 
observation could go by where nothing, or at least nothing novel happened.  Of-
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course that reflects the nature of practice, the answer to the question "what 
happened?" is frequently going to be "nothing much".  However, when it comes 
to analysing data and writing dissertations, it is very difficult to resist the large 
quantities of data that derives from talk as opposed to action.  This brings you 
back to the starting point of participation observation, are we describing what 
people do or what they say about what they do?  Are we giving narrative 
accounts disproportionate influence in theoretical explanations of organisational 
practice? 
The data generated by participant observation is entirely dependent on the 
position of the researcher.  The researcher only sees what they see, hears what 
they hear etc.   In this case position has a powerful physical aspect.  To observe 
you must be in the room, or speaking to somebody who was in the room who is 
reporting events to you.  This makes data contingent.  If you had been in 
different rooms at different times, the events witnessed would have been 
different. This acts as an enduring caveat to descriptions of organisational 
practice and the analysis those descriptions support. 
The participant observer can be (will be) misled. They will be misled because 
actors are presenting themselves in legitimate ways and because they are 
protecting their organisations, superiors, sub-ordinates and peers.  They will also 
be misled because informants are trying to be helpful, to give the researcher the 
information it is believed they want or need.  They will be misled because 
informants will want to give voice to their own beliefs.  However they will also 
mislead themselves.  Their commitment to ideas, explanations purposes will bias 
their research, not least by influencing what they seek to observe and how they 
observe it.   
During my period of participant observation the team that I was a member of 
was 'taken-out' by a rival group.  Some individuals who were regarded as 
valuable were incorporated into the victorious group.  Others were left to 
scramble to find new roles within the organisation.  Inevitably my interpretation 
of this event was biased by the fact that it was 'my' team that was 'taken out'.  
However it is very difficult to know how far my interpretation of this event was 
biased because the counter-factual experience was not available to me. 
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In summary these limitations illuminate the contingent nature of interpretive 
ethnography.  The findings of such studies depend on a stream of decisions, 
interpretative frames and serendipity.  Changing the pattern of these three pillars 
of interpretive research will inevitably change the nature of the findings and the 
theoretical conclusions those findings support.   
This does not invalidate qualitative approaches to organisational research.  
However it does mean that the trustworthiness of conclusions depends on the 
decisions, interpretive frames and the sequence of positions available to the 
researcher to be made available for the scrutiny of readers.  This, of-course, is 
not a new insight.  Indeed Virginia Woolf made just that point in a lecture at 
Cambridge in 1928:     
When a subject is highly controversial... one cannot hope to tell the 
truth.  One can only show how one came to hold whatever opinion one 
does hold.  One can only give one’s audience the chance of drawing 
their own conclusions as they observe the limitations, the prejudices, 
the idiosyncrasies of the speaker" (Woolf, 1929 p.6). 
The author has attempted to do this in the material contained within this chapter.  
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Chapter 5  Evidence of Goal Incongruence 
 
Introduction   
This Chapter will present evidence for goal incongruence within the case study 
network. Goal incongruence can be defined as contradiction between 
organisational actors as to the legitimacy of specific goals in the planning, 
conduct and control of work. The conceptual framework described in chapter 
three is utilized to evaluate the evidence for goal incongruence in a rigorous and 
systematic manner and warrant subsequent claims.  
Existing conceptions of goal incongruence accept difference between goals as a 
sufficient criterion for establishing incongruence. The conceptual framework 
developed and applied in this work does not accept that difference is 
synonymous with incongruence. It goes beyond established conceptions in 
insisting that difference between goals must also be demonstrated to be 
contradictory. Contradiction is confirmed when it can be demonstrated to give 
rise to organisational consequences whereby action to attain particular goals 
impedes, deflects or subverts action to attain other formal or operative goals of 
organisations with the effect of moderating or subordinating organisational 
purposes. 
The chapter will present an overview of the evidence for the presence of goal 
incongruence within the case study network and how that evidence satisfies the 
criteria for the identification of goal incongruence set out in the conceptual 
framework. It will then discuss in more detail those instances where the 
conceptual framework indicates that the empirical evidence does and does not 
indicate the presence of goal incongruence.  The chapter concludes by reviewing 
the evidence for goal incongruence and the value of the new conceptual 
framework over established conceptions of goal incongruence utilized in the 
existing literature on goal incongruence in public organisations. Goal 
Incongruence in the case study network is described in figure 5.1 (overleaf).  It 
indicates the presence or otherwise of goal incongruence.  Following Figure 5.1 
the evidence for goal incongruence in the nine sectors of Figure 5.1 is described.   
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An Overview of Goal Incongruence in the Case Study Network 
 
Figure 5.1 Description of Goal Incongruence in the Case Study Network 
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Empirical Contexts in which the presence of Goal Incongruence 
is Established 
The following section describes the five empirical contexts in which the 
conceptual framework suggests the evidence establishes the presence of goal 
incongruence.  For each empirical context the nature of goal incongruence is 
described and discussed. The implications of these conclusions for the 
explanations of goal incongruence will be returned to in chapters six and seven. 
 
 Formal – Operative goal incongruence within the Strategic Core 
There were two examples of formal – operative goal incongruence within the 
strategic core.  The first was that the formal goal of the cross criminal justice 
system (xCJS) efficiency programme was operatively subverted. Data collected 
during participant observation included explicit and implicit evidence of the 
operational subversion of this formal goal. This appears to constitute clear 
evidence of difference and contradiction between formal and operative goals.  
This work suggest that the criterion of contradiction achieving operational 
consequence is met in that the operative subversion of the formal goal appeared 
to derive from the senior leadership constituency in the MoJ who were in a 
position to make decisions concerning the prioritization of action and the 
allocation of resource. 
Continuous improvement was represented in the case study by the xCJS 
efficiency programme The objective of this programme was to integrate the 
practices of delivery agencies in order to improve operational efficiency and 
effectiveness. The logic for the xCJS programme was set out in a MoJ policy 
document in the following terms:  
The Criminal Justice System is the product of incremental change 
over centuries, based on principles of fairness, independence and due 
process, rather than efficiency; there is a need for greater collective 
responsibility amongst criminal justice agencies (including defence 
practitioners) with no incentive for any particular agency to take 
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actions which save money for other parts of the system (MoJ Policy 
Document, Participant Observation Notes). 
However despite this official position there was a view held by some in the 
Strategic Core that the xCJS programme was: unlikely to deliver in acceptable 
time scales:   
Being focused on incremental improvement the xCJS efficiency is 
unlikely to save the Ministry money. This only occurs when 
infrastructure is closed.  Senior leaders are only interested in saving 
money.  At best, this will be achieved without impairing performance 
too greatly. ... if organisational activity is not focused on driving cash 
out, should we be devoting resources to it? (Participant Observation 
Notes).    
Within the policy environment of the strategic core the xCJS efficiency 
programme was characterised as: "having a big name but little substance, 
lacking a clear long term narrative and failing to secure the engagement of 
Ministers" (Participant Observation Notes).  In addition there was a sentiment 
that it was unwise to commit to a course of action that was not in the direct 
interests of the MoJ:   
Any xCJS efficiency changes should represent what worked for the 
MoJ as opposed to other government departments. In particular the 
MoJ should resist changes which would deliver big improvements to 
the system, but which could be claimed by other departments: "why 
should we fall on our sword?" (Participant Observation Notes). 
Evidence for the low importance attached to continuous improvement was 
provided during participation at a closed MoJ event at a civil service conference: 
In the afternoon I took part in an event where eight teams of 5 to 6 
people from across the MoJ came together to create presentations on a 
range of challenges which face the MoJ network.  Two senior civil 
servants from the MoJ judged the presentations. My group’s subject 
was how the MoJ could reduce the number of  cracked and ineffective 
trials. These are trials which are scheduled for hearing in the criminal 
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courts but do not go ahead, causing disruption and expense to criminal 
justice agencies and potential distress to the victims of crime. My 
group argued that part of the solution would be to align the measures 
of different criminal justice agencies that cooperate to conduct trials.  
Our suggestion was picked up by one of the event judges who asked 
in a weary tone which hovered somewhere between disappointment 
and exasperation  “how realistic we thought it was” that delivery 
agency measures could be aligned, particularly within the 2010-15 
period (Participant Observation Notes). 
This experience is offered as evidence of the relatively low importance attached 
to continuous improvement within the delivery network. Inter-agency integration 
had been dismissed by authoritative figures in a public forum. This conclusion 
appears to be supported by a middle manager within the strategic core who 
dismissed the MoJ’s Business Plan as: “just for public consumption” (Participant 
Observation Notes). 
The second example of goal incongruence is the claim that the MoJ’s formal 
goals of reform are incongruent with the operative goal of reporting.  This claim 
rests on the impression formed during Participant Observation that individuals 
within the strategic core prioritized their commitment to the operative goal of 
reporting above their commitment to achieving the formal goals on which they 
were reporting.   
It is difficult to convey the amount of effort and resources directed toward the 
activity of Reporting within the strategic core and the proportion of staff for 
whom reporting was in many cases their most significant operative goal. 
Headquarters staff in the MoJ reported extensively and persistently on activity 
within the Ministry of Justice and its delivery agencies.  The term Reporting is 
used in this study to indicates collecting data requested by the senior leadership 
community and presenting it either on an ad-hoc basis or through papers 
prepared for standing committees.  The basis of reports might be management 
information on activities, capabilities and outputs, progress on implementing 
projects, or compliance with obligations imposed on the delivery network by the 
strategic core.   
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The availability of reporting data is often an issue. Operational areas in the 
delivery network find the continued requests for data to be unwelcome, onerous 
and a distraction from their operational commitments.  The result is widespread 
non-compliance with requests to provide data. Even where reporting information 
is provided the quality of the data is frequently poor in terms of accuracy, 
intelligibility and relevance. Members of the reporting structure within the 
strategic core have developed several strategies for dealing with these 
deficiencies. The first is a profound commitment to achieving the highest 
standards of presentation. This is manifested in its most complete form in the 
routine production of sophisticated documents that are often produced at A0 
scale or larger (in some cases they include panels comprised of numerous sheets 
of A0 paper).  
These sophisticated documents frequently incorporate graphics, flow-charts, 
process maps, critical paths, narrative accounts, and spread sheet data imported 
from multiple software applications.  Considerable creative effort is invested in 
the appearance of these documents and their visual impact can be striking.  
Formatting and printing such documents can be a prolonged and skilled process 
where the modification of a single word can result in hours of reformatting. 
The production and maintenance of these sophisticated documents absorbs 
considerable amounts of resources and appear as significant operative goals of 
specific individuals and teams.  The documents themselves can come to serve as 
talismans of the teams that produce them.  Their presentation to senior leaders, 
the location and persistence of their display and the response they elicit serve as 
signals of the status of the team. Consequently the production of these 
sophisticated documents can take on a competitive dimension.  The finite 
amount of space and number of display boards in and on which such documents 
are displayed lead teams to: “'fight for the same territory, sometimes almost 
literally" (Participant Observation Notes).     
The ability to produce pretty documents is highly valued. Judgement is 
frequently based not on the content of the documents but on their aesthetic 
impact.  This is illustrated in the following passage that describes the response to 
one such document: 
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Today I spoke with a person who is acknowledged as an expert in 
producing large and sophisticated documents that are used to report 
data to senior civil servants and ministers. The document presented 
progress on the MoJ’s plan to achieve £2.4 in expenditure reduction 
over the SR10 period (2010-15).  It was unusual for the density of data 
it contained concerning the ability of the MoJ to meet its deficit 
reduction targets.  It included actions and projects that would secure 
savings, the business / project owners, savings to date, progress 
against project milestones and business risks.  The data it contained 
indicated clearly that there were significant threats to the projects that 
the MoJ were relying on to deliver savings.   
These threats were so serious that the team that produced the 
document felt they demanded immediate action from the senior 
leadership constituency within the MoJ. However when reviewed by 
the Transforming Justice Committee, the only comment from a senior 
civil servant who had line responsibility for the team who compiled 
the document was that they “did not like the colour scheme” as it was 
“too monochromatic.” This comment was relayed to the creator of the 
document, who was deeply unimpressed by the shallow and 
inappropriate nature of the response, but who took action to amend the 
colour scheme (Participant Observation Notes). 
This passage is offered in support of the argument that commitments to realizing 
formal goals were superficial and tactical while commitment to maintaining the 
practice of reporting were profound and expressed in the practice and 
maintenance of taken for granted routines.  A considerable amount of evidence 
drawn from participant observation appeared to indicate that the commitment to 
the process of reporting exceeded the commitment to achieving the formal goals 
of the Ministry of Justice was so prevalent that it meets the study’s criterion of 
significance.  
In summary it is suggested that in both of these cases (the subversion of the 
cross CJS efficiency programme and the privileging of the operative goal of 
reporting over realising formal goals set out in the MoJ business plan) 
participant observation identified goal incongruence. Differences between 
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formal and operative goals were experienced as contradictory and that 
contradiction resulted in the impeding, deflection and subversion of formal 
goals.   
 
 Formal – Operative goal incongruence within the Delivery Network 
Comparing the formal and operating goals of delivery network organisations 
indicates intra-organisational congruence, but inter-organisational incongruence.  
Formal - operative goal incongruence might occur within each of those 
organisations (between the formal and operative goals of the same organisation) 
and between those organisations (between the formal and operative goals of 
different organisations). 
There was remarkably little evidence for formal - operative goal incongruence 
within individual delivery network organisations.  There were examples of 
managers reconciling competing operational requirements.  Perhaps the clearest 
example of this was given in the Participant Observation notes which describe a 
Delivery Network manager taking action to maintain a relatively low access rate 
to service in order to maintain quality and control workload:   
Currently 40% of eligible victims register for post-trial services to 
which victims had a statutory entitlement. There are a variety of 
reasons for this low take-up rate (which in previous years was lower at 
30%).  One of them is that victims have to opt-in to the system.  The 
Agency responsible for the service writes to victims a short period 
after the conclusion of the trial to invite them to register for the 
service.  If there is no response a second and final letter is sent. On a 
pilot basis, it was decided to telephone victims rather than write to 
them. The result was that after two weeks, the take-up rate had 
increased to 80%.  The manager terminated the pilot and returned to 
inviting victims to opt-in by letter. The take-up rate returned to 40% 
(Participant Observation Notes). 
In the scenario described above the delivery agency manager responsible for 
terminating the pilot justified their action with the persuasive argument that an 
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increase in service recipients would not be matched by a corresponding (or any) 
increase in resources. Therefore an increase in the number of clients would result 
in higher workloads for staff and a diminution in the quality of service provided 
to clients.  If the increased workload led to one or more members of staff taking 
sickness leave the output of the team and the outcomes for clients would suffer 
even further damage. Better then to manage on the basis of sustainable 
incremental improvements. 
This work suggest that if such attempts to optimize the configuration of 
resources process and output is taken as evidence of goal incongruence then goal 
incongruence would be an ubiquitous phenomenon within organisations with 
finite resources, where demand exceeds ability to supply and a network context 
where funding is frequently dislocated from activity. Rather than reflecting the 
subversion of formal goals the above example illustrates a profound operational 
commitment and best attempts to achieve those goals inevitably constrained by 
the resources available to provide comprehensive and high quality services.  
The case study collected data from four statutory agencies that were responsible 
for administering the Criminal Justice System within a specific English city.  
They included the Police, the Crown Prosecution Service, HMCTS (the Courts) 
and the local Probation Trust.  The case study focused on services that these 
agencies delivered to victims of serious crimes (those crimes covered by section 
15 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003) that in practice meant crimes of violence 
and sexual violence.  
Differences in priority were reinforced by the practice of drawing organisational 
boundaries around professional / task orientations.  This had the effect of 
reinforcing patterns of communication within rather than between professional / 
task groups.  It also ensured that creation of hierarchical management teams who 
had an interest in optimising (in operational and financial terms) discreet 
elements of the delivery network (their agency) but no formal interest in 
optimising the performance of the network as a whole.  
There is considerable evidence from participant observation of actors pursuing 
operative goals that are different and contradictory to the formal goals of other 
delivery agencies.  This contradiction might be regarded as an almost inevitable 
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consequence of the functional specialisation of delivery network organisations.  
The operative goals of specific organisations within the delivery network focus 
on attaining the formal goals of the same organisation and frequently bear little 
overt relationship with the formal goals of other delivery network organisations.  
The articulation of functional agency objectives in formal goals necessarily 
restricts those formal goals to agency objectives that contradict the operative 
goals of other delivery network agencies.  The significance of that contradiction 
may of-course be reduced by actors’ tacit recognition of the formal goals of 
other delivery agencies and a consequent modification of behaviour.   
Participant observation appears to indicate that while the evidence is mixed, the 
differential experience of the operational imperative does appear to satisfy the 
third criterion for the identification of goal incongruence, that of organisational 
consequence which impedes, deflects or subverts the attainment of network 
goals.  This final criterion is satisfied by evidence for the prioritization by 
delivery network professionals of the operative goals of their own organisations 
that results in the subversion and deflection of the formal and operative goals of 
other delivery network organisations. 
 
 Operative - Operative goal incongruence within the Delivery Network 
Participant observation indicated that there were widespread differences in the 
operative goals in the delivery network.   This appeared to reflect the differential 
experience of operational imperatives within functionally specialized delivery 
agencies. The clearest expression of operative goals in the delivery network was 
one that might be most expected, that was goals that derived from the 
operational imperative of conducting work demanded by the operation of the 
Criminal Justice System.    
The dominant operative goals inferred from observation of the delivery network 
derive from the work necessary to meet the operational imperatives of the 
Criminal Justice System. This included a wide range of activities from 
conducting criminal investigations, making decisions to charge (or not), creating 
case files, making legal arrangements, listing and conducting trials, ensuring that 
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witnesses attended court to give evidence and providing information to victims 
and representing the views of victims in legal hearings following sentence.  
The operational imperative appeared to be experienced in two distinct ways.  
Firstly it was experienced as an imposed set of obligations. Secondly it was 
experienced as a shared personal commitment to achieving the ends of the 
Criminal Justice System.  This duality was articulated most clearly by a delivery 
network manager who argued that a high level of service should be provided to 
victims of crime: "Because we have to and because its right" (Participant 
Observation Notes).  
At a high level of generalisation it is possible to argue that operative goals in the 
delivery network were congruent around meeting operational imperatives.  
Closer analysis reveals that individual delivery agencies focus on specific 
operational imperatives that derive from their task and professional orientation.   
Incongruence of operative goals is most clearly illustrated in the tasks, targets 
and measures of performance exhibited by particular agencies and their lack of 
mutual relevance. These patterns are reinforced by the existence of discreet 
management teams embedded within distinct professional orientations and 
financial objectives whose formal responsibility is for the performance of their 
Agency regardless of the implications for the network. Participant observation 
conducted within the delivery network provided detailed descriptions of 
differences in operative goals.  Observation provided numerous examples of 
operative goals being experienced as contradictory, particularly within inter-
organisational contexts.  
Analysis during participant observation of the interaction of CJS agencies when 
investigating and prosecuting sexual violence cases indicated agencies working 
at cross-purposes due to the consequences of agencies prioritising their own 
operative goals.  Police investigators might wait up to two months to obtain a 
meeting with CPS advocates responsible for making charging decisions.  
Statutory Agencies might have no knowledge (let alone communication) with 
voluntary agencies that provide invaluable practical assistance and emotional 
support to victims.  Trials were ‘vacated’ (rescheduled) because files had not 
been prepared.  The availability of allocated prosecution advocates was not 
considered when ‘listing’ (scheduling) and ‘re-listing’ trials.  There was a 
	   	   	  
	   	   	  
	  
124	  
widespread lack of knowledge in Criminal Justice Agencies regarding post-trial 
services available to victims (which were only taken up by 40% of eligible 
victims). There was also widespread frustration expressed across the delivery 
network at the effort required in obtaining information from other CJS agencies.    
It was widely believed that the inclination to prioritise agency over network 
(with regard to effectiveness, efficiency and economy) had been exacerbated by 
budget reductions aimed at achieving deficit reduction targets. It was commonly 
accepted that agency managers made decisions about the deployment of 
resources that were in the financial and operational interests of their own 
agencies rather than the best interests of the network and network beneficiaries.  
These decisions included action to reduce agency workloads and cost and meet 
agency-specific performance targets despite negative consequences for the CJS 
network. 
A simple but illustrative example of the above was given at a meeting of the 
local Criminal Justice Board victim and witness group: 
A participant reported on a survey that had examined witness attitudes 
to waiting times in Magistrate’s Courts. The HMCTs has national 
targets on waiting times, measuring how many witnesses have to wait 
longer than two hours to give evidence.  One area in the region had 
excellent performance on witness waiting times.  However they did 
poorly on ‘cracked’ trials (trials which are listed but do not go ahead).  
It was suggested that this was explained by their practice of listing 3 or 
4 trials to run concurrently, then releasing three. In consequence 
performance against waiting time targets was excellent.  The meeting 
went on to discuss the consequences of this target driven behaviour for 
the Criminal Justice Network and the public.   
Firstly witnesses had to return to Court on a rescheduled date in order to 
give evidence. This created additional work for the police Witness 
Liaison Unit who had to inform witnesses of rescheduled dates and 
persuade them to attend. If witnesses were particularly reluctant or even 
refusing to attend this might require the expensive and time-consuming 
action of issuing a summons. Police witnesses might also be required to 
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return to Court to give evidence, reducing their efficiency. The Crown 
Prosecution Service experienced additional work and disruption to the 
schedules of Crown Advocates. The CPS might also have to meet the 
expenses of witnesses necessary to compensate additional costs of 
travel, lost wages, child-care and on occasion overnight expenses.  The 
survey suggested that witnesses preferred to wait for longer to give their 
evidence ‘on the day‘ rather than be released and required to return to 
Court on a subsequent day (Participant Observation Notes).   
As such there is considerable evidence of widespread incongruence within the 
delivery network manifested in the differential experience of the operational 
imperative (targets and measures, professional practice, management objectives 
and financial performance). This work suggests that these operative goals 
demonstrate difference and contradiction.  The result of incongruence is reduced 
operational effectiveness of the network as agencies prioritise actions and 
decisions that make sense for their own agency but reduce the effectiveness and 
efficiency of other delivery network agencies.  
 
Formal – Operative goal incongruence between the Strategic Core and 
Delivery Network  
There was some evidence of difference and contradiction between the formal 
and operative goals of the strategic core and delivery network. The formal goals 
of the strategic core emphasise reform of the Criminal Justice System.  The 
operative goals of the delivery network concentrate on meeting the operational 
imperative of maintaining the activity of the CJS.  Some might argue that these 
goals are complimentary. However the evidence sets out in the Participant 
Observation notes suggests that they are experienced as incongruent.  The 
inconsistency between formal goals of the strategic core and the operative goals 
of the delivery network were clearest in the description of the tension and 
inconsistent and contradictory interaction over Victim Personal Statements.   
These were statements taken by Probation Trust staff from victims of serious 
crime.  The statements could be used to inform parole board hearings which 
considered whether offenders should be released from prison, and if so on what 
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license conditions.  Ministers were believed to be extremely keen that all victims 
of serious crime were given the opportunity to complete such a statement in 
order that their views and experience might be better represented within the 
Criminal Justice System, an example of the formal goals of reforming the 
system.  However in practice Probation Trust staff were reluctant to engage with 
the completion of Victim Personal Statements.  The situation was explained in 
the following terms: 
The Victim Liaison Officers can help victims to write personal 
statements that might be read to parole board oral hearings.  These 
reports describe the impact that the crime had on victims and their 
fears of risks associated with the release of offenders.  I was told that 
'like any system' writing Victim Personal Statements had started off 
badly.  However as the reports became better written, they started to 
influence the outcomes of oral hearings against the interests of 
offenders.  This led to the statements being challenged by offenders’ 
legal representatives.   
Despite the initial assumption that the Victim Personal Statement 
would be confidential, (an application can be made to the parole board 
to withhold its contents from the offender) offender’s solicitors were 
indeed applying for them to be disclosed. 
In some cases parole boards had decided to provide statements to 
offenders even though they had previously agreed to withhold them.  
They had then refused to allow the victim to withdraw their statement.  
It was explained that in one case, where the victim was an elderly 
wheelchair-bound woman, the offender’s solicitor had applied to 
summons the victim to attend the oral parole hearing.  This is a quasi-
judicial process, chaired by a judge and convened within a prison. The 
victim would have been cross- examined by the offender’s solicitor, 
in the presence of the offender, without recourse to her own legal 
representation. 
In this case the chair of the parole board had refused to summons the 
victim.  However the probation staff member was appalled by the case.  
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One of the probation staff responsible for assisting victims to write 
personal statements said “I haven’t written a victim report for five 
months”. This was because they were frightened of the possible 
consequences for the victim, in particular that reports would not be 
withheld.  They went on to say that they had reduced the time taken in 
victims meetings from three hours to 45 minutes, “closing them off” in 
order to discourage people from writing personal statements which 
might put them in a compromised and  distressing position in future 
parole board oral hearings. They concluded by saying that in victim 
meetings: “you can manipulate people really easily and I feel rotten 
about that" (Participant Observation Notes). 
The difference in the manner of engagement with this policy between policy 
staff in the Ministry of Justice and operational staff in the delivery network 
which resulted in a practice of non-compliance at the local level cannot be 
described in terms of different but complimentary. Instead it illustrates 
contradictions between the formal goals of the strategic core and the operative 
goals of the delivery network that presented a clear example of groups working 
at cross-purposes.   
The formal goals of the delivery network (largely focused on meeting 
operational imperatives) were also different and contradictory to the operative 
goal of reporting in the strategic core. The formal goals of the delivery network 
again concentrate on meeting operational imperatives sometimes informed by 
the disciplines of meeting comparative performance targets or exposure to 
market forces. On the other hand this work has argued that operative goals 
within the strategic core focus on maintaining a commitment to the reporting 
culture.  Again the evidence from Participant Observation would suggest that 
these goals are experienced as incongruent. 
There was considerable evidence from participant observation (which has been 
included in earlier discussions) about the irritation (sometimes intense) with 
which members of the delivery network experienced as a result of requests for 
information. This resulted in contradictory behaviour of compliance at least 
effort, refusal to comply with requests for information, and on occasion the 
provision of inaccurate information. 
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At a deeper level it has been argued in earlier sections of this work that the 
objective of the reporting culture in the strategic core was the construction of 
plausible narratives that might enjoy a flexible relationship to practice. The case 
of Victim Personal Statements described above is again a good example of this.  
The VPS policy enabled the strategic core to construct and disseminate a 
narrative that presented change in the Criminal Justice System that benefited the 
victims of serious crime.  
This was incongruent with the delivery network’s formal goals that focused on 
operational performance and were grounded in the victim’s experience of the 
realities of the Criminal Justice System. It is vital to stress that the experience of 
immersion in the work of the CJS is a sine qua non of the delivery network but is 
simply unavailable to staff within the strategic core. The author is not suggesting 
that the delivery network refrained entirely from engaging in such narrative 
creation practices.  However the nature of their formal goals (focusing on the 
operational imperative) and the public scrutiny of that performance significantly 
reduced their ability to present legitimizing narratives at the expense of taking 
responsibility for operational outputs and outcomes. 
 
Operative – Operative goal incongruence between the Strategic Core and 
Delivery Network  
Participant observation appeared to indicate that there was difference between 
the strategic core’s operative goal of reporting and the delivery network’s 
operative goals of meeting operational imperatives. This author also wishes to 
suggest that these differences are contradictory and led to incompatible 
prioritizations of outcomes, resources and activities.  
Evidence from participant observation, particularly that which describes 
interactions between members of the strategic core and delivery network, 
indicates that interactions organized around the practice of reporting are 
experienced as significant and negative feature of those relationships.  
Participant observation evidence drawn from the operational implementation of 
the policy on Victim Personal Statements indicates that the perceived operative 
goals of staff in the strategic core and delivery network were experienced as 
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being in conflict. This conflict resulted in behaviour within the delivery network 
that acted to subvert the operative goals of the strategic core (influencing victims 
of crime not to complete victim personal statements). This work suggests that 
this evidence for the modification of intended outcomes meets the criterion of 
significance.   
In the discussion of the operative goals of the strategic core the author spent 
some time describing the effort Headquarters staff devote to obtaining and 
reporting information from the delivery network.  Providing such data can also 
be a significant task within the delivery network. However the practice is 
perceived as a frustrating distraction from their main purposes and ends. 
Attitudes to reporting were generally characterised by minimal compliance.  
Even so, minimal compliance might entail a significant investment of resources.  
On some occasions the competing requirements of work and reporting were 
reconciled by submitting data that gave a misleading impression of operational 
aspects of the Criminal Justice System. On other occasions the demands to 
report data were felt to be so onerous, sensitive or potentially career limiting that 
members of the delivery network refused to engage with requests to provide 
information for reporting purposes.  Presenting members of the strategic core 
with reporting data that was accurate but unwelcome was an act that might be 
interpreted by elite members and managers of the core and delivery network as 
tantamount to whistle-blowing: 
When I arrived at the MoJ I overheard a conversation between two 
accountants.  They were getting quite heated, one said to the other: 
"We have to put in [to the committee pack] that they won't give an 
answer.  Nobody comes back with answers [for cash variances in the 
accounts].  We can't make up an answer.  We get frustrated that the 
businesses are not responding.  If we write that in the pack then D---- 
will do something.  They are hiding the truth from the likes of D----" 
(participant observation notes).   
In such cases it was not always clear that the sanctions available to those 
requesting data in the strategic core were sufficiently credible to be effective.  
While members of the strategic core might make threats to individuals within the 
delivery network (and frequently did, usually implicitly but sometimes 
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explicitly) it was clearly understood that such threats were empty unless there 
was a real prospect of incurring the active displeasure of senior individuals.  As 
one policy civil servant in the strategic core indicated: "its not a good idea to 
upset the Criminal Justice System as they will pay lip service to changes, say 
they are doing them, while not implementing in practice" (Participant 
observation notes). 
Claims from the strategic core that the requirements to report data to the centre 
were being relaxed were widely disbelieved and their veracity challenged with 
accounts of the persistence of ‘reporting culture’.  It was not uncommon for staff 
in the delivery network to be dismissive of the accuracy of official data 
(although it was also common for staff within the strategic core to be equally 
dismissive). One policy civil servant in the strategic core: 
Pointed to inconsistencies in the satisfaction surveys that appear to 
suggest that 85% of victims are happy with the service that they 
receive.  The survey excludes homicides, sexual violence and young 
victims because the survey is by phone and it is considered too 
insensitive to include the victims of serious crime.  There are 
insufficient funds to justify face-to-face interviews.  The satisfaction 
survey is: "useful because it allows us to say that the government is 
doing well, but in reality we know that that is not the case" 
(participant observation notes).   
Engagement with the Headquarters reporting culture appeared to be regarded as 
a distraction, an occupational hazard and an unfortunate but unavoidable fact of 
organisational life rather than an operative goal of individuals within the 
delivery network.  
The dissonance between policy and operational ends is perhaps most clearly 
illustrated in the participant observation notes by the conflict experienced over 
the collection of Victim Personal Statements which has been described in an 
earlier section.  This case describes a clear incongruence between the operative 
goals of the strategic core and delivery network with regard to a specific 
component of the Criminal Justice System (specifically the Victim Personal 
Statements). The strategic core were motivated by operative goals which 
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emphasised the need to report compliance with national policy.  This would 
enable the creation of a plausible and desirable narrative describing progress 
made by the senior leadership constituency in representing the interests of 
victims in the Criminal Justice System.  However members of the delivery 
network were motivated by the operational imperative of protecting victims 
from distress caused by encounters with the realities of the Criminal Justice 
System.   
In the face of these difficulties members of the strategic core could on occasion 
retreat from an engagement with reality to a safer, more controllable and benign 
environment: 
While restating a business case in order that it could be reported to a 
forthcoming Transforming Justice Committee (abstracting data and 
rewriting vague descriptions of activity into snappy purpose 
statements) for a major £100 million plus NOMS project which is of 
pretty low quality (in an earlier meeting with the NOMS individuals 
responsible for the project that had repudiated the contents of the 
business case, saying that figures in business cases should never really 
be taken too seriously"). I overheard a conversation between one of 
my colleagues and an individual from a Minister's private office. 
"Could we put up a fast tracker? Someone who will be amazing on 
camera!", to present to the senior civil service conference being held 
within the MoJ. The message that the fast tracker would have to 
deliver was: "we want them the proletariat saying to them the 
leadership, come on, buck your ideas up" (Participant Observation 
Notes). 
As such the cases described above and the dysfunctional relationship between 
the strategic core and the delivery network mediated by reporting practices 
emphasises the difficulty encountered in maintaining goal congruence across 
different organisational contexts that exhibit contingent objectives and 
constraints. Operative goals were found to be different, experienced as 
contradictory and that contradiction resulted in the subversion or modification of 
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organisational purposes with goal congruence resulting in the impeding, 
deflection and subversion of operative network goals. 
 
Empirical Contexts in which the presence of Goal Incongruence 
is Not Established 
The following section describes the five empirical contexts in which the 
conceptual framework suggests the evidence does not establish the presence of 
goal incongruence.  For each empirical context the nature of goal incongruence 
is described and discussed.   
 
 Formal – Formal goal incongruence within the Strategic Core 
Formal goals of the Strategic Core were taken from the Ministry of Justice 
Business Plan 2012-13.   The document states that the formal goals of the 
Ministry of Justice are to: -­‐ Introduce a rehabilitation revolution -­‐ Reform sentencing and penalties -­‐ Reform courts tribunals and legal aid and work with others to reform 
 delivery of Criminal Justice -­‐ Assure Better Law -­‐ Reform how we [the Ministry of Justice] deliver our services -­‐ Reduce expenditure over the SR10 period 
Comparison of the textual content of the formal goals of the strategic core 
indicates difference.  That difference is expressed in the multiple spheres of 
activity with which the formal goals of the strategic core engage and prioritize.  
Formal goals reflect the range of activities in which the Ministry of Justice is 
engaged, including developing policy, reviewing network structure and 
delivering operational effectiveness within the UK justice system. However the 
differences identified by comparison of individual formal goals with each of the 
others fails to demonstrate that those differences are contradictory.  
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There are two factors that militate against inferring that difference in the formal 
goals indicated contradiction and therefore support claims of incongruence 
between the formal goals of the strategic core. The first derives from the 
wording of the formal goals of the strategic core suggests that identifying 
contradiction would be difficult.  All of the formal goals except for the final one 
of reducing expenditure are presented in categorical terms.  Goals introduced by 
the indeterminate injunctions of reforming, assuring and introducing permit a 
wide range of means and conceptions of specific ends to be consistent with the 
stated formal goals.  This indeterminacy creates a “space for congruence” 
(Boyne 2012 personal communication) that acts against the positive 
identification of incongruence from an analysis of formal goals.  
The second is that even where textual analysis suggests difference, for example 
between the formal goals of reducing expenditure and introducing a 
rehabilitation revolution, evidence from participant observation indicated that 
these goals were experienced as congruent. For example a significant component 
of the plan to reduce expenditure was achieving a reduction in the size of the 
prison population.  One anticipated challenge to this policy was how offending 
behaviours would be managed if not by prison sentence.  The different but 
complimentary formal goal of introducing a rehabilitation revolution provided a 
plausible response to this anticipated and unwelcome critical scrutiny. 
In addition evidence from participant observation indicated that a further and 
supporting attraction of the formal goal of introducing a rehabilitation revolution 
not exclusively concerned with reducing the prison population or re-offending 
rates.  This was the opportunity the rehabilitation revolution had for broadening 
responsibility or 'sharing blame' (Kline 2001) for offenders and re-offending.  
Within the Strategic Core prison was understood to concentrate responsibility 
for managing offenders, offending and re-offending within the Ministry of 
Justice.  On the other hand the rehabilitation policy was understood to broaden 
responsibility for dealing with offending and offenders to include a range of 
other Government agencies and private and third sector organisations  
(contracted to provide rehabilitation services).  This view was summarized in the 
assertion that “Prison is a respite provider for other [government] agencies” 
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(Participant Observation Notes) made by a senior manager within the strategic 
core.   
This appears to suggest that textual differences between formal goals might be a 
misleading indicator of incongruence. In this case textual differences appear 
insufficient to warrant claims of incongruence. This is due to the qualified and 
indeterminate nature of those goals creating a space for the constructions of 
complimentary associations.  In addition formal goals, which exhibited 
difference, appeared to be experienced by actors as complimentary and therefore 
congruent within complex organisational contexts. The inability to establish 
contradiction between different formal goals leads to the conclusion that goal 
incongruence cannot be demonstrated between the formal goals of the strategic 
core. 
 
 Formal-Formal goal incongruence within the Delivery Network 
Comparison of the formal goals of delivery network agencies indicates a 
considerable degree of difference. As was the case with the strategic core the 
majority of the difference between formal goals in the delivery network could 
not be shown to meet the criteria of being contradictory and therefore do not 
constitute evidence for goal incongruence.  Instead they reflect differences in the 
task orientations of functionally specialized agencies within the overarching 
objectives of the Criminal Justice System and consequently it is extremely 
difficult to demonstrate that these goals do not act in a complimentary manner. 
There were two exceptions to this position.  The first was the local Probation 
Trust’s commitment to formal goals orientated around norms of market 
competition.  These were articulated in the Strategic Plan as: -­‐ To develop our business and professional skills to be a provider of choice 
 in a competitive market -­‐ To deliver services to contract -­‐ Developing commercial capability and delivering competitive advantage 
The local probation trust is the only organisation in the delivery network to 
reference market norms and objectives in its formal goals.  Its strategic vision 
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and objectives includes references to the development of business and 
professional skills to be a provider of choice in a competitive market and 
delivering services to contract.  This is different to the other organisations in the 
delivery network that occupy protected positions in the network secured by 
statute.   
The precarious position of the local probation trust, conceivably threatened by 
the commercial activities of other probation trusts or private sector entrants to 
the market, arguably creates a state of incongruence with the formal goals of 
other delivery network organisations.  Considerations of competitive advantage, 
expressed in concern over the protection of proprietary knowledge and other 
forms of intellectual property might contradict active inter organisational 
cooperation which would make it more difficult to maintain confidentiality and 
unambiguous ownership of intellectual property. 
The second example of possible incongruence is provided by the local police 
service’s formal goals orientated on norms of operational performance and 
institutional competition.  The Strategic Policing Plan sets out a number of 
operational targets.  For example: -­‐ Detection rates for serious sexual offences -­‐ Detection rates for serious violence -­‐ Serious acquisitive crime rate 
The performance of the local police service is given by their ranking in 
performance league tables of the 43 police services.  The Strategic Policing Plan 
indicates comparative performance targets – either to improve the position of the 
local service in the national league tables or to achieve or maintain a position in 
the top ten. 
It is noteworthy that the local police service Strategic Police Plan is the only 
example in the delivery network to set out operational performance measures 
and to make commitments to attain specific targets. The explicit targets are 
comparative.  They either require the local police service to improve on its 
position in national rankings or to be ranked in the top 10 of police services.  It 
can be argued that such targets constitute goal incongruence with the other 
formal goals of delivery network organisations. Formal goals of achieving 
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specific performance targets might lead to resources being allocated in order to 
attain public commitments to comparative performance targets as opposed to 
cooperative action with other Criminal Justice Agencies.  
This is especially relevant as the Policing Plan Targets concentrate on measures 
that do not require the cooperation or assistance of other delivery network 
organisations.  In other words the performance targets concentrate almost 
exclusively on internal rather than boundary spanning activities. This clearly 
meets the criterion of difference (this form of goal is absent from the Strategic 
Business Plans of other delivery network Agencies) in that it provides a radically 
different basis of legitimization to that found in other delivery network agencies.  
That is the public comparison of operational effectiveness within an 
organisational field as measured by a set of operational performance indicators.    
However, in neither case can it be established that these very significant 
differences are contradictory.  That is the study was unable to offer a compelling 
argument to establish that the base of an organization’s legitimization will 
inevitably likely to have organisational consequences likely to act to impede, 
deflect or subvert the formal goals of other delivery network organisations.  
Therefore the evidence drawn from documentary analysis was unable to 
establish formal - formal goal incongruence within the delivery network. 
 
Formal – Formal goal incongruence between the Strategic Core and 
Delivery Network  
The formal goals between the strategic core and the delivery network do not 
demonstrate incongruence.  While there is difference between formal goals this 
difference cannot be demonstrated to be incongruent as the criterion of 
contradiction is not met. As was the case within the strategic core the categorical 
nature of the formal goals of the Ministry of Justice creates a ‘space for 
congruence’ that makes it difficult to identify incongruent positions between 
formal goals.   
The case study identified formal goals from the business plans published by each 
of the case study organisations. These sources were selected because they were 
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consistently available (all of the case study organisations published documents 
described as Business Plans or Strategic Business plans for the 2011-15 period 
and for specific years within that period).  They also fulfilled the requirement of 
being formal documents whose content might reasonably be expected to be the 
considered product of reflective thought and therefore to meet Perrow’s criteria 
of being authoritative public statements. 
The formal goals of the delivery network tend to concentrate on the operational 
aspects Criminal Justice System.  The formal goals of the strategic core 
concentrate on the structural reform of the system.  This reform includes the 
introduction of a rehabilitation revolution, reform of sentences and penalties, 
reform of the way in which the Ministry, the HMCTS and Legal Services 
Commission operate and the creation of  'better law'.   
This study’s criteria for the identification of goal incongruence are that goals are 
different, contradictory and that contradictions are not trivial but result in 
organisational consequences that impede, deflect or subvert the attainment of 
organisational goals.  It is possible to argue that the formal goals of the strategic 
core and delivery network are different from the perspective of a textual or 
content analysis. As such it could be argued that rather than being 
complimentary they are inconsistent with each other and lead to members of the 
strategic core working at cross purposes with members of the delivery network. 
However it is difficult to sustain the argument that the formal goals of the 
strategic core and the delivery network are contradictory. Variation in formal 
goals reflects the categorical differences in the task orientations between the 
strategic core and delivery network particularly the strategic core’s responsibility 
and accountability for policy and legislative change.  In analyzing organisational 
business plans for evidence of formal-formal goal incongruence it proves 
extremely difficult to establish definitively that goals are contradictory as well as 
different.  Again the documentary evidence provided by organisational business 
plans is inconclusive.  The nature of the information available prevents us from 
making a definite statement as to whether the formal goals of the strategic core 
and delivery network are contradictory.   
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In an earlier section this work suggested that there are two examples of formal-
formal goal incongruence within the delivery network.  They are incongruence 
around market orientated formal goals of the local probation trust and the 
performance target orientated goals of the local police service.  However 
comparison of the formal goals of the strategic core and the delivery network 
indicates that market-orientated goals of the local probation trust are congruent 
with the provisions of the MoJ’s formal goal of delivering a rehabilitation 
revolution. The formal goals of the local police service orientated on 
comparative performance targets are again consistent with central government 
(not the Ministry of Justice but the Home Office) formal goals for managing the 
performance of the police.   Again this reflects that the outcome of inquiries into 
the existence of goal incongruence depends to a large extent on the conceptual 
framework used to define goal incongruence and the framing organisational 
context. 
The formal goals of the strategic core did not appear to be incongruent with the 
operative formal goals of the delivery network.  While comparison does indicate 
some difference with the formal goals of the strategic core emphasizing reform 
and the formal goals of the delivery network emphasizing meeting the 
operational imperative there is little evidence that those differences were 
contradictory.  It is difficult to argue that there are fundamental contradictions 
between the formal objectives of delivering reform and maintaining operational 
effectiveness.  As we have argued the indeterminate nature of the formal goals 
of the Ministry of Justice which permit a wide range of ends and means make 
the identification of goal congruence from the study of formal goals less likely.  
 
 Operative – Operative goal incongruence within the Strategic Core 
Participant observation indicated that operative goals within the strategic core 
were congruent.  There was some evidence for different and contradiction in the 
operative goals of the strategic core. In particular the tension between 
commitments to reporting practice versus implementing operational change 
appeared to offer a context for competition between different conceptions of 
how the strategic core should operate. Observation stressed that practices that 
	   	   	  
	   	   	  
	  
139	  
were interpreted as incongruent with the operative goal of reporting were 
problematised.  Senior managers asserted practices associated with the operative 
goal of reporting. Individuals who could not be reconciled to the operative goal 
of reporting were marginalized and moved from the strategic core to the delivery 
network.    Therefore participant observation appeared to indicate the presence 
of effective processes for establishing and maintaining congruence between 
operative goals within the strategic core.   
It would be misleading to suggest that the focus on the construction of credible 
narratives and the commitment to reporting was universal within the strategic 
core.  A number of significant exceptions were observed.  The first related to 
those objectives that could be realised through the policy process (for example 
legislative changes to reform the practice of the Justice System).  The second 
involved executive decisions that fell under the authority of the strategic core 
(for example the decision to reduce staff through a programme of voluntary 
redundancy).  In these cases Headquarters staff within the strategic core were 
able to demonstrate a commitment to achieving planned outputs and outcomes.   
The third exception were those groups of Headquarters staff who did exhibit a 
commitment to achieving outcome orientated goals and working with elements 
of the delivery network to delivery transformational change and continuous 
improvement.  There was unambiguous evidence of considerable work to 
improve the operation of the delivery network, particularly within the Criminal 
Justice System).  However during the period of participant observation it became 
clear that groups and individuals who maintained a persistent commitment to 
operationally meaningful goals at the expense of engaging in the Headquarters 
reporting culture were perceived as disruptive and their behaviour 
problematised.  This resulted in marginalization of those groups and 
occasionally in their ultimate removal (voluntary or forced) from the 
Headquarters environment.  
Evidence for the precarious nature of operative goal incongruence within the 
strategic core focused on the resistance of a minority to accepting operative 
goals of maintaining a reporting culture that actively avoided taking any 
operational responsibility for change.  These were individuals who wished to 
pursue a more active involvement in and greater responsibility for operational 
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improvement.  The opportunity to realise these ambitions took three forms.  The 
first was to pursue operational continuous improvement via the cross Criminal 
Justice Efficiency project. The second was to develop a more interventionist role 
with regard delivery network projects, effectively transforming reporting roles 
into change agent roles. The third was to engage in formal learning and 
development activities operated by the strategic core, and to organise these 
activities around active involvement with improvement projects. 
During participant observation evidence accumulated that each of these 
incongruent possibilities were problematised and acted against by individuals in 
positions of formal authority.  We described earlier how public commitments to 
the cross Criminal Justice Efficiency Programme were privately contradicted by 
members of the senior leadership constituency and individuals close to them.  
The programme was seen as being discredited, a distraction from deficit 
reduction and viewed as being ‘unhelpful’ by influential members of the senior 
leadership constituency.   
For the second and third sources of incongruent goals, evidence drawn from 
participant observation indicated how a commitment to active engagement with 
operational change was interpreted as deviant behaviour which, if uncorrected 
resulted in pressure to leave the strategic core.  For example line-management 
responsibility for a particular team within the strategic core was moved from an 
individual who actively encouraged the ‘change manager’ conception of the role 
to a person who was seen as being much closer to individuals within the senior 
leadership constituency and who made it clear that the change agent role was 
unacceptable and would not be permitted.  The role of members of the team was 
to act as a conduit of information between the senior leadership constituency and 
project and portfolio leads in the delivery network. The manager who had 
encouraged the more interventionist change agent role subsequently left the 
strategic core for a position in the delivery network.   
Finally the team responsible for delivering the MoJ’s programme for the MoJ’s 
continuous improvement learning and development programme were moved 
from the strategic core to the delivery network.  The argument for this action 
was explained in two ways.  The quasi-official explanation was that the 
incoming TJ Director (the original Director had moved to a similar role in 
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another Ministry) did not understand how continuous improvement might 
contribute to the Transforming Justice Programme.  In private it was explained 
that the new line manager and other members of the senior leadership 
constituency resented having team members who were not actively involved in 
reporting practices.  Moving the team to the delivery network meant that 
individuals who were fully committed to reporting practices could replace them.  
As such there was considerable evidence that within the strategic core measures 
were taken to reduce goal incongruence.   The weight of evidence appears to 
indicate that these measures were effective in sustaining a shared commitment to 
the reporting culture. The inability to demonstrate difference and 
organisationally meaningful contradiction between the operative goals of the 
strategic core preclude any claims of incongruence. 	  
Conclusion 
This chapter has introduced and tested a new conceptual framework for 
identifying goal incongruence.  Existing conceptions of goal incongruence 
accept difference between goals as a sufficient criterion for establishing 
incongruence.  The conceptual framework developed and applied in this work 
does not accept difference as synonymous with incongruence.  It goes beyond 
established conceptions in insisting that difference between goals must also be 
demonstrated to be contradictory in order to provide evidence for goal 
incongruence.  Contradiction is confirmed when it can be demonstrated to give 
rise to organisational consequences whereby action to attain particular goals 
impedes, deflects or subverts or alters action to attain other formal or operative 
goals with the effect of moderating or subordinating organisational purposes. 
The application of the new conceptual framework to case study data indicates 
that goal incongruence is present in some dimensions and contexts (formal – 
operative incongruence within the strategic core, within the delivery network 
and between the strategic core and delivery network, and operative – operative 
incongruence within the delivery network and between the strategic core and 
delivery network) but is absent in others (all expressions of formal -formal goal 
incongruence and operative – operative incongruence within the strategic core). 
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It is important to stress that difference between goals was identified in all 
dimensions of incongruence and organisational contexts.  Indeed had the study 
employed difference as the sole criterion of goal incongruence then findings of 
incongruence would have been ubiquitous and the study would have been 
overwhelmed by endless and varied examples of the phenomenon.   
The application of the conceptual framework appears to suggest that difference 
is, on its own, an inadequate indicator of incongruence.  It fails to differentiate 
between goals that are different and contradictory and goals that are different but 
complimentary. It might be suggested that this conclusion has significant 
implications for interpreting existing research on goal incongruence (and the 
corollary construct of goal congruence) and the claims for the presence of goal 
incongruence that they contain. 
In addition, the conceptual framework incorporates criteria that allow accounts 
of differing types of goal incongruence (formal – formal, formal – operative, and 
operative–operative) distributed across different network contexts (incongruence 
within the strategic core, within the delivery network and between the strategic 
core and delivery network).  
This appears to have provided richer accounts of goal incongruence than are 
available from simple tests for the existence of difference.  The new conceptual 
framework provides descriptions of the contexts in which goal incongruence is 
present and absent rather than present or absent. This ability to provide more 
refined analytical perspectives might be considered to be of value in 
investigating the determinants of goal incongruence.  This is the subject we will 
turn to in the following chapters. 
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Chapter 6   Bureaucratic Delegation as the Source of 
Goal Incongruence 
 
Introduction  
This chapter will test whether the evidence of goal incongruence within the case 
study network supports the hierarchical explanation of goal incongruence and 
the six shaping influences of hierarchical goal incongruence.  The chapter begins 
with a summary of those influences and then provides an overview of the 
evidence for bureaucratic delegation as the source of goal incongruence.  The 
evidence that supports the claims made in the overview is then explored for each 
of the five empirical contexts that were found to exhibit goal incongruence in 
chapter five. 
Analysis indicates that hierarchical goal incongruence arose from four of the six 
shaping influences. Evidence suggests that a mixture of the pre-occupation and 
compliance model and the Bifurcation of Interests model provides the most 
prevalent shaping influence. In addition the organisational segmentation and 
performance control models also explained the emergence of hierarchical goal 
incongruence within the delivery network.   
However two proposed shaping influences were not supported. The case study 
found no evidence for inadequate comprehension or discretionary gap models of 
hierarchical goal incongruence. Indeed on balance the evidence cast doubt on the 
explanatory value of these models.  
Finally, analysis of the evidence of goal incongruence produced an empirical 
surprise. Formal-operative goal incongruence was greater at the apex of the 
network than it was at the base. In other words the operative goals of the 
strategic core were more incongruent with the formal goals of the network than 
were the operative goals of the delivery network. This contradicts the established 
view of goal incongruence presented in the literature, that senior staff and policy 
makers are more 'trustworthy' in terms of commitment to achieve formal public 
goals than junior or operational staff.  
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Summary of Shaping Influences for Hierarchical Goal 
Incongruence  
Chapter three presented six suggested influences by which goal incongruence 
might be produced under conditions of bureaucratic delegation. The objective of 
this chapter is to test whether the empirical evidence produced by participant 
observation supports any or all of these suggested influences.  For the benefit of 
the reader they are summarised below.   
1. The Pre-Occupation and Compliance model describes the propensity for 
the operational behaviours of intermediaries to become centred on 
specific daily problems and proximate goals that are effectively 
substituted for the professed goals of the organisation.  This presents the 
most ‘innocent’ explanation for goal incongruence.  Intermediary and 
subordinate actors become pre-occupied with their work and ultimate 
ends and goals are forgotten, or at least recede from consciousness.  The 
propensity to become pre-occupied with daily problems is re-enforced by 
the tendency for office holders to identify with the importance of 
bureaucratic rules and procedures and the necessity of securing 
compliance with those rules and procedures even at the expense of 
achieving the formal goals or ultimate ends of the organisation. 
 
 
2. The use of intermediaries creates a tendency toward a bifurcation of 
interests, under which intermediaries are concerned chiefly with their 
social positions as agents.  This introduces operative goals of advancing 
their status (Sills 1957) relationships with individuals outside the 
hierarchical chain of delegation (Sills 1957, Lipsky 1983), general self-
interest (Downs 1967) and self-aggrandizement and illegitimate 
functions (Bozeman 1993). Lipsky contributes by reminding us that 
intermediaries’ conception of self–interest will extend to avoiding 
dangerous, difficult or boring work and that work which is destructive of 
the individuals ability to maintain a positive representation of self. 
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3. The discretionary gap associated with the iterated downward delegation 
of goals within hierarchies is experienced within a context characterised 
by differential access to information and perceptions of reality and 
uncertain outcomes (Downs 1967) and the misapplication of policies due 
to genuine misunderstanding of their nature by subordinates (Bozeman 
1993). In consequence a form of rule entropy operates for downward 
delegation within hierarchical arrangements in which the greater the 
number of occasions on which the realisation of goals must be delegated 
the greater the loss of meaning within the hierarchy (Bozeman 1993). 
 
 
4. The Inadequate Comprehension model attributes the goal incongruence 
to the inadequate practice of superiors, particularly top-most officials, 
who may not appreciate the difficulty involved in implementing the 
policies that they formulate. This issue is described by Bozeman in terms 
of the inadequate comprehension of office holders at the apex of 
bureaucracies of the difficulties involved in applying policies (polices 
which Downs tells us are frequently formulated in general terms).  
Lipsky (1983) expands on this theme with by characterising formal goals 
as idealised, difficult to achieve and confusing to approach.  Thus goal 
incongruence is caused by the inability of superiors, particularly top-
most officials, to formulate policy and goals that can be articulated 
clearly and implemented effectively by staff in operational levels of 
hierarchy 
 
 
5. The organisational segmentation model focuses on the organisational 
allegiances of professionals in multiple hierarchies clustered within 
network arrangements as the shaping influence for goal incongruence.  
Differential organisational membership intensifies inter and intra 
professional competition and goal incongruence. Organisational 
affiliation acts to encourage professionals to identify with and promote 
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goals that reflect the interests of their organisation. It also influences 
patterns of inter and intra professional interaction, tending to ensure that 
interactions within organisation boundaries are denser than interactions 
across organisational boundaries.  Finally organisational boundaries act 
to protect and maintain goal commitments that would be resolved to the 
satisfaction of dominant professional groups without the influence of 
such protective institutional boundaries (Larson 1977).  Under this model 
hierarchy produces goal incongruence as a result of intra organisational 
introspection and inter-organisational parochialism and competition. 
 
 
6. The performance control model locates the cause of goal incongruence in 
the different systems of hierarchically imposed performance 
measurement used to control professional practice (particularly within 
network arrangements). Performance control systems prioritise action to 
achieve the goals they contain at the expense of those that they omit.  
They can also act as powerful goals in themselves as professionals strive 
to achieve comparative advantage in performance comparisons.   
Performance measurement and control systems tend to be co-terminus 
with professional orientations. They therefore operate as discreet systems 
that concentrate on professionally introspective measures of practice and 
outcomes. The result is that hierarchically imposed professional 
performance measurement and control systems tend to act against the 
tendencies toward inter-professional co-operation.  They act to establish 
and maintain inter-professional goal incongruence while reducing intra – 
professional goal incongruence.     
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Evidence for Bureaucratic Delegation as the Source of Goal 
Incongruence 
In chapter five it was suggested that goal incongruence was present in five 
network contexts.  In the subsequent section we will consider whether the nature 
of bureaucratic delegation within hierarchical arrangements is a persuasive or 
convincing determinant of that goal incongruence. As the different organisations 
of the delivery network do not share hierarchical relationships bureaucratic 
delegation cannot contribute an explanation of goal incongruence within the 
three delivery network settings. Therefore the examples of goal incongruence 
within the delivery network are excluded from the following discussion. 
If goal incongruence is determined by the nature of bureaucratic delegation 
within hierarchal arrangements what evidence would we expect to find for the 
causes of goal incongruence within the case study network? Evidence would 
consist in actors subverting, deflecting or contradicting practices aimed at 
achieving delegated formal and operative goals.  Furthermore the practice of 
subversion by intermediaries exercising bureaucratic discretion should 
correspond to one or more of the shaping influences described in the proceeding 
section.  
A discussion of the empirical evidence drawn from the case study and the extent 
to which it supports one or more of the explanations of the hierarchical 
production of goal incongruence is presented below. Figure 6.1 presents the 
evidence produced by the study for the sources of hierarchical goal 
incongruence.   
For each of the five empirical contexts that exhibit goal incongruence figure 6.1 
(overleaf) sets out whether evidence supports each of the six shaping influences 
or not, or whether it is not applicable within the empirical context.  Following 
figure 6.1 the evidence supporting the conclusions drawn from the figure are 
evaluated.  
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Figure 6.1     Evidence for Sources of Hierarchical Goal Incongruence 
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The Pre-occupation and Compliance Model  
The pre-occupation and compliance model predicts that organizational actors 
will become focused (pre-occupied) on proximate goals and day-to-day 
problems and challenges and ensuring compliance with processes and 
procedures to achieve such proximate objectives. The test for the pre-occupation 
and compliance model is that intermediary and subordinate staff become focused 
on achieving proximate goals and complying with proximate bureaucratic 
procedures. To cause goal incongruence subordinate pre-occupation and 
compliance must act to subvert formal or original goals of organisation.  The 
author has earlier characterised this model as emphasising the ‘passive 
forgetting’ of formal organisational goals.  
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Analysis of the empirical evidence generated by the case study appears to 
indicate that this is indeed the case.  Members of the delivery network 
concentrate on meeting the functional operative imperatives of their agencies.  
Members of the strategic core appear committed to overcoming day-to-day 
problems encountered in the conduct of Reporting practices. To this extent the 
pre-occupation model appears to be provide a valuable contribution to the 
explication of the causes of goal incongruence within the case study network. 
Empirical descriptions also seem capable of accommodating the ‘passivity’ of 
the pre-occupation model.  A concern with reporting practice results in the 
appreciation of the importance of meeting operational imperatives ‘falling away’ 
within the strategic core.  Similarly the concern with the operational imperative 
leads to the importance of reporting being almost ‘incomprehensible’ to 
members of the delivery network.    
However, closer consideration of the validity of the pre-occupation model 
reveals a concern, or more accurately an analytical dissatisfaction, with the 
prospect of accepting it as an explanation of operative goal incongruence 
between the strategic core and the delivery network.  This reluctance concerns 
the legitimacy of the strategic core’s commitment to Reporting.  The author 
contends that Reporting is hardly an end and barely a means.  The extent of the 
strategic core’s commitment to reporting is extremely difficult to justify by 
reference to its importance for achieving the formal goals of the Ministry of 
Justice.  It therefore should no be regarded as a legitimate ‘means’ to achieving 
formal goals.  Indeed the author argues that there appeared to be a real sense that 
when it came to reporting the strategic core regarded content as being of 
secondary importance. The operative goals of the strategic core focused on the 
construction of plausible and convincing narratives.  It was also clear that staff 
within the strategic core were uncomfortable in taking responsibility for the 
absolutes of output and outcome, efficiency and effectiveness. Instead there 
appeared to be a pronounced enthusiasm for evolving operative goals that 
focused on disseminating appropriate values and behaviours throughout the 
network.  It might be argued that this retreat from the measurable and objective 
reflected the distance between the strategic core and the operational areas of the 
delivery network.  However the point we feel worthy of emphasis is our belief 
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that that distance could have been closed quite easily had members of the 
strategic core wished it.  
Within the strategic core, in the case of the subversion of the formal goals of 
delivering the xCJS efficiency programme, a pre-occupation with the proximate 
challenges of servicing committees, formulating and implementing policies and 
reporting on the progress of those implementations diverted the attention from 
the formal goal of increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of the Criminal 
Justice System through network co-operation. This explanation presents an 
innocent explanation of goal incongruence to the extent that describes the 
determinants of goal incongruence in terms of a ‘passive forgetting’ of original 
objectives and ultimate aims. 
However the plausibility of this benign explanation based on the passive 
forgetting of ends is undermined in empirical accounts that emphasise the way in 
which members of the strategic core actively rejected and problematised the 
xCJS efficiency programme. In addition the strategic core was able to engage 
with other challenging policy objectives despite the distraction of day-to-day 
challenges.  Equally tellingly, the strategic core were able to organise a limited 
engagement with the xCJS efficiency programme which was sufficient to give 
the appearance of compliance without requiring the full operative enactment of 
the formal goal.  Taken together, these strands of evidence tend to undermine the 
argument that the xCJS efficiency programme was lost or forgotten due to a pre-
occupation with day-to-day challenges and proximate goals. 
Turning to the incongruence between formal goals of reforming the Criminal 
Justice System and the strategic core’s commitment to the operative goal of 
Reporting, it is more difficult to dismiss the pre-occupation explanation.  The 
case study described a plethora of Reporting activities that dominated the 
experience of work within the strategic core and the way in which managers 
acted to enforce compliance with rules and procedures related to reporting 
practices.  It is therefore more plausible to argue that in their preoccupation with 
reporting, members of the strategic core became distanced from original and 
ultimate ends, and that attempts to rediscover those ends by developing the 
‘active change manager’ role described in chapter five were seen as threats to 
bureaucratic authority that were acted against decisively.  That is superiors and 
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intermediates within the strategic core acted successfully to enforce compliance 
with local conceptions of appropriate bureaucratic rules and procedures. 
Despite this positive evidence, the pre-occupation model appears to be a partial 
and somewhat generous explanation of goal incongruence. It omits important 
aspects of the case study evidence. In particular it does not appear able to 
incorporate the informal advantages of the subversion of formal goals to 
members of the strategic core. These included; the avoidance of responsibility 
for operational effectiveness, the protection against blame for operational failure 
or inadequacy, and the reduction in objective scrutiny to which the strategic core 
was exposed.  In short a range of informal benefits associated with mitigating 
risks to the perceived competence, effectiveness and legitimacy of the strategic 
core that derived from being associated with responsibility for the operational 
performance of the Criminal Justice System. Therefore the pre-occupation 
model of goal incongruence fails to incorporate important and significant 
patterns of behaviour described in the empirical evidence.  
Empirical descriptions of the incongruent implementation of the Victim Personal 
Statement policy are also inconsistent with the pre-occupation and compliance 
model. A superficial reading of the case study might lead to the view that the 
Victim Personal Statement policy was indeed subverted by subordinate actors’ 
pre-occupation with protecting the interests of victims.  However this work 
suggests that this protection should not be defined as a day-to-day problem.  
Rather it reflects fundamental deficiencies and contradictions in the policy.  The 
Victim Personal Statement policy, intended to improve the experience of victims 
and represent their interests more effectively, actually achieved the opposite in 
practice.   
While subordinate actors subverted the delivery of the Victim Personal 
Statement policy (VPS policy), they did not subvert the principle of the formal 
goal, protecting and representing the interests of the victims of serious crime.  In 
particular, empirical descriptions provide no evidence of the ‘passive forgetting’ 
that characterises the model. Instead subordinate actors made regretted but active 
and deliberate choices to subvert the VPS policy.  
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For these reasons the conclusions drawn for the validity of the pre-occupation 
model of hierarchical goal incongruence must be equivocal.  The case study did 
provide evidence in support of the model.  However that evidence was of a 
partial and unsatisfactory quality.  Once again, the pre-occupation model of goal 
incongruence fails to incorporate important and significant patterns of behaviour 
described in the empirical evidence.  
 
The Bifurcation Of Interest Model 
The Bifurcation of Interests model suggests that the pursuit of self-interest by 
intermediaries is the prime determinant of goal incongruence within hierarchical 
contexts. The model incorporates considerations of the social position of 
intermediate actors and consequently encompasses a wide range of self-interest 
including aggrandisement, the maintenance of status relationships with other 
actors and the avoidance of undesirable work. For both examples of 
incongruence between formal and operative goals within the strategic core there 
is evidence that the pursuit of self-interest was associated with goal 
incongruence. However what is less clear is that the empirical evidence 
establishes that such self-interest was a decisive factor in producing goal 
incongruence or indeed that conceptions of self-interest were hierarchically 
contradictory  
In the case of the xCJS efficiency programme, the evidence for self-interest is 
made in the explicit statement that the MoJ should; “resist changes which would 
deliver big improvements to the [Criminal Justice] system, but which could be 
claimed by other Departments” (Participant Observation Notes).  In this case 
delivering big improvements to the Criminal Justice System which would; 
realise the formal goals of the Ministry of Justice, benefit victims of crime and 
contribute to the general social good of society were to be resisted in order to 
protect against the undesirable outcome of credit for those big improvements 
being appropriated by other Government Departments.  This would appear to 
provide convincing support for the theory of Bifurcation of interest as a shaper 
of goal incongruence.  
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However, it is not clear that in subverting the formal goal of the xCJS efficiency 
programme intermediaries within the strategic core were demonstrating a 
commitment to self-interest that was incongruent with their superiors. On the 
contrary, there was considerable evidence that the most senior policy makers in 
the Ministry had also discounted the formal goal associated with xCJS efficiency 
programme. Therefore, far from following their own self-interests, 
intermediaries were faithfully reproducing the delegated goal priorities of their 
superiors.    
The evidence from participant observation for this position is provided in 
statements such as: “Senior leaders are only interested in saving money…. Being 
focused on incremental improvement xCJS efficiency is unlikely to save the 
Ministry money” and that the programme lacked a “ clear long term narrative 
and had failed to secure the engagement of Ministers” (Participant Observation 
Notes).  On that basis it appears doubtful that incongruence between formal goal 
of xCJS efficiency programme and its operative subversion were caused by 
imperfections in the mechanism of bureaucratic delegation, on the contrary it 
appears that the subversion of the formal goal was faithfully reproduced as it 
was delegated within the strategic core. Intermediate actors believed that they 
were carrying out the wishes of superiors in limiting the operative enactment of 
the formal goal. 
In the case of incongruence between the formal goals of the Ministry of Justice 
and the strategic core’s commitment to the operative goal of Reporting, can we 
show that bifurcation of interest provides a persuasive explanation of the 
empirical data?  We have already touched on an argument that we wish to 
develop here, that the incongruent commitment to Reporting is very strongly 
associated with the self-interest seeking behaviours predicted in the bifurcation 
of interests model. However if this incongruence is caused by the nature of 
bureaucratic delegation it is noteworthy that such a significant example of 
incongruence occurs at the first stage of delegation, that between the formal 
goals of the MoJ and the practices of the strategic core. Perhaps more 
importantly, we might question the validity of reporting as a legitimate means 
within the means – ends chains that characterise the conceptions of bureaucratic 
delegation we are discussing.  During participant observation the impression was 
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formed that the commitment to reporting was better understood as an attempt to 
absent members of the strategic core from those means – ends chains and 
consequent responsibility for any failure to achieve ultimate ends (the formal 
goals of the Ministry of Justice).  
Time and again over the period of participant observation there were references 
in meetings and in overheard conversations (an inevitable consequence of 
working in open-plan environments) to the; “best way of presenting 
information”, how to go about “telling the story”, or the need to “build a 
narrative” (Participant Observation Notes). This established a sense that 
individuals were involved in constructing plausible, convincing and satisfactory 
stories that the more senior people who they were briefing could engage with in 
an unproblematic manner.    
The practice of Reporting arguably led to a fluid relationship with operational 
practice where it is easy to make big claims and then fail to deliver them, safe in 
the knowledge that allowances will be made. In this context failure to achieve 
formal and operational ends becomes not just an option, but also possibly the 
easiest option.  If formal goals were not achieved then Reporting practice would 
come to the rescue.  Narratives could be constructed containing descriptions of 
the great deal of activity undertaken to develop plans, plausible explanations for 
their lack of success and the promise of future plans for Transforming Justice to 
distract attention from present difficulties. One example of this was provided by 
a senior civil servant's comments at a meeting within the strategic planning 
meeting within the strategic core described below: 
A participant suggested that in the year before the election it would be 
better to run prisons empty rather than close them.  This would defer 
redundancy payments and increase the amount of savings the MoJ 
could claim. 
A colleague gently dismissed the idea by reminding the room of its 
similarity to a Yes Minister episode in which a hospital had been run 
with no patients in order to ‘save money’.   
In response the originator of the suggestion speculated that; "you might 
be able to run the prison half-full and sell it as a pilot". 
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(Description of a meeting attended by senior civil servants attended 
during participant observation.) 
Throughout the period of participant observation at MoJ Headquarters evidence 
accumulated that senior individuals were more comfortable discussing concepts 
such as desirable values and behaviours (frequently in abstract terms) than they 
were with the outputs and outcomes of the delivery network’s processes.  This 
was inferred from many observations in meetings, workshops and informal 
discussions where senior individuals ignored or failed to engage with agenda 
points which focused on measuring and improving operational outputs and 
outcomes.  On the other hand discussions about appropriate and desirable values 
and behaviours were engaged with enthusiastically and at length.  
It is possible to speculate on the reasons for this condition.  The most generous is 
that the remoteness of operational practice to Headquarters staff  (both 
geographically and administratively) makes effective control of practice 
unavailable. A more challenging suggestion might be that privileging the 
abstract over the practical represented an attempt to protect Headquarters staff in 
general and the accounting officer in particular from responsibility or blame for 
perceived operational inadequacies. 
The practice of Reporting insulates members of the strategic core from 
responsibility for the operational effectiveness of the Criminal Justice System.  
More particularly, Reporting protects them from the negative consequences 
associated with taking responsibility for real and perceived failure within the 
Criminal Justice System whether that failure is associated with operational 
inadequacies or the implementation of policy delegated from the strategic core. 
It also makes effective scrutiny of the activities of the strategic core more 
difficult by restricting evaluation to subjective and qualitative measures.  
The Reporting culture’s concentration on narrative construction provides the 
strategic core with a flexibility that enables operational and policy failure to be 
explained in ways deemed favourable to the strategic core. In particular the 
objective of Reporting practices appears to be the preservation of the perception 
that the strategic core and senior individuals within the strategic core are 
competent, effective and legitimate.  Reporting practice therefore reflects the 
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active self-interest seeking of members of the strategic core by providing an 
effective method for dissociating the strategic core from blame associated with 
representations of operational or policy failure. To that extent it might be 
represented as what Bozeman would describe as an illegitimate organisational 
function serving the needs of intermediaries as social agents (promoting status, 
aggrandisement and avoiding undesirable work). However it should also be 
remembered that the illegitimate function of Reporting also benefits 
intermediaries as economic agents by protecting established employment 
benefits and assuring career opportunities and progression.  
The Bifurcation of Interest model stresses the potential for intermediary and 
subordinate actors to act to further their self-interest particularly in their capacity 
of social actors at the expense of realising delegated means and ends. A 
persuasive case can be made that the Bifurcation of Interest model is consistent 
with empirical accounts of the subversion of the Victim Personal Statement 
policy as delegated from the strategic core to the delivery network. 
That evidence appears to indicate that the subordinate actors to whom delivery 
of the policy was delegated were unable to dissociate themselves from the 
potential negative consequences of the Victim Personal Statement policy for 
those victims of serious crime whose interests the policy was intended to 
promote. This derived from subordinate’s personal and professional 
identification with the interests and experience of the victims of serious crime 
that were generally experienced in an unmediated and visceral manner.   
This self-interest was articulated in the “Because its right” rhetoric which 
indicated the high mission valence subordinate actors within the delivery 
network experienced towards supporting and protecting the interests of the 
victims of serious crime.  These personal and professional commitments to the 
victims of crime led subordinate actors to subvert the delegated VPS policy 
because they felt that the provisions of the policy as delegated potentially 
contradicted the interests of those victims.  To comply with the delegated policy 
threatened the self-interest of subordinate actors' personal and professional 
identity as social agents.  Therefore the study produced compelling evidence for 
the positive role of the bifurcation of interests model as a shaper of hierarchical 
goal incongruence.   
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The bifurcation of interest model rescues us from the doubts described above.  It 
reminds us that interests can coalesce around and be sustained by intermediary 
actors’ social role as agents.  This may give rise to commitments to what 
Bozeman (1993) describes as illegitimate functions that are by definition 
difficult to resolve satisfactorily with the professed or official claims of 
organisational purposes.  
We suggest that the stubborn refusal to vacate the ambiguous ground of values 
and behaviours is explained by the freedom and flexibility it confers on 
members of the strategic core to constructing plausible and protective narratives.  
These narratives act as a buffer between operational performance and the 
strategic core.  In that sense one of their functions is to restrict the consequences 
of operational failure to the delivery network, thereby protecting senior civil 
servants, and particularly the most powerful civil servants, from potentially 
adverse consequences of being associated with operational failure.  
In the delivery network the interests of members are much more closely aligned 
with meeting the  (legitimate) operational imperatives of functionally specialised 
agencies within the Criminal Justice System.  At the same time the influence and 
demands of top-most officials (which pervades the strategic core) on 
conceptions and constructions of self-interest is replaced or at the least 
ameliorated by the moral demand to satisfy the needs of victims of serious 
crime. 
As has been described in earlier passages of this section, the bifurcation of 
interests of actors in the core and network operating in their capacity as social 
agents provides a convincing explanation for the patterns of data collected 
during participant observation. As such a reinforcing combination of the 
bifurcation of interest model and the pre-occupation model appears to resolve 
the issue of the pursuit of illegitimate goals and provides a plausible and 
convincing explanation for the evidence of operative goal incongruence between 
the strategic core and delivery network. 
There is a further issue that must be discussed here, what might be described as 
an empirical surprise.  The literature on hierarchical goal incongruence indicates 
that goal incongruence will increase with iterated bureaucratic delegations.  That 
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is the operative goals of lower (operational) levels of hierarchies will be more 
incongruent with formal goals than will be the higher (strategic or policy) levels.  
The evidence drawn from the participant observation contradicts this theoretical 
perspective.  In the case study network 
Evidence drawn from the case study indicates that the operative goals of the 
strategic core were more incongruent with the formal goals of the Ministry of 
Justice than were the operative goals of the delivery network. In other words it is 
managerial elites and their staffs at the apex of hierarchies who are the most 
likely to exhibit goal incongruence and divert the organisation to their own 
illegitimate purposes. Correspondingly, delivery network members who operate 
lower levels in the hierarchy are more likely to act in accordance with formal 
network goals.  The common sense view that incongruence between formal and 
operative goals increases as move down the hierarchy is wrong; it actually 
decreases. This is a crucial insight that will be returned to later in this work. 
 
The Discretionary Gap Model 
The discretionary gap model argues that goal incongruence is caused by the 
iterated delegation of orders that are necessary in bureaucratic hierarchies.  The 
repeated nature of delegation, on each occasion requiring subordinates to 
exercise discretion in translating policies and orders formulated in general terms 
into more detailed instructions, leads to a gradual and cumulative loss of 
meaning as means and ends are transmitted downward through the bureaucratic 
hierarchy.  The concept of a gradual but inevitable decay as delegation follows 
delegation is central to this explanation of goal incongruence.  How far does is it 
supported by the empirical evidence provided by the case study?  Neither 
example of formal – operative goal incongruence within the strategic core 
appear to offer support for the discretionary gap model. 
Consideration of the xCJS efficiency programme emphasises that the means – 
ends chains (the span of bureaucratic control) within the strategic core were 
short, and concentrated within a single (albeit rather large) building.  This 
ensures that superiors, intermediaries and subordinates are readily available to 
each other and operate within similar information contexts and shared 
	   	   	  
	   	   	  
	  
160	  
perceptions of reality.  This contextual transparency and normative and physical 
proximity appear to ensure that superiors exercise effective control over the 
actions of subordinates.  In other words the authority of superiors, particularly 
top-most officials and their intermediaries is more meaningful than the 
discretion of subordinates.  
Turning to the goal incongruence generated by the strategic core’s commitment 
to the operative goal of Reporting, we again suggest that empirical accounts 
provide little support for the model.  The general impression of the commitment 
to the Reporting culture formed during participant observation within the 
strategic core was that it was pervasive, homogenous and stable.  It was not 
characterised by a gradual decay, or change in meaning as it was delegated down 
through the hierarchy. Instead it was experienced as a shared commitment to a 
common set of practices by individuals at different levels of the bureaucratic 
hierarchy within the strategic core. Indeed attempts by individuals to use 
discretion to challenge the Reporting culture in favour of a more active change 
management role were susceptible to action by superiors to exercise their 
authority to protect the operative goal of producing a Reporting culture. This 
was achieved by enforcing compliance with Reporting practices and, on 
occasion, removing individuals from the strategic core.   
This behaviour is not consistent with the picture presented by the discretionary 
gap model of subordinate actors applying discretion to modify delegated orders 
or policies. The model therefore appears to be inconsistent with empirical 
accounts of formal – operative goal incongruence within the strategic core. 
The view that goal incongruence is caused by the incremental decay in meaning 
as means and ends are transmitted down bureaucratic hierarchies by successive 
delegations does not appear to correspond with empirical evidence for formal – 
operative goal incongruence between the strategic core and delivery network.   
The essential elements of the VPS policy appear to be transmitted accurately to 
the ‘lowest’ operational levels of the case study hierarchy. There is little 
evidence for the application of discretion by intermediaries operating within the 
chain of delegation.  Instead subordinate actors at the operational level choose to 
implement the policy or not in ways determined most appropriate within their 
operational contexts.   
	   	   	  
	   	   	  
	  
161	  
In the case of subordinate actors from case study delivery agencies, the response 
to the delegated policy is not a subtle and nuanced implementation of aspects of 
the policy (as predicted by the ‘decay’ concept of the model) but by the decision 
to entirely reject engagement with the policy, as evidenced by the statement 
made by one subordinate responsible for preparing Victim Personal Statements: 
“I haven’t written a victim report for five months” (Participant Observation).  
This absolute response of subordinate staff, individuals responsible for the 
ultimate delivery of the policy who satisfy Lipsky’s conception of the street 
level bureaucrat is dissonant with the theoretical suggestion of the discretionary 
gap model that actors within the chain of bureaucratic command will apply a 
limited discretion to the implementation of delegated means and ends.   
The discretionary gap model emphasises the gradual decay of meaning as 
organisational means and ends are delegated downward through successive 
layers of superiors and subordinates within bureaucratic hierarchies.  Empirical 
evidence drawn from the case study does not appear to support this explanation 
of the cause of goal incongruence. Changing goal commitments appear to 
manifest themselves in radical discontinuities, whether between the formal goals 
of the Ministry of Justice and the commitment to reporting practices in the 
strategic core, and between those practices and the delivery network’s 
commitment to meeting the operative imperatives of the Criminal Justice 
System. 
In addition it is vital to recognise that within the case study hierarchy did not 
operate in a straightforward or unified manner. Members of the delivery network 
report through their own local and national hierarchies (Police Services, CPS, 
HMCTS etc.) that are connected to the strategic core in complex, nuanced and 
occasionally ambiguous relationships.  Senior members of delivery network 
hierarchies frequently posses’ far greater status, influence and authority than 
those members of the strategic core who transmit delegated actions to 
operational members of the delivery network.  Under these circumstances the 
authority of members of the strategic core was frequently unclear and contested. 
The contested nature of bureaucratic authority was exposed on those occasions 
where the demands to report data were felt to be so onerous, sensitive or 
potentially career limiting that members of the delivery network refused to 
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engage with requests to provide information for Reporting purposes.  In such 
cases it was not always clear that the sanctions available to those requesting data 
in the strategic core were sufficiently credible to be effective.  While members 
of the strategic core might make threats to individuals within the delivery 
network (and frequently did, usually implicitly but sometimes explicitly) it was 
clearly understood that such threats were empty unless there was a real prospect 
of incurring the active displeasure of very senior individuals within the strategic 
core or delivery network. For these reasons it appears that empirical accounts of 
goal incongruence between the strategic core and delivery network do not 
provide support for the discretionary gap model. 
 
The Inadequate Comprehension Model 
The inadequate comprehension model of the causes of goal incongruence places 
the emphasis on the inadequate comprehension of top-most officials of the 
difficulties, challenges and constraints under which intermediaries and under 
which subordinates operate, or the unintended purposes to which subordinates 
will put delegated tasks.  This explanatory model emphasises the failure of top-
most officials to formulate achievable policies and goals in the production of 
incongruence rather than the modification of goals by subordinates.  However 
neither example of formal – operative goal incongruence within the strategic 
core, as described in empirical case study accounts, appears to support the 
model.   
To adopt a formal goal of improving the operational effectiveness of the 
Criminal Justice System by developing network cooperation appears 
unremarkable.  It was certainly not a novel goal, and had been the focus of 
activity within the Criminal Justice System for a substantial period of time.  To 
argue that it represents an overly optimistic or excessively ambitious objective, 
in effect asking an organisation to deliver what it is incapable of, lacks 
credibility.  The conclusion that must be drawn from study of the empirical 
evidence is that, while it would certainly have entailed difficult and unglamorous 
work, the xCJS efficiency could have been delivered reasonably 
straightforwardly had members of the strategic core wished to do so.    
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Similarly, with regard to the commitment displayed by members of the strategic 
core to the operative goal of the Reporting culture, the empirical evidence 
indicates that members of the strategic core were unwilling rather than unable to 
take meaningful responsibility for delivering objective improvements to the 
Criminal Justice System.  Their commitment to the operative goal of Reporting 
as described in earlier sections is explained by the advantages it holds for 
protecting the reputation of the strategic core (and particularly its senior 
members) as competent, effective and legitimate rather than lying in an inability 
to engage with formal goals due to their complexity and incoherence.   
It is difficult to argue that the empirical evidence supports the view that the 
subversion of the xCJS efficiency programme or the commitment to the 
operative goal of Reporting was caused was consistent with the inadequate 
comprehension model. In neither case is there compelling empirical evidence 
that incongruence between formal and operative goals within the strategic core 
was caused by the failure of top-most officials to formulate implementable 
policies. 
The inadequate comprehension model of goal incongruence focuses on the 
inability of superiors, particularly top-most superiors, to formulate and delegate 
clear and consistent polices: “persons designing the rules have insufficient 
understanding of the problem at hand, the relationship of the rule to the… 
problem, or others’ likely application or response to the rule” (Bozeman 1993, p. 
286).   
This theoretical explanation appears to resonate with empirical descriptions of 
the operation of the Victim Personal Statement drawn from the case study. 
Members of oral hearing boards relied on victim statements in unintended ways 
(basing their decisions on the victim’s fear of the risk of re-offending rather than 
the risk of re-offending. Offender’s legal representatives could and did challenge 
the confidentiality of Victim Personal Statements, demanded disclosure, and 
despite the formal intension and operative assurance that personal statements 
were confidential, the chair of the oral hearing might order disclosure and 
prevent the victim from withdrawing their statement.  In addition it was expected 
that disclosure might be made inadvertently due to inadequate management of 
documents by statutory agencies during legal processes.  Finally, there was the 
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prospect that victims might be summonsed to attend oral hearings, in the 
presence of offenders, convened on prison premises, without recourse to legal 
representation.   
The VPS policy as formulated by top-most officials contained inherent 
contradictions and dangers that were beyond the ability of subordinate actors to 
resolve or manage. The refusal of top-most officials and their intermediate 
representatives to acknowledge difficulties indicated during implementation and 
take corrective action compounded the impact of these inherent deficiencies.   
This catalogue of unintended and unforeseen consequences resulted in 
subordinates feeling that in practice the VPS policy achieved the opposite of 
what it was intended to achieve. From the subordinate perspective of those 
implementing the policy this unsatisfactory position was compounded by the 
apparent refusal of top-most superiors to acknowledge and address deficiencies 
in the delegated policy.  This refusal to engage with practice appeared to derive 
from a settled desire on the part of top-most superiors and their functionaries in 
the strategic core to present a positive, uncomplicated and consequently 
legitimising narrative account of the success of the VPS policy.   
The case study does not appear to provide evidence to support the inadequate 
comprehension model as an explanation for incongruence between the operative 
goals of the strategic core and the delivery network.  This model would predict 
that superiors would delegate confused, inappropriate and unachievable goals on 
subordinates.  There was little empirical evidence of this pattern of behaviour (at 
least for the case of operative goals discussed here). The case study indicates 
that members of the strategic core were aware of the practical challenges and 
constraints encountered in the delivery network, but the operational areas of the 
delivery network were, if not actually irrelevant, then of only marginal relevance 
to their actions.   
An important consideration in this regard is the integration of senior and 
operational staff within networks of electronic communication capable of 
transmitting information on operations in real time. Furthermore even if one 
posits a breakdown in internal communications (accidental or intended) then 
top-most officials remain in a position to obtain detailed information regarding 
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the implementation of policy from non-governmental organisations, social media 
web sites and the media.   
The relationship between the strategic core and delivery network was therefore 
characterised by the former’s desire to disengage as far as practicable from 
involvement with the delivery network. This resulted in an arm’s length 
relationship that was not conducive to the development of the conditions of 
interaction necessary to sustain the inadequate comprehension model. 
 
Organisational Segmentation 
Organisational segmentation appeared to be a fact of professional life within the 
delivery network. Professional identity was tethered to organisational 
membership. Delivery network professionals were distributed across an 
organisational landscape comprised of the local police service and probation 
trust and the regional divisions of the Crown Prosecution Service and the 
HMCTS.  
Organisational boundaries were frequently co-terminus with those of 
professional orientations within the local delivery network. As such it was 
difficult to distinguish the empirical influence of organisational segmentation 
from other proposed shaping influences for goal incongruence.  As described 
earlier the ‘dichotomy between organisational commitment and professional 
allegiance’ was difficult to discern in empirical contexts.  
However organisational affiliation was observed to produce goal incongruence 
to the extent that professionals were compelled to represent organisational 
interests and goals in boundary spanning professional interactions. Actors might 
represent such interests enthusiastically, reluctantly or even apologetically. On 
occasion representing organisational interests presented as a conscious advocacy 
of organisational advantage.  On other occasions it was manifested in actors’ 
performance of taken for granted habituated routines that were shaped by 
organisational affiliation.   
These parochial contests were shaped by representations of economy, efficiency 
and effectiveness that were shaped by the needs of the organisations rather than 
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the network. In other terms, professionals were compelled, with greater or lesser 
degrees of reluctance, to act as advocates of narrow organisational interest. To 
the extent that those differences were different and contradictory organisational 
segmentation acted to reinforce inter-professional goal incongruence.  
The organisational segmentation model is supported by evidence drawn from the 
case study.  Differences in priority were reinforced by the practice of drawing 
organisational boundaries around professional / task orientations.  This had the 
effect of reinforcing patterns of communication within rather than between 
professional / task groups. It also ensured that creation of hierarchical 
management teams who had an interest in optimising (in operational and 
financial terms) discreet elements of the delivery network (their agency) but no 
formal interest in optimising the performance of the network as a whole.   
The inevitable result of task specialisation is that the formal goals of particular 
agencies are dissociated from and contradict the operational goals of other 
agencies. This is perhaps an unremarkable insight from a theoretical perspective.  
However in practical terms its importance is difficult to overstate.  It is felt in the 
in the abdication of responsibility for the overall effectiveness and efficiency of 
the CJS and the incentive to optimise discreet components of the system even at 
the price of sub-optimising the system as a whole.  
 
The Performance Control Model 
The evidence in favour of the performance control model of goal incongruence 
is perhaps the clearest provided by the case study. Performance control regimes 
were readily available in published documents that frequently set out 
measurement and control metrics applied to discreet professional orientations.  
Performance measurement enabled the comparison of professional sub-units 
against their professional peers and where the metrics had remained stable the 
longitudinal performance of particular groups. This established a clear link 
between the system of performance control and professional practice.  There was 
clear evidence that the professional groups represented in the delivery network 
were influenced by their respective performance measurement / control system.   
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Performance measurement and control systems were professionally organised 
and focused and reflected professional concerns, practices and meanings.  They 
incorporated coercive, normative and mimetic influences on the behaviour of 
professionals (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). They were coercive because they 
frequently measured performance against statutory obligations. Normative 
because of the pervasive influence they had on the values and actions of 
professionals. They were mimetic due to the practice of professionals replicating 
the apparently successful behaviours, actions and structures of fellow 
professionals.   
Performance measurement / control systems focused on the actions of particular 
professional groups to the exclusion of others. Each professional orientation was 
subject to a distinct and discreet performance measurement system.  These acted 
to foster an introspective preoccupation with professional performance that 
marginalised or excluded perspectives from outside or adjacent perspectives.  
Thus performance control systems tended to replicate inherent contradictions in 
the sphere of professional practice.  Differences in the measurement and control 
systems to which professionals were exposed, and the professional response to 
the influence of those systems acted to produce inter-professional goal 
incongruence within the delivery network. 
Near identical arguments can be made with regard to hierarchically imposed 
systems of professional control. Aligning discrepant professional control 
systems with agency boundaries results in contradiction between formal and 
operative goals drawn from different professional control regimes. The 
similarity of the arguments derives from the close association in the delivery 
network between agency identity and professional control system. Indeed 
analysis was complicated by the fundamental entanglement between these two 
concepts, to the extent that it became almost impossible to make theoretical 
distinctions between organisational identities and imposed professional control 
systems.    
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Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the extent to which hierarchical explanations of goal 
incongruence are supported by the empirical evidence provided by the case 
study.  It has also sought to unpack the hierarchical model and draw conclusions 
about which of the proposed shaping influences for hierarchical goal 
incongruence are supported by the empirical evidence. The chapter finds that the 
case study evidence provides considerable support for hierarchical explanations 
of goal incongruence. In each of the empirical contexts that exhibit goal 
incongruence a plausible case is made that the hierarchical model is provides a 
convincing explanation of the source of goal incongruence.   
Analysis indicates that hierarchical goal incongruence arose from four of the six 
shaping influences.  Evidence indicated that a mixture of the pre-occupation and 
compliance model and the bifurcation of interests model provided the most 
prevalent shaping influence of goal incongruence.  In the analysis evidence for 
the former model was described as equivocal.  It is worth exploring this 
qualification in more detail in this conclusion. While there was undoubtedly 
evidence that actors (particularly in the strategic core) became pre-occupied with 
complying with proximate goals, the pre-occupation and compliance model 
appeared excessively generous to those actors in ascribing an 'unintended' aspect 
to their actions.  It presented a passive view of their behaviour that was at odds 
with the active and deliberate choices actors were observed to make during the 
research. In more technical terms, it appears to ignore the agency of 
organisational actors. 
On the other hand the bifurcation of interests model incorporates this evidence 
of active shaping of the operative goals very well.  Its exposition of individual's 
behaviour as social (and economic) actors presents an effective analytical lens 
and compelling explanation of why operative goals become incongruent with 
formal goals within hierarchical settings.  The case study provided considerable 
evidence of individuals prioritising their interests and behaving as social actors.  
In the strategic core this concentrated on reducing responsibility and blame for 
operational outcomes in favour of constructing and presenting plausible 
narratives. Within the delivery network it focused on meeting operational 
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imperatives and the inability of actors to distance themselves professionally and 
personally from CJS outcomes experienced by the victims of serious crime.  
In addition the organisational segmentation and professional control models also 
explained the emergence of hierarchical goal incongruence within the delivery 
network.  Both models acted to produce and maintain a hierarchically imposed 
introspection that produced goal incongruence.  Members of the delivery 
networked were compelled to by organisational segmentation to act in the 
capacity of 'organisational advocates', even in circumstances where this required 
them to act against the overall interests of the network.  Hierarchically imposed 
systems of professional control institutionalised a rigid goal incongruence that 
was impossible to overcome by 'legitimate means'. Professionals were compelled 
to represent (with varying degrees of enthusiasm) contradictory organisational 
interests.  Perhaps most powerfully professional behaviour appeared particularly 
susceptible to the influence of the performance control regimes to which they 
were subject. 
However two proposed shaping influences were not supported. The case study 
found no evidence for inadequate comprehension model of hierarchical goal 
incongruence. Indeed on balance the evidence cast doubt on the explanatory 
value of these proposed models.  The problem for them appears to be that given 
modern communication technology and the manner in which pervasive social 
and formal media can transmit information, it is difficult to sustain a belief that 
top-most officials can be in ignorance of events 'on the ground' or that sub-
ordinates can mistake the intentions of top-most officials when the words of 
those officials are available verbatim.  The effect of modern communications 
technology on collapsing the distance between hierarchically separated 
organisational actors in public networks appears to mitigate against the 
arguments of the discretionary gap and inadequate comprehension models.  With 
regard to the discretionary gap model, it suggests that there will be a gradual 
decay in meaning as ends are delegated downward through hierarchies.  The 
case study found very little evidence of entropy.  Instead incongruence appeared 
to emerge from radical discontinuities.  This provides support for the bifurcation 
of interest model at the expense of the discretionary gap model.  
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Finally, analysis of the evidence of goal incongruence produced an empirical 
surprise. Formal-operative goal incongruence was greater at the apex of the 
network than it was at the base.  In other words the operative goals of the 
strategic core were more incongruent with the formal goals of the network than 
were the operative goals of the delivery network. This contradicts the established 
view of goal incongruence presented in the literature, that senior staff and policy 
makers are more 'trustworthy' in terms of commitment to achieve formal public 
goals than junior or operational staff.  This insight problematizes the apex of 
networks rather than the base with regard to goal incongruence and is a subject 
that this work will return to in the conclusion.    
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Chapter 7  Professional Difference as the source of 
Goal Incongruence 
 
Introduction 
This chapter will discuss the extent to which the empirical descriptions of goal 
incongruence set out in chapter five support theoretical claims that goal 
incongruence is caused by different and contradictory professional orientations.  
The professional orientation model of goal incongruence draws on the 
theoretical perspective that organisations should not be conceptualized as chains 
of command but as coalitions of interest (Cyert and March 1963). This 
theoretical frame suggests that organisations are comprised of coalitions of 
individuals, some of whom are organised into sub-coalitions.  Organizational 
goals emerge from the process of bargaining, both within and between sub-
coalitions.  As such the question of goal incongruence is central to conceptual 
descriptions of organisational contexts.  As Cyert and March explain:  
Individual participants in the organization may have substantially 
different preference orderings  (i.e., individual goals).  That is to say, 
any theory of organisation must deal successfully with the  obvious 
potential for internal goal conflict inherent in a coalition of diverse 
individuals and groups.  (Cyert and March 1963, p.31).  
The discussion that will be developed in this chapter proceeds from the 
assumption that professional identities and commitments operate as a 
particularly significant locus for the development of organisational coalitions 
and sub-coalitions. Arguments that different professional orientations produce 
inter-professional relationships characterised by conflict and competition are 
reviewed and three shaping influences for professional conflict are identified and 
described. These shaping influences are described as the: reinforced pre-
disposition model, the communities of practice model and the inter-professional 
competition model.  
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The chapter will then progress to consider whether evidence of goal 
incongruence drawn from participant observation within the case study network 
is consistent with the each of the explanations of the shaping influences for goal 
incongruence put forward by the professional orientation model. Due to the 
expression of professional difference within the case study only one empirical 
context for goal incongruence will be discussed.  It is that of goal incongruence 
within the delivery network.  
The chapter will describe how within the delivery network inter-professional 
goal incongruence is balanced by organic attempts at network integration. The 
chapter will conclude by suggesting that attempts to reduce goal incongruence 
within the delivery network reflect perceptions of inter-professional obligation 
and dependency derived from the nature of work and equivalence between 
different professional orientations within the Criminal Justice System. 
The chapter will begin by summarizing the suggested shaping influences for 
professional orientation as a source of goal incongruence.  It will then provide 
and overview of the claimed sources of horizontally produced goal incongruence 
and discusses the evidence that supports these claims.    
 
Professional Difference as a Source of Goal Incongruence 
The proceeding discussion of the proposed causes of goal incongruence suggests 
a number of shaping influences by which professional difference might lead to 
goal incongruence. These are summarised below. 
The first shaping influence for goal incongruence within the professional 
orientation paradigm is the reinforced pre-dispositions model.  New entrants to 
professionals are not selected at random, but self-select on the basis of attraction 
(their pre-disposition) to the values, goals, practice and benefits of their chosen 
profession.  This expression of fundamental difference in the commitments of 
prospective professionals is reinforced by the pre-and in service training those 
individuals received.  Professional training acts to socialise professionals into a 
cohesive epistemic community (Knorr-Certina 1999), reducing variability in an 
already self-selecting group. Voluntaristic commitments to undergo professional 
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training produce goal incongruence within a heuristic cycle of attraction, 
selection and attrition (Schneider 1987) that acts to establish and maintain inter-
professional distinction and preference orderings. 
The second shaping influence for goal incongruence is the specialised nature and 
experience of professional work and the consequent manifestation of 
professional groups as communities of practice. Professionals operate within 
specific and closely defined jurisdictional domains (Friedson 1986). These 
domains define the limit of professional responsibility, skills, experience and 
expertise and act to separate individuals of different professional orientations. 
The consequence of this specialisation is that professionals engage with the 
technical requirements of their work and the development of expertise necessary 
to achieve proximate ends and means.   
The corollary of this outcome, less frequently discussed, is that professionals are 
distanced or excluded from engaging with work that is outside their 
jurisdictional domains.  In itself this differential experience and consequent 
preoccupation with the technical demands of work might be considered 
sufficient to produce goal incongruence between workers with different 
professional orientations. From the institutional perspective the individual’s 
conception of desired ends are mediated by: “cognitive frameworks that guide 
organisation members’ thoughts and actions” (Misangyi, Weaver and Elms 
2008:753).  That means that professional groups are inclined to develop shared 
interpretations (ascribe similar meaning) to conceptions of desired ends.  Under 
such circumstances the individual’s relationship to organisational goals can 
become entangled with shared understandings of and commitment to identities 
and practices within cognitive communities (Porac and Rosa 1996; Porac, Wade 
and Pollack 1999).  
From this perspective goal incongruence is a product of the extent of agreement 
or similarity of particular cognitive orientations produced and maintained by the 
cognitive group that exist within network arrangements. Professions are 
organised around systems of formal knowledge. The apparatus required to 
accomplish this task effectively produces a discourse.  Indeed Larson has argued 
that professions comprise of discursive fields and that: "Professions can be 
distinguished by the nature and the structure of their discursive field" (1990, 
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p.38).  The distinct communities of practice shaped by action, meaning and 
knowledge will influence the means and ends of distinct professional groups and 
will tend to create conditions of inter-professional goal incongruence. The 
shaping influences discussed above may be considered plausible.  However they 
appear to provide a somewhat passive explanation of the sources of goal 
incongruence rooted in impersonal discourses and systems of shared meanings.  
Viewed through their lenses, goal incongruence can appear as an unfortunate 
accident of diversity.   
Conversely the inter-professional competition model emphasises the intended 
and deliberate nature of goal incongruence.  It emphasises that the objective of 
professions is to contend with out-groups in a struggle for survival, dominance 
and control.  For professional groups whose members are generally employed by 
organisations and can therefore be described as being institutionally bound 
(Hughes 1958), the tendency toward inter-professional competition is reinforced 
by the intersection of organisational commitments.  
According to the inter-professional competition model, the source of goal 
incongruence is the contest between professional groups that it inherent in the 
professionalization project. Professional jurisdiction consists of acquiring rights 
(ideally exclusive rights) to solve particular problems.  The fundamental concept 
in acquiring and protecting jurisdictional rights is that of audience. Professionals 
are involved in a constant process of influencing pubic opinion, both as an end 
itself and as a way of influencing legal and political constituencies.  The 
competition may be for the resources of power, prestige, status and financial 
rewards, or may be an existential contest for jurisdictional rights.  Goal 
incongruence is both an outcome of that struggle and a means by which it is 
conducted. 
	  
Evidence for Professional Orientation as the Determinant of 
Goal Incongruence 
In chapter five goal incongruence was identified in five network contexts. In the 
following section we will evaluate whether professional orientation is a 
persuasive explanation of that goal incongruence.  As members of the strategic 
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core share a professional orientation the discussion will concentrate on goal 
incongruence within the delivery network and goal incongruence between the 
strategic core and delivery network. 
If goal incongruence were determined by dissonant professional orientations 
what evidence would we expect to find for the causes of goal incongruence 
within the case study network?  As was the case in the previous chapter we 
suggest that such evidence would consist in actors subverting, deflecting or 
contradicting practices aimed at achieving the formal and operative goals of 
other professional constituencies. Furthermore the practice of subversion by 
organisational actors should correspond to one or more of the shaping influences 
described in the preceding section. A discussion of the empirical evidence drawn 
from the case study and the extent to which it supports one or more of the 
shaping influences for the professional production of goal incongruence will 
follow. The discussion will present analysis of goal incongruence between 
different professional groups in the delivery network.  
 
Professional Orientations, Goal Incongruence and Integration 
within the Delivery Network  
The case study collected data from four statutory agencies that were responsible 
for administering the Criminal Justice System within a specific English city.  
They included the local Police service, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), 
Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunal Service (HMCTS) and the local Probation 
Trust. The dominant work practices observed within the delivery network have 
been described at length in earlier chapters and revolved around the operational 
tasks necessary for the operation of the local criminal justice system.  
At a high level of analysis it is possible to argue that professional orientations in 
the delivery network were congruent around meeting the operational imperatives 
of the Criminal Justice system.  Each of the professional orientations observed 
appeared to reflect the individual’s experience of being ‘immersed’ in the work 
of the Criminal Justice System.  Each appeared to share what we have described 
as the dual ‘because we have to, because its right’ motivation towards meeting 
operational imperatives.  Each professional orientation was exposed to systems 
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of performance measurement that published selected data on the efficiency and 
effectiveness of agency performance. In summary each professional orientation 
exhibited a high commitment to meeting the operational imperatives of the 
Criminal Justice System within the inevitable and predictable constraints of 
resources and demand.     
However analysis reveals that particular delivery agencies focus on different 
operational imperatives. Professional orientations were not distributed uniformly 
over the delivery network. Differences in priority were reinforced by the practice 
of drawing organisational boundaries around professional / task orientations.  
This had the effect of reinforcing patterns of communication within rather than 
between professional / task groups.  It also ensured that creation of hierarchical 
management teams who had an interest in optimising discreet elements of the 
delivery network (their agency), but no formal interest in optimising the 
performance of the network as a whole.  
Chapter five presented a discussion of how professional constituencies with 
different professional or task orientations exhibited commitment to different and 
sometimes contradictory operative goals.  One person with experience of leading 
improvement projects in the Criminal Justice System described their view that: 
“the police’s main priority is detection, the CPS care about what proportion of 
cases are successful and the Courts measure court room utilization.”  (PO 
Notes).  Subsequent data collection indicated that this description while 
undoubtedly an over-simplification was not devoid of merit. 
Analysis during participant observation of the interaction of CJS agencies when 
investigating and prosecuting sexual violence cases indicated agencies working 
at cross-purposes.  Police investigators might wait up to two months to obtain a 
meeting with CPS advocates responsible for making charging decisions.  
Statutory Agencies might have no knowledge (let alone communication) with 
voluntary agencies that provide invaluable practical assistance and emotional 
support to victims.  Trials were ‘vacated’ (rescheduled) because files had not 
been prepared or submitted by the CPS. The availability of allocated prosecution 
advocates was not considered by HMCTS who were responsible for ‘listing’ 
trials.  There was a widespread lack of knowledge in Criminal Justice Agencies 
regarding post-trial services available to victims (which were only taken up by 
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40% of eligible victims).  There was also widespread frustration expressed at the 
effort required to obtain essential but unremarkable information from other CJS 
agencies.    
It was widely believed that the inclination to prioritize agency over network had 
been exacerbated by budget reductions aimed at achieving deficit reduction 
targets. It was commonly accepted that agency managers made decisions about 
the deployment of resources that were in the financial and operational interests 
of their own agencies rather than the best interests of the network and network 
beneficiaries.  These decisions included action to reduce agency workloads and 
cost and meet agency specific performance targets despite negative 
consequences for the CJS network. 
A simple but illustrative example of the above was given at a meeting of the 
local Criminal Justice Board victim and witness group:  
A participant reported on a survey that had examined witness attitudes 
to waiting times in Magistrate’s Courts.  The HMCTs has national 
targets on waiting times, measuring how many witnesses have to wait 
longer than two hours to give evidence.  One area in the region had 
excellent performance on witness waiting times.  However they did 
poorly on ‘cracked’ trials (trials which are listed but do not go ahead).  
It was suggested that this was explained by their practice of listing three 
or four trials to run concurrently, then releasing three.  In consequence 
performance against waiting time targets was excellent.  The meeting 
went on to discuss the consequences of this target driven behaviour for 
the Criminal Justice Network and the public.   
Firstly witnesses had to return to Court on a rescheduled date in order to 
give evidence. This created additional work for the police Witness 
Liaison Unit who had to inform witnesses of rescheduled dates and 
persuades them to attend.  If witnesses were particularly reluctant or 
even refusing to attend this might require the expensive and time-
consuming action of issuing a summons. Police witnesses might also be 
required to return to Court to give evidence, reducing their efficiency.  
The Crown Prosecution Service experienced additional work and 
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disruption to the schedules of Crown Advocates. The CPS might also 
have to meet the expenses of witnesses necessary to compensate 
additional costs of travel, lost wages, child-care and on occasion 
overnight expenses. The survey suggested that witnesses preferred to 
wait for longer to give their evidence ‘on the day‘ rather than be 
released and required to return to Court on a subsequent day     
(Participant Observation Notes).  
There appeared to be a fundamental incongruence within the delivery network in 
the experience of the operational imperative, targets and measures, professional 
practice, management objectives and financial performance.  The result of such 
incongruence between professional orientations is a paradox. Professional 
commitments to meeting the operational imperative result in sub-optimal 
performance both for the network and individual agencies as professionals 
prioritize actions and decisions that make sense for their own Agency but reduce 
the effectiveness and efficiency of other Criminal Justice agencies.   
In summary, the case study provides significant evidence that professional 
orientation was associated with goal incongruence.  Professional orientations, 
reinforced by the practice of eliding organisational boundaries with professional 
/ task orientations led to a concentration on proximate operative imperatives 
grounded in the professional’s distinctive experience of work. The main 
expression of goal incongruence was in groups of professionals pursuing their 
own interests and agendas to the extent that it impeded the effectiveness and 
efficiency of other delivery network agencies through boundary spanning 
activities.  The perverse but predictable outcome of this pattern of behaviour was 
the direct impeding of the capability of other network agencies and indirectly the 
impeding of the effectiveness of the professionals own agency through its 
dependency on other network agencies. Inter-professional cooperation was 
significantly impaired despite the fact that the nature of the work demanded an 
extensive, dense, continuous and seamless sharing of information that was 
essential to the effective performance of complex tasks and decisions demanded 
by the nature of the Criminal Justice System.   
Despite the emphatic evidence for goal incongruence in the delivery network, 
the case study also produced a clear indication that senior professionals in the 
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delivery network understood the benefits of inter-agency integration and 
cooperation and the benefits of adopting an approach to resource configuration 
based on mutual assistance.  This was evidenced by the success of organic local 
initiatives to develop integrated services to address problems caused by prolific 
offenders of acquisitive crimes and to provide integrated services to victims of 
sexual violence.  These initiatives had proved to be so successful that the model 
was being extended to the management of dangerous offenders and services 
offered to victims.  One participant commented that:  
Integration has been very successful.  A lot of progress has been made.  
Success means that you want more but Agency priorities are inevitably 
different (Participant Observation Notes). 
At least four examples of significant integration (either implemented or being 
planned) were observed during participant observation.  The integration models 
ranged from increasing the efficiency of information exchange between CJS 
agencies to the physical co-location of multi-disciplinary teams.  These 
initiatives were believed to have been successful in increasing the effectiveness 
of the local Criminal Justice System.  They had received national recognition 
and were widely regarded as presenting a positive impression of agency and the 
reputation of senior local leaders for professional competence. However it is 
important to emphasise the local, organic and contingent nature of such 
integration activities. It appeared that even where integration was seen as 
successful, effective and legitimizing, senior advocates of integration struggled 
to resist pressure to prioritize narrow agency interests.  
This organic commitment to integration emerged from professional's shared 
commitment to the formal goals of the criminal justice system, identification 
with the experience of the victims of serious crime and shared representations of 
what constituted satisfactory criminal justice outcomes for those victims.  The 
author also argues that the emergence of integrated organisation reflects 
professional’s recognition that the outcomes of their own practice are dependent 
on the actions, behaviour and goodwill of other groups of professionals within 
the criminal justice system.   The performance of each agency is dependent on 
that of its counterparts within the network. The implication of this insight is that 
the professional experience of work acts to connect as much as divide, and 
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results in the recognition of the value of inter-professional dependency and 
obligation as much as the tactical advantages of inter-professional competition.   
If the case study produced evidence in support of professional orientation as an 
explanation of incongruence between operative goals within the Delivery 
Network what inferences can be drawn for the shaping influences of that goal 
incongruence that we discussed earlier in the chapter?  The following section 
will evaluate the evidence. 
 
 The Reinforced Predispositions Model 
Differences in predisposition and training between distinct professional groups 
within the delivery network were clearly demonstrated during participant 
observation. Difference was expressed in dissonant entry requirements and 
career pathways, alternative reward systems and different ideological 
commitments.  This was the case between delivery network agencies, where the 
experience of being a member of the local Police Service, Crown Prosecution 
Service or Probation Trust were very different.  It was also experienced within 
agencies, for example between warranted police officers and the civilian staff 
who ensured that victims and witnesses appeared at Court or the legal and 
administrative professions within the HMCTS. 
However it is difficult to claim that predisposition and training shaped goal 
incongruence. This work has argued consistently that difference is an 
insufficient criterion to establish goal incongruence.  The connection between 
dissonant reinforced predispositions and goal incongruence was empirically 
indistinct.  While there certainly appeared to be an association between the two 
the nature of the evidence produced by participant observation was insufficient 
to provided a convincing argument for reinforced predispositions as a shaping 
influence for goal incongruence. Therefore the limit of the claims that can be 
warranted by the evidence is that there is an association between reinforced 
predispositions. While a shaping relationship might be suspected, it cannot be 
confidently inferred. 
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 The Communities of Practice Model 
The case study appears to provide convincing evidence for the communities of 
practice model as a shaping influence for goal incongruence.  Differences in the 
working practices of distinct professional groups provide the basic definition of 
professional difference and commitments. The nature of work defined 
professional experience, what they did and what they knew, how their 
proficiency was evaluated, what they contributed to the criminal justice system 
and how that contribution defined their value and identity as professionalised 
workers. 
The inevitable pre-occupation with the proximate goals of work resulted in goal 
incongruence (the pursuit of contradictory goals) between professional 
orientations.  This occurred due to professionals prioritising goals that emerged 
from their own work, and benefited the effectiveness and efficiency of their own 
work, at the expense of the work of other professional groups, as described in 
the empirical description of interaction within the delivery network earlier in this 
chapter. 
However it would be a misleading simplification to suggest that the differential 
experience of work operated exclusively to produce goal incongruence. What 
emerges from consideration of the data is the realisation that while the nature of 
work within the criminal justice system not only separates but also connects 
groups with distinct professional orientations. The tendency toward the 
discrepant experience of work between professional groups was moderated by 
extensive interactions that were demanded by the nature of work within the 
Criminal Justice System.  Organising effective criminal prosecutions demanded 
extensive, intense and protracted communication between multiple elements of 
various delivery network agencies. 
Therefore the evidence for the experience of work as a shaper of goal 
incongruence was balanced. On the one hand it created difference and 
contradiction between professional groups that resulted in goal incongruence.  
On the other the connected nature of work established inter-professional 
dependencies and obligations that acted to reduce goal incongruence. The 
experience of work connected as well as divided individuals with different 
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professional orientations. This is an intriguing feature of the evidence that we 
will return to at several points in the remainder of this chapter. 
The case study produced clear evidence that professional groups exhibited 
different and exclusive epistemic commitments.  That is they operated as distinct 
communities of knowledge. In addition each profession, to a varying extent, 
operated as a discursive community, that is, produced systems and structures for 
the creation, curation, dissemination, acquisition consumption of specific bodies 
of knowledge. This experience of knowledge as a discursive identity was 
perhaps most visible and material in the Headquarters of the local Police Service 
that had lecture theatres and seminar rooms that were equivalent to those found 
in the best resourced Universities.  These were used to educate new and existing 
members of the professional community.  
However there was little positive evidence that the existence of these 
communities of knowledge shaped goal incongruence. Furthermore, the 
observation of professional commitments to integration within the delivery 
network suggests that communities of knowledge do not act as an inevitable 
shaper of goal incongruence. In examining this problem, that distinct 
communities of knowledge existed but did not produce uncontrollable goal 
incongruence, it might be worth considering two moderating influences.  The 
first is that while discreet, the bodies of knowledge incorporated shared 
commitments to the outcomes of the Criminal Justice System.   
The second is that they were frequently connected in that they shared elements 
of knowledge.  For example a presentation organised by the local police service 
in their state of the art lecture theatre by a respected academic on the myths and 
stereotypes that apply to serious sexual violence was made available to and 
heavily attended by members of other professional groups within the delivery 
agency.  For each epistemic community the myths and stereotypes knowledge 
had a significant valence.  In that sense the 'distinctness' of the various epistemic 
communities lay in the way that they created, curated and credentialed 
knowledge (the discursive structures that carried knowledge) rather than 
knowledge itself.  It is possible to argue that provided the integrity (and 
therefore utility) of these discursive structures were protected, the shared 
knowledge they carried could act to reduce goal incongruence as much as 
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increase it.  
The communities of practice model suggest that goal incongruence is caused by 
patterns of shared interpretations of meaning across professional groups. 
Professional groups act as cognitive communities and goal incongruence emerge 
and are maintained because different professional groups 'see their worlds in the 
same way'.  The case study certainly provided evidence that different 
professional groups did operate as cognitive communities.  The patterns of their 
dress, language, manner, concerns and values did appear to exhibit professional 
patterning.   
Of-course discerning the private subjective meanings ascribed to particular 
events is notoriously difficult.  The researcher is frequently left to puzzle at 
empirical hints and nuances, frequently these are from the material or linguistic 
domain simply because these domains are more empirically available.  For 
example several individuals commented that the police had natural authority in 
formal multi-professional interactions because they wore uniform. It was 
intriguing to note that non-uniformed male police officers were almost 
invariably adorned with ostentatious cuff links, a practice that was generally 
avoided by Courts and CPS staff, and positively shunned the Probation Service.    
However, once again the presence of these empirically indistinct communities of 
meaning did not preclude significant commitments to inter-agency integration 
within the delivery network. Therefore the conclusion must be that (in the case 
study at least) the existence of professional communities of meaning did not act 
to shape goal incongruence. Why might this be? This work suggests that 
competing communities of meaning founded on peer group relations moderated 
the effects of professional communities of meaning.  This is a subject that will 
be returned to in the following chapter.  However it is worth making the point 
here that for many professionals within the CJS, their primary working 
interactions (that is peer group interactions) are with members of other 
professions as they co-operate to bring cases before the Courts. As such, 
professionals are engaged in multiple communities of meaning.  Evidence from 
the case study might indicate that the peer group community is particularly 
powerful in reducing goal incongruence (in this case by promoting the concept 
of network integration.)    
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 The Inter-Professional Competition Model 
The inter-professional competition model suggests that different professional 
groups will compete to protect control of their own jurisdiction and to attempt to 
extend their control over the jurisdiction of other professional groups, that is to 
exclude or sub-ordinate other professional groups.  The other important aspect of 
the model is that of audience.  Professional groups will attempt to influence the 
perception of their audience (whether the public or policy makers) as to the 
effectiveness, efficiency and ultimately the legitimacy of the profession.  They 
attempt to position themselves as deserving rather than undeserving professions 
(to borrow a phrase).  The difficulty in studying this model in the case study was 
that professional groups were aligned with organisational boundaries, isolating 
organisational and professional interests was not a straightforward task.    
The case study does appear to provide relevant evidence for this model.  For 
example, professionals in the delivery network appeared to be very sensitive to 
newspaper stories that could influence opinion.  They also appeared to have an 
absolute horror of agencies blaming each other for poor performance in informal 
communications with victims of crime. In addition influencing the policy 
audience in the strategic core by proposing novel projects or by developing 
narratives of best practice and improved outcomes were coveted activities that 
were regarded as a marker of professional accomplishment and prestige.  
However the case study also furnished evidence that challenged to the inter-
professional competition model.  The most overt was that the different 
professions came together to organise network integration. That in itself suggests 
that inter-professional competition was experienced in a more sophisticated way 
than simple expressions of the model suggest.  Within the case study, the 
possibility of one profession usurping the jurisdiction of another (for example 
the police taking over the running of the courts or the CPS taking operational 
responsibility for police investigations) was remote to say the least.  What was 
of greater concern was that particular professional groups might be maneuvered 
into taking the blame for perceived failures of the joint enterprise of the Criminal 
Justice System.  Furthermore, some professionals (and particularly professional 
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elites) feared losing their rights to operate their inherited jurisdictions.  Not to 
competing professional groups within the CJS, but to private organisations.  This 
effectively meant that adverse publicity might increase the chance that existing 
professional elites would 'losing their franchise' to operate elements of the CJS.  
Against this background the logic for inter-professional competition was 
moderated.  Jurisdictional boundaries within the CJS were viewed as relatively 
stable, and professional co-operation between professional groups to improve 
performance and reduce public blaming was seen as an effective defense against 
the members of the Strategic Core opening the CJS to the jurisdictional 
incursions of the private sector  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has presented and evaluated the theoretical argument that goal 
incongruence is caused by differences in the professional orientation of network 
actors.  This theoretical perspective derives from conceptions of organisations as 
coalitions of interest (Cyert and March 1963) rather than chains of commands.  
Professionalization, understood as the “collective struggle of members of an 
occupation to define the conditions and methods of their own work” (DiMaggio 
and Powell 1991) is taken as the predominant institutional frame for the 
construction of those coalitions.  
This chapter has discussed three shaping influences by which divergent 
professional orientations are claimed to produce goal incongruence.  It evaluates 
the claims made by these models of the causal determinants of goal 
incongruence by testing them against case study evidence derived from 
participant observation of goal incongruence within the Delivery Network.   
What conclusions can be drawn from the evidence?  Evidence from the case 
study indicates that differences in professional orientations produced goal 
incongruence. The case study produced data that appeared to support 
professional difference as the source of goal incongruence.  Evidence described 
how professional orientation determined engagement with work that acted as 
barriers to inter-professional cooperation and understanding.  Evidence drawn 
from participant observation provided accounts that supported the communities 
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of knowledge, meaning and practice models.   The evidence also appeared to 
suggest an association between goal incongruence and differences in the 
reinforced pre-dispositions of different professional orientations despite the 
empirical evidence being insufficiently strong to allow the confident inference of 
a causal relationship. Participant observation also provided qualified (or more 
accurately nuanced) support for the inter-professional competition model to the 
extent that professional groups were particularly sensitive to inter-professional 
criticism and its role in questioning the legitimacy and desirability of 
jurisdictional control. 
However as the work describes, accounts of practice from the delivery network 
included evidence of inter-professional integration within the delivery network.  
This represented an organic attempt to reduce goal incongruence and its negative 
consequences for the operational performance of the Criminal Justice System.  
These attempts to integrate network activities represent an attempt by senior 
professionals within delivery agencies to self-medicate against the negative 
effects of goal incongruence.   
How can this apparently contradictory empirical surprise be resolved? Narratives 
that explore the experience of inter-professional interactions emphasise the 
evidence for the existence of mutual obligation and dependency that exist 
between professional groups within the Criminal Justice System.   Patterns of 
connection, obligation and dependence emerge from analysis of the three 
shaping influences discussed in this chapter. The most important is the 
experience of work.  The nature of the work of the Criminal Justice System 
demands extensive, sustained, complex and intense communication.  We have 
argued work acts to connect as much as to separate professional orientations. 
Communities of practice produced by the shared aspects of the experience of 
work within the delivery network are to some extent professionally inclusive and 
are not entirely co-terminus with professional and organisational boundaries.   
The reinforced pre-dispositions model demonstrates equivalence as professional 
groups share commitments to the overarching goals and values of the Criminal 
Justice System, reflected in a common identification with the experience of the 
victim of serious crime. Finally the realization of professional interests is 
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understood by delivery network members to be dependent on the goodwill and 
cooperation of other delivery network agencies.  
In summary, evaluation of the case study indicates that goal incongruence was 
not produced by differences in professional orientation as predicted by the 
professional conflict literature.  It would be wrong to suggest that competition 
and contradictory difference were absent from inter-professional relationships.  
However the empirical surprise provided by the data is that local professional 
elites organised to reduce goal incongruence by developing practices of network 
integration. This work concludes that this empirical surprise, that professionals 
who were supposed to compete with each other in fact attempted to co-operate, 
reflects the fact that the shaping influences for goal incongruence were 
moderated and altered by perceptions of inter-professional dependency and 
obligation that were experienced within the delivery network. The conclusion 
drawn from this account is that the tendency to professional introspection and 
the creation of contradictory conceptions of desired ends was not the source of 
goal incongruence within the case study. 
In summary the case study provides evidence that different professional 
orientations did exist, did act to limit the effectiveness of cooperation and 
collaboration and on occasion did result in inter-professional tension and 
conflict.  However evidence also indicates that the suggested shaping influences 
for goal incongruence were associated with the production of goal incongruence, 
they also appeared to account for organic actions to limit goal incongruence by 
promoting inter-professional collaboration in the shape of network integration. 
The propensity for network integration demonstrated in the case study stands 
against inter-professional conflict as a cause of goal incongruence. However we 
suggest that the organic integration initiatives represent a tacit recognition on the 
part of local professionals of the negative impact that inter-professional conflict 
on the effectiveness of all the local Criminal Justice Agencies. It can be thought 
of as senior professionals in the delivery network taking steps to reduce the 
effects of inter-professional conflict and goal incongruence.   
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Chapter 8  Theorising Network Integration 
	  
Introduction 
Theory suggests that goal incongruence is caused by two factors.  The first is the 
nature of bureaucratic delegation within hierarchies.  The second is difference 
between professional orientations.  Theorists and policy-makers have assumed 
that disparate groups of professionals will pursue their own interests and goals 
unless they are induced or even coerced into meeting external performance 
expectations and cooperating with each other. This practice of control is most 
clearly expressed in the performance measurement systems that are imposed on 
professionals by bureaucratic hierarchies.   
The evidence of the study confirms hierarchical explanations of goal 
incongruence (see chapter six).  However the research found that the influence 
of professional orientations (at least in the delivery network) acted to reduce 
goal incongruence. Evidence indicates that groups with different professional 
orientations were attempting to co-operate by deliberately integrating their 
practice. However the literature predicts that they should be competing with 
each other and attempting to separate their working practices. Perversely, 
hierarchical attempts by the strategic core to manage network performance 
appeared to push professional groups further apart, promoting goal incongruence 
and reducing network effectiveness.  
This empirical surprise, that professional groups are capable of voluntary action 
to reduce goal incongruence and that they are prevented from doing so by 
hierarchical interventions that have the same purpose, raises three important 
questions.  
1. Does the evidence really show professionals attempting to co-operate?  
2. Why do professionals in the delivery network attempt to co-operate by 
integrating working practices? 
3. If professionals do show a propensity to co-operate, what modifications 
do we need to make to the theory of goal incongruence?   
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This work needs to establish with confidence that the evidence of the case study 
contradicts theoretical perspectives that argue that dissonant professional 
orientations will create goal incongruence. Warranting this claim demands a 
close evaluation of the evidence.  The chapter will do this by scrutinising four 
examples of professional co-operation and network integration drawn from the 
case study. 
The chapter will then go on to explore the influences of professional co-
operation.  Four shaping influences will be suggested and evaluated.  They are 
that co-operation is a response to professional control systems, that it emerges 
from the nature of work within the network, that it is an attempt to realise 
institutional benefits and that it reflects attempts on the part of senior individuals 
to acquire professional recognition.  The chapter will argue that the case study 
provides no empirical support for the first theoretical explanation, but 
considerable evidence that professional co-operation and integration is produce 
by the conditions of work, institutional benefits and professional recognition. 
The chapter will conclude by proposing modifications to theory suggested by the 
research findings. The proposed modifications include those drawn directly from 
empirical observation.  They are that different professional groups act to 
promote co-operation and network integration, integration is caused by the 
nature of professional work, attempts to realise institutional benefits and the 
desire to acquire professional recognition and that performance control systems 
act to increase goal incongruence and reduce professional co-operation and 
network integration.   
There are also two modifications that derive from analysis of the data.  Firstly, 
theory underestimates the role of peer group interactions in favour of 
institutional and professional interactions.  Secondly theory over-emphasises the 
identification of inter-professional difference and underestimates the influence 
of equivalence between different groups of professionals within network 
contexts.  In both cases the author suggests that what is searched for influences 
what is found.  Modifying theory to include the influence of peer groups and the 
concept of equivalence is likely to lead to different interpretations of the causes 
of goal incongruence.     
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Professional Integration in the Delivery Network 
Does the evidence really show professionals attempting to co-operate?  This 
work suggests that it does, and in compelling terms.  This section will present 
four examples of integration to support our case. They include the Integrated 
Victim Service (IVS) project, two forms of Integrated Offender Management 
(IOM) and a cluster of integrated practices that support the local Violence 
Against Women and Girls (VAWG) strategy.  The work argues that in each case 
professionals in the delivery network demonstrate a commitment to boundary 
spanning co-operation.  This results in network integration despite institutional 
barriers to professional collaboration.  
 
 Integrated Victim Service Project 
The IVS project’s objective was to provide services to victims of crime in a 
‘more joined up and effective way’ (participant observation notes).  The most 
recent official satisfaction surveys indicated that 85% of victims were satisfied 
with the services that they received from local criminal justice agencies. Despite 
this, senior professionals within the delivery network expressed a profound 
dissatisfaction with the performance of the system.  It was felt to be disjointed, 
incoherent and incapable delivering effective outcomes for victims.  
Senior professionals expressed a variety of negative views with regard to the 
operation of the system: 
 At the moment victims ricochet around the system like a ball in a 
pinball machine. 
 [The system is]… not just fragmented, but inconsistent, with 
 victims being given  contradictory information on a regular basis. 
 At present victims and witnesses are more confident that offenders 
 will harm them than they are that the system will protect them.   
 (Participant Observation Notes) 
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More junior members of delivery agencies could give a more visceral impression of 
victims' experience of the Criminal Justice System.  One, employed to provide post-
trial services to victims whose work involved developing long term relationships 
with victims of sexual violence, explained the victim’s position (and indirectly their 
identification with it) in less constrained terms:   
At the end of the trial victims feel like they have been shat on by the 
Criminal Justice System.  We are the people who get the backlash 
because we are the ones who go out and speak to victims in their own 
homes (Participant Observation Notes). 
Professionals felt that the fragmented nature of the system impaired the service 
offered to victims.  It was also felt to have a serious negative impact on the 
efficiency and effectiveness of professionals and their agencies as they struggled 
to obtain information and coordinate the processes of the Criminal Justice 
System.  Initial work conducted under the auspices of the IVS project indicated 
that each of the participating agencies experienced significant negative impacts 
as a result of poor information flow and inefficiencies, long lead times and poor 
quality associated with boundary spanning activities.   
The formal aim of the IVS project was to “review the way services are currently 
delivered in a dis-jointed way across the Criminal Justice agencies and re-write 
the end-to end processes / services that victims receive…” (Participant 
observation notes).  The logic of promoting integration is illustrated in the 
anticipated benefits from integrated victim services that were set out in the 
project proposal.  These included: 
- Raise the profile of the victim and the victim’s voice in the CJS. 
- Better target available resources according to need. 
- Victims will be presented with a more coherent and positive CJS, 
reducing instances where services are disjointed, repetitive or 
contradictory information is received from different agencies, therefore 
improving efficiency. 
- The Integrated Victim Service would provide a single point of contact for 
resolving queries / issues / complaints about the CJ process. 
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- Shared information about the victim, case and offender will reduce the 
number of times a victim has to share personal information, impacting on 
the confidence of the victim and increasing efficiency and responsivity 
across the CJS. 
- Integrated information sources would provide a better opportunity to 
devise protective services for victims, therefore reducing risk of repeat 
victimization. 
- Achieve efficiency savings from economies of scale. 
- Bringing services together breaks down barriers and increases focus on   
need 
Adapted from Local Criminal Justice Board IVS Paper,  (Participant 
Observation) 
During the research phase of the case study, the IVS project was at a pre-
implementation stage.  Challenges had been experienced in securing adequate 
project resources.  The numbers of people in the local Criminal Justice Board 
(who would have been most likely to provide project management and analysis 
resource) had reduced from eight full time equivalent employees to just one.  It 
was only at the end of the period of participant observation that funding for a 
IVS project manager was secured from the voluntary sector.  
The evidence of the IVS project consists of analyses of perceived deficiencies in 
the delivery of victim services and expectations of how integration might be 
expected to address them.  It is a representation of desired rather than actual 
practice. Nevertheless it serves to illustrate the perceived benefits of co-
operation and integration held by network professionals.  The anticipated 
benefits outlined above indicate that integration is understood to confer three 
broad categories of benefit.  First the experience of the victim would improve.  
Services would be more coherent, clearer and easier to access. Secondly 
Criminal Justice agencies will be made to operate more efficiently.  Economies 
of scale, easier access to information and reductions in duplication and errors 
will reduce agency workloads and costs for meeting particular levels of outputs. 
Thirdly the effectiveness of criminal justice agencies would be enhanced. 
Agencies would be placed in a position to provide statutory services to a greater 
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proportion of victims more frequently than they do now.  In addition, integration 
was seen as a pathway to new services being offered to victims, and a way in 
which their needs could be identified more accurately and met more 
appropriately.  
The commitment to integration indicated by the IVS project did not derive solely 
from principle.  Professionals in the case study could draw on their successful 
recent experience of establishing and operating Integrated Offender Management 
(IOM) projects.  The perceived success of IOM projects provided a significant 
stimulus to persist with diffusing the practice of co-operation and integration 
into the provision of services to victims. 
 
 Integrated Offender Management 
As the name suggests IOM involves criminal justice agencies co-operating by 
coordinating their activities in order to reduce offending in their local areas.  The 
Government Policy Statement (Home Office, 2009) indicated that IOM: was to 
be the strategic umbrella that brought together agencies across government to 
prioritise intervention with offenders causing crime in their locality; was to build 
on and expand current offender-focused and public protection approaches; and 
should relate to all agencies engaged in Community Safety Partnerships (CSPs) 
and Local Criminal Justice Boards (LCJBs) with direction and support in 
bringing together the management of repeat offenders in a more coherent 
structure. 
In 2008/09 the criminal justice agencies within the case study network were 
selected to be one of six ‘pioneer’ areas that received central funding from the 
Home Office and Ministry of Justice to implement an IOM project.  The project 
concentrated on reducing crimes committed by prolific acquisitive offenders. In 
layman’s terms this meant offenders who were responsible for high numbers of 
burglaries, robberies and thefts.   
The IOM project introduced intense cooperation between different criminal 
justice professionals.  An integrated project team was established that included 
members of the police, prison and probation services and drug workers.  The co-
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location of this team within a single office was widely regarded as an important 
and meaningful action. It facilitated cooperation and signified agency 
commitment to the project.  The provision of inter-agency access to IT systems 
and resources to IOM project members was also regarded as evidence of a 
radical approach to professional coordination. 
The practical form of integration was essentially interventionist.  The integrated 
IOM team gathered intelligence that enabled the integrated team to form a 
‘cohort’ of approximately 800 prolific acquisitive offenders active in the local 
area.  These offenders were contacted and made aware of the IOM project and 
its intention to disrupt their offending behaviours.  This disruption was founded 
on a carrot and stick approach.  On one hand offenders were informed of the 
resources that the integrated team would devote to intelligence gathering and 
surveillance and ensuring that where evidence of criminal actions was collected 
it would be brought before the Courts. On the other offenders were offered 
support to follow a range of ‘reducing re-offending pathways’ that included 
support connected with employment, housing, education and addiction.  
The case study did not involve direct observation or contact with active 
members of the prolific acquisitive IOM project.  However within the delivery 
network the project was regarded as being extremely successful and a beacon of 
best practice that attracted national attention and appreciation.  It was credited 
with reducing crime in the local area.  It was also regarded as being a more 
intelligent way of working and utilizing agency resources. The positive 
understanding of the IOM is revealed in the following quotations, again taken 
from the web site of the local police service: 
One of the most effective ways to cut crime is to focus most of our 
efforts on the people who are committing most of the crimes in our 
communities.  … [IOM] is a multi-agency team who are all working 
together as one. 
[IOM] doesn’t cost any extra.  Probation, Police, Prisons and Local 
Authorities have come together and worked out how to get more for 
their money by working together to tackle the same problems. 
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[IOM] gets real results.  When it was introduced … as a trial in 2008 
serious acquisitive crime (which includes domestic burglary, theft 
from motor vehicle, theft of motor vehicle and robbery) dropped by 
28.3% in just two years. 
  (Descriptions of IOM published on agency web sites. Web site 
  Address Withheld) 
The project was seen as a positive story to be associated with both for the 
agencies involved and senior professionals within those agencies.  Interest in the 
project was so great that the numbers of visitors proved disruptive to the work of 
the team.  It became necessary to restrict external visits by visiting professionals 
who wanted to understand how integration operated to a fixed day each week to 
minimize such disruption.  
The perceived success of the initial project was such that the IOM approach was 
extended to managing dangerous offenders.  This commitment required agencies 
to undertake a significant amount of preparatory work identifying a cohort of 
dangerous or potentially dangerous offenders, creating appropriate crime 
reduction pathways and developing relationships with public agencies that were 
more peripheral to the Criminal Justice System. The dangerous offender IOM 
included the local mental health partnership NHS Trust as a core organisation in 
addition to the established involvement of the police, probation and prison 
services.   
However in other respects the integration model remained unchanged.  Co-
location, information sharing and the carrot and stick approach were all facets of 
integration that were carried forward from the management of prolific 
acquisitive offenders to that of persistent dangerous offenders. The anticipated 
benefits remained extremely similar and the perceived effectiveness of the 
pioneer project was taken as an indication that the second IOM could expect to 
meet with the same success. When the dangerous offenders IOM project was 
formally announced launched (after the period of participant observation) it was 
described in an official press release in the following terms: 
“By adopting a similar approach [to the prolific acquisitive offender 
IOM] … staff from the different agencies will be based at the same 
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location, sharing information and joint responsibility.  We think using 
this approach we can achieve similarly positive results with dangerous 
offenders and do reduce the risk to the public”  (Press Release 27.06.12; 
Web address withheld)  
“The …team will work together to identify, assess and monitor 
individuals who we believe pose a risk of causing harm.  This 
initiative will help us to work together even more closely with our 
partners in probation, the NHS and prison service to manage those 
who we believe pose a risk so we are even more effective in reducing 
the risk of harm to the public”  
 (Press Release 27.06.12; Web address withheld) 
Taken together, these accounts of two IOM projects in the case study network, 
the second a consequence of the perceived success of the first, illustrate 
professionals’ commitment to co-operation and integration.  Integration was 
seen as an effective way of improving the outcomes of the criminal justice 
system.  It was also seen as a more attractive, intelligent and efficient way for 
agencies to deploy resources and for professionals to work.  The hallmarks of 
the IOM approach were co-location, shared access to system information and IT 
systems, and joint responsibility for outcomes. National interest in IOM within 
the case study network ensured that it was seen as a positive story to be 
associated with by professionals working within the Criminal Justice System. 
IOM was widely perceived to be a different, better and more professional way to 
organise work within the Criminal Justice System. It therefore represented 
professionals desire to overcome institutional barriers to inter-professional co-
operation and consequently acted to reduce of goal incongruence within the 
delivery network. 
It might be objected that however effective, the IOM projects do not reflect 
inter-professional co-operation because they received initial funding from 
central Government and were conducted under a hierarchical policy framework.   
However this objection can be safely dismissed. The Government policy 
statement was guidance rather than proscription.  It envisaged that local agencies 
would enjoy considerable discretion in devising, implementing and developing 
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IOM approaches. Central government’s role was seen to create a permissive 
environment characterised by benign neglect rather than mandated actions 
enforced by intrusive systems of performance control.  
In their evaluation of the pioneer IOM projects Senior et al (2011) describe the 
situation in the following terms: 
Sites … were provided with ‘pioneer’ funding from the Home Office 
(HO) and Ministry of Justice (MoJ) in 2008/09 and 2009/10, to 
develop IOM free from central prescription. IOM has been 
characterised by ‘bottom up’ developments in local areas.  While this 
approach has been supported by central government it has not been 
directed towards a single model or mode of operation (Senior et al 
2011, p.3). 
Establishing the primacy of local professionals in the production of patterns of 
integration within IOM projects is of such vital importance to this discussion 
that it is worth quoting such an authoritative source even more completely.  
Writing about the role of local professionals in IOM projects versus the civil 
servants of central government Senior et al. state explicitly that: 
Definition of the approach [to IOM] was left to local discretion 
(Senior et al 2011:i)  
And:  
The enthusiasm and commitment to IOM from local stakeholders was 
critical to IOM development and resulted from encouraging local 
development free from national prescription (Emphasis added) 
(Senior et al 2011:iv). 
These accounts of IOM projects emphasise that integration flows from the 
commitment of professionals working within local criminal justice agencies.  
This commitment is not based on prescription, coercion or control but emanates 
from professionals belief that integration presents the opportunity to work in a 
better, more effective and more professional way. As such it provides 
compelling evidence for professionals’ influence in reducing goal incongruence. 
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Violence Against Women and Girls (VAWG) Strategy 
Co-operation and integration was not restricted to IVS and IOM projects.  A 
range of practical attempts to realize the objectives of the local VAWG strategy 
also provided evidence for professional integration that reduced goal 
incongruence. These were coordinated attempts to reduce violence directed 
against women and girls. This included domestic abuse, sexual violence, and 
female genital mutilation, so called ‘honor’ killings, as well as prostitution and 
trafficking.  
The varied nature of these challenges meant that rather than a unified approach 
pursued by IOM projects a wide range of integrated responses was developed.  
This produced a crowded and complex landscape of inter-agency co-operation 
that included statutory initiatives such as Multi Agency Public Protection 
Arrangements (MAPPAs) and voluntary arrangements such as Multi Agency 
Risk Assessment Committees (MARACs) and Special Domestic Violence 
Courts (SDVCs). Each of these initiatives represented attempts to coordinate 
inter-agency action in order to improve process outcomes and efficiency.    
The initiative that was most visible within the case study was the organisation of 
SDVCs (Robinson 2004, Robinson and Tregidga 2005).  SDVCs originated in 
North America during the 1980s.  They are attempts to concentrate resources 
awareness and skills in order to ensure that cases of domestic violence are 
brought before the Courts, offenders are convicted and offered effective support 
to address their behaviour. Key to achieving this is that victims of domestic 
abuse have the confidence to report crime, prosecute their attacker and give 
evidence in a trial.  The components of SDVCs are designed to assure that 
confidence and include: 
• Frontline police officers trained in investigating domestic violence. 
• Accredited independent domestic violence advisors (ISVAs) who offer 
victims one point of contact during and after their case. 
• Dedicated prosecutors, specially trained magistrates, legal advisors. 
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• Either a fast tracking of domestic violence cases, or a clustering-together 
of cases on a designated day each week or month. 
• Where possible, separate entrances, exits and waiting areas so that 
victims do not face the risk of being confronted by their attackers while 
attending court. 
• Single rather than double list domestic violence trails.  Morning trials 
only to accommodate childcare and the school run, applications to very 
bail only considered after all the parties have ben informed. 
• Applications to use special measures, such as screens around the witness 
box or video links should be used wherever it is felt needed 
 
Adapted from Specialist Domestic Violence Court Programme:  
Resource Manual  (Home Office 2006) 
SDVC’s demand that statutory and voluntary agencies cooperate to deliver the 
policy effectively. Clustering and fast tracking of cases required close co-
operation between court listing officers, police witness care staff responsible for 
assuring the attendance of victims and witnesses, and the CPS who were 
responsible for preparing cases in time and ensuring that they were presented by 
prosecutors who had received specialized training in prosecuting domestic 
violence cases.  Assurance of the victim’s experience required co-ordination and 
management of the communication between statutory agencies and the victim 
and their voluntary IDVA. Courts staff was responsible for ensuring that 
Magistrates had been made aware of domestic violence issues.  They also had to 
pass listing information to voluntary witness service units who provided a 
welcoming and safe environment in Court and providing support to victims, for 
example by coordinating the provision of special measures and where requested, 
sitting with victims while they gave evidence by video-link. 
SDVCs were highly regarded by professionals in the case study.  They were 
seen as being effective, representing good practice and enabling professionals to 
make a difference to the experience of victims of domestic violence.  Delivering 
the individual components of SDVCs effectively was seen as an expression of 
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successful collective action. Each agency expected the others to make their 
contribution and recognised their own obligations to do the same.  
The importance of SDVCs was illustrated by an event that occurred during the 
case study. Rumors began to circulate (apparently started by members of 
voluntary agencies) that the local HMCTS was going to stop running SDVCs.  
This was because they were felt to be expensive and disruptive at a time when 
HMCTS was under intense pressure to reduce costs and maximize efficiency.  
Concerns were expressed regarding HMCTS’ action to reduce the quality of 
SDVCs to the point where they are no longer fit for purpose.  This involved 
putting DV cases into non-DV courts. In addition, because of the courts’ 
multiple listing policy (up to quadruple listings were claimed) witnesses were 
expected to turn up to court on several occasions as a matter of course.   
It was stated that it was: "impossible to get witnesses to turn up more than once, 
so cases were collapsing as a result.”  (Participant observation notes). When the 
rumors of the possible threat to SDVC’s emerged and were discussed at a 
meeting with HMCTS staff it was reported that the meeting had got: “really, 
really nasty” (Participant observation notes).  
The veracity of these rumors was never established.  However they galvanized 
professionals from other agencies to make informal representations to members 
of the local HMCTS to protect SDVCs.  When the subject of the possible 
'fraying’ of the HMCTS’ commitment to SDVCs arose in a multi-agency 
meeting that was not attended by Court staff: 
There was a lot of anger in the room, particularly as the Police, CPS 
and Probation felt that they had fought very hard for domestic 
violence courts and they felt that they were very effective.  One 
individual said that it had taken twenty years to achieve this, [referring 
to SDVCs] and we can’t go back now (Participant Observation 
Notes).   
Whether these representations were effective or necessary was unclear.  The 
local HMCTS was quick to assure their colleagues from other agencies that they 
had no intention of suspending SDVCs. This account illustrates the informal 
influence, mutual dependency and tacit obligations that characterised inter-
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agency relationships. Integration was frequently founded on inter-agency 
goodwill rather than statutory obligations or the demands of local service level 
agreements.  As an example the local CPS had been providing assistance to their 
counterparts in the local Police Service.  At one observed meeting the CPS 
representative reminded the meeting that this assistance had been agreed as a 
short-term measure and it could not be carried on indefinitely: 
The local police service had a very high caution rate for domestic 
violence (in excess of 40%).  This was regarded as being highly 
unsatisfactory and out of line with good practice and national averages.  
The CPS agreed to provide mandated advice to police officers before 
they dealt with domestic violence cases by offering a caution, for a 
limited period.  The consequence of this was that the cautioning rate for 
domestic violence fell to 17%.  This was felt to be a much more 
appropriate rate.  However the CPS were doing this ‘as a favour’ which 
they found they could no longer fund.  The Police representative at the 
meeting understood the reason for the ending of the ‘favour’, but was 
concerned that the cautioning rate would return to an unacceptably high 
level.  They committed to developing robust guidance in an attempt to 
maintain desirable cautioning rates (Participant observation notes).       
What does the evidence of SDVCs imply for inter-professional relationships?  
This work argues that it demonstrates the intense interactions that characterise 
inter-professional relationships and the presence of at least a degree of goodwill 
within those relationships.  SDVCs were regarded as collectively produced.  
Professionals from statutory and voluntary agencies were committed to intense if 
imperfect collaboration.  Professionals embraced integration and the mutual 
dependencies, obligations and expectations that arose from integration.  The 
fundamental insight appears to be that professionals were particularly exposed to 
formal and informal influence and pressure from members of their peer group 
who came from different agencies and different professional affiliations. These 
multi-agency peer groups acted to reduce goal incongruence within the delivery 
network. 
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Theoretical Explanations of Professional Integration 
What are the theoretical explanations of professional co-operation and network 
integration?  This work will examine four alternative models.  The first suggests 
that co-operation is a response to performance control systems imposed on 
professionals.  Secondly that co-operation emerges from shared experiences of 
work.  Thirdly that it confers institutional benefits and finally that co-operation 
is pursued because it provides opportunities for professional recognition. 
 
 'Co-operate to Compete': a response to performance control systems? 
The first explanation of professional co-operation is that it is a response to 
imposed systems of performance control.  The previous chapter discussed how 
systems of performance measurement are used to control professional practice 
and become goals in themselves.  The most important attributes of these control 
systems are that they make comparisons within professions and those 
comparisons are made public, frequently in the form of league tables.  The 
author has argued that professionals care about their comparative performance 
within such systems.  It has also been suggested that being placed at the bottom 
or close to the bottom of the performance range appeared to constitute a 
particularly powerful motivating factor for improvement.  
One of the ways in which performance can be improved is by collaborating with 
adjacent professional groups employed by different agencies.  Institutionally 
bound professionals are induced to co-operate with other professional groups in 
their local network in order to compete more effectively with fellow 
professionals distributed across an organisational field.  With reference to the 
case study, a local police service might seek co-operation with other local 
criminal justice agencies (Courts, CPS and Probation etc.) in order to directly or 
indirectly improve its performance and subsequent position in national police 
service league tables. 
'Co-operate to compete' is a widely recognised and long established logic in 
private sector literatures (Sako 1992, Lamming 1993, Nishiguchi 1993).  Writing 
in 1982 Peter Drucker commented that:  
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Nowhere in business is there greater potential for benefiting from … 
interdependence than between customer firms and their suppliers.  
This is the largest remaining frontier for gaining competitive 
advantage – and nowhere has a frontier been more neglected. (Drucker 
1982, p.4) 
However is there evidence that it was responsible for inter-professional 
integration in the case study network?  Plausible evidence might be observations 
that integration was initiated, justified or evaluated on the basis of improving 
comparative agency performance within professional fields. Given the 
importance attached to poor performance, it might be considered that the 
evidence should be scrutinized particularly carefully for evidence that 
integration was initiated by poor or very poor performance in performance 
measurement systems. 
In fact the case study provides very little positive evidence for the role of 
performance control systems in encouraging professional co-operation.  While 
there was certainly evidence of action taken to address unsatisfactory 
performance measurement outcomes, that action did not include network 
integration.  Instead, the repertoire of responses to unsatisfactory external 
scrutiny tended to concentrate on three types of action.  They were: 
• Gaming the measurement system 
• Concentration of resources 
• Remedial competence building 
Gaming the performance measurement system was frequently the most 
straightforward method of avoiding the undesirable outcomes of scrutiny.  For 
example waiting time targets in the Courts were met by cancelling trials without 
need in order to prevent witness waiting times extending beyond targets.  
Genuine attempts to improve performance usually consisted of concentrating 
resources in order to meet specific and limited goals that would have maximum 
effect on performance measures.  In addition, as very poor performance can 
often reflect a fundamental lack of competence, remedial competence building is 
frequently an appropriate and obvious response to poor performance. 
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Responses to the adverse effects of performance control systems appear to lead 
not to integration but to organisational introspection.  Institutions appeared to 
turn away from their network partners in order to concentrate on internal 
improvement strategies. The case study indicates that professional integration is 
not a response to performance measurement systems imposed on professional 
practice. The 'co-operate to compete' theorization of integration is not 
empirically supported. 
 Why might this be?  Internally focused strategies might be preferable because 
they promise a faster response to urgent situations. Similarly their 
implementation also falls within the span of control of agency decision makers, 
and action can be taken without securing the uncertain support of counterparts in 
other network agencies. However it can also be suggested that a contributory 
factor was that the 'co-operate to compete' logic was too abstract to have a 
meaningful influence on professional behaviour. The professional experience 
was one of immersion in the work of the criminal justice system and 
membership of communities of practice associated with that work. The 
immersive nature of the experience of work appeared to prevent professionals 
from engaging seriously with a somewhat complicated concept of organisational 
behaviour. The argument that cooperation within a network will enhance 
competitive advantage within an organisational field was too remote form 
practice for it to have a serious influence on professional behaviour. 
 
 The Experience of Work  
An alternative theory of network integration is that it emerges from the 
connected nature of work and the similar demands that patterns of work make on 
professionals.  This argument suggests that the complex and intense interactions 
demanded by the work of the criminal justice system acts as a centripetal force 
that overcomes the barriers of professional orientation and institutional 
affiliation. Network integration develops from professionals’ identification with 
and their commitments to their immediate peer group (Kidron 1965).  In network 
contexts the immediate peer group will frequently incorporate members from a 
variety of professional backgrounds and network agencies.   
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Furthermore, the Justice System is essentially local.  Interactions occurred with a 
high degree of geographical and in some cases physical proximity and 
relationships, both institutional and personal were generally stable.  Face to face 
communication, particularly between managers, was common and regular. 
Communication between operational staff was frequently verbal and informal.  
Inter –agency interaction became a habitual, taken for granted process. 
The implication of this insight is that the professional experience of work acts to 
connect professionals rather then divides them. The close and meaningful 
interactions required by patterns of work gave rise to stable relationships that 
were characterised by intense collaboration and connected professionals in 
relationships of reciprocal obligation and dependency.      
This work has argued consistently that the professional experience was one of 
immersion in the work of the Criminal Justice System. The case study produced 
considerable evidence that professionals understood and took for granted that 
their performance depended on the performance of their counterparts in other 
network agencies. We also argue that the emergence of integrated organisation 
reflects professional’s recognition that the outcomes and efficiency of their own 
work were dependent on the actions, behaviour and goodwill of other groups of 
professionals within the criminal justice system. In other words the experience 
of work created normative and cognitive systems of reciprocal obligation and 
dependency between professionals.  These systems were reinforced by shared 
commitments to the overall objectives of the criminal justice system and a strong 
identification with the experience of the victim.   
Collective commitments could not eliminate the fact that real differences existed 
between professional within the network. However despite undeniable 
differences they were united by several factors. For example their shared 
experience of connected and co-ordinated work within the criminal justice 
system, their dependency on and obligation to other professionals, and collective 
commitments to the overall objectives of the criminal justice system.  Finally 
professionals appeared to be committed to meeting the needs of the victims of 
serious crime because this was: "the right thing to do" (adapted from participant 
observation notes).    
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Co-operation and network integration is understood to enable professional work 
to be completed more efficiently and effectively.  It is believed to improve the 
experience of the victim. It also protects professionals from the negative 
experience of being associated with or even held responsible for perceived 
failure of the criminal justice system, negative outcomes for the victims of 
serious crime and inefficient and unrewarding working practices.  
 
 Institutional Benefits 
Another approach to theorizing the development of professional co-operation 
and network integration is to emphasise the institutional benefits it confers to 
integrating agencies.  The term ‘institutional’ is used to describe benefits that are 
not directly linked to service delivery.  Instead they reflect improvements in the 
agency’s ability to influence its proximate environment and maintain its network 
position. 
In the first instance professional integration is attractive because it extends the 
influence of agency actors outside agency boundaries.  Integration is a method to 
influence the decisions taken in other network agencies that are nevertheless 
likely to cause affects within the original agency. Such boundary spanning 
influence may be desirable as an end in itself.  However it is also likely to be 
used to achieve certain ends.  For example the influence of network integration 
might by hypothesized to allow agency actors to influence the strategic 
priorities, organisational structures and resource allocations to their own 
advantage.  In such a way integration is an approach that agency actors can 
employ to co-opt the resources of other network agencies for their own purposes.   
The second category of institutional benefit is that integration makes it more 
difficult to marginalize or replace agencies within network contexts.  Integration 
creates shared tacit knowledge, informal structures, complex agency interfaces, 
collaborative relationships and, if successful, inter-agency goodwill.  Together, 
these act as a barrier to new entrants, thereby protecting and institutionalizing 
the position of network incumbents.  Integration therefore represents a strategy 
of solidarity and exclusion (Cousins 1987).  It acts to exclude new entrants and 
marginalize existing competitors.   It does this by increasing the perceived risks, 
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costs and relational disruption of switching service providers. It provides 
integrated network incumbents with advantageous access to information and 
increases the costs of acquiring tacit information and establishing required 
competency to potential replacements.  
There was clear empirical evidence that integration was valued because it 
reduced the willingness and ability of agencies to be critical of their network 
counterparts.  Senior professionals appeared to be particularly sensitive to 
criticism from network peers.  This sensitivity appeared especially pronounced 
when criticism was made to members of the public who experienced network 
services.  This was because it was thought to bring the professional reputation of 
agencies into disrepute.  Integration was felt to reduce inter-agency criticism 
because it was seen as a breach of good faith.  It also became difficult because 
under integration delivering effective outcomes became a shared network 
responsibility.  In one inter-agency meeting observed during the case study 
where: 
 A number of participants indicated that they were dissatisfied with 
agencies blaming each other [for poor performance] in the presence of 
victims and witnesses.  It was a sign of poor trust that was extremely 
negative for the public’s confidence in the administration of justice  
(Participant Observation Notes). 
The case study supports theories of professional co-operation and network 
integration that emphasise the causative role of institutional benefits. Co-
operation and integration reduced the likelihood of public criticism.  It acted to 
secure the position of agencies and gave the opportunity for agencies to acquire 
boundary-spanning influence within network contexts.   
 
 Professional Recognition 
Observation indicated that professional co-operation and network integration 
depended on the support of senior professionals.  One theoretical explanation of 
their commitment is that integration provided them with an opportunity to obtain 
professional recognition.  Integration was an effective method of achieving 
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professional recognition because staff generally supported it. Integration was 
viewed as a legitimate and beneficial activity by the policy community and was 
generally perceived to deliver positive results.  Integration was therefore viewed 
as a good thing to do.  Beyond this, and perhaps more importantly, integration 
represented a novel practice.  It was a new way of working as opposed to 
business as usual and therefore it was exciting and worthy of discussion and 
comment. Integration projects gave senior professionals the opportunity to talk 
about themselves, their projects and their agencies and in turn to be talked about 
by other professionals.  The discussion of integration projects allowed senior 
professionals to become centres of attention and the subject of others’ 
appreciation.   
Vitally, senior professionals had far more control over the terms of these 
conversations than they could hope to exercise over imposed performance 
measurement systems and targets.  Conversations around integration projects 
therefore acted to transform their roles from that of passive subjects of direction 
and scrutiny into active social entrepreneurs.  It may be regarded as hyperbole to 
suggest that integration projects enabled senior professionals to present 
themselves and be presented within a ‘heroic’ frame.  However the case study 
provided considerable evidence that acquiring professional recognition was a 
significant factor in securing the commitment of senior professionals to 
integration projects. 
Integration projects were used to engage with prestigious but distant authority 
figures.  For example one integration project within the case study was formally 
initiated by the submission of a two page briefing paper to the Home Secretary, 
submitted ostensibly as a request for funding. Despite being unsuccessful in its 
stated objective, some years later it was widely referred to as ‘the Jack Straw 
paper’.  The project benefited from the cachet of the association, however 
tenuous, and was eventually funded by a far more mundane source (a local 
charity). 
Prizes and awards also appeared to play a prominent role in ensuring 
commitment to integration projects.  Several case study integration projects had 
applied for or had won awards.  Prizes and awards appeared to enjoy a 
surprisingly high importance in the discourse of senior professionals.  For 
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example identifying prizes and awards that a project might win was observed to 
occur before the project was implemented and therefore acted a priori to 
encourage integration projects. 
Being talked about and becoming the subject of professional conversations also 
appeared an important motivating factor.  This professional equivalent of being 
‘mentioned in dispatches’ could take several forms.  At its most formal it might 
involve external evaluations of the benefits of integration projects conducted 
more or less rigorously by academics, consultants or think-tank staff. Several of 
the case study integration projects had been the subject of rigorous and official 
process evaluations conducted by academic institutions. The positive results of 
these evaluations had been incorporated into other official documents such as 
policy guidance and Government Green papers.  They could also be shared at 
policy and practitioner conferences.  
Successful integration projects within the case study network had received 
considerable publicity and were widely regarded as examples of excellent 
practice.  As a result there was a very high demand for professionals to visit 
integration projects within the case study, witness them working and discuss 
their innovations.  The demand for visits was so great that ‘industrial tourism’ 
was regarded as a significant disruption to the work of the integrated teams.  
Visits from professionals from other agencies to see how the model worked and 
to talk to senior professionals and team members were restricted to one set day 
each week in order to limit the interruption of work. 
The evidence appears to indicate that professional recognition is a plausible 
theory for the development of network integration.  It does seem that integration 
projects allowed senior professionals to acquire status through professional 
recognition through talking about themselves and their practice and in-turn being 
talked about by other professionals.  Integration projects were well suited to this 
purpose because they were regarded as novel and effective but not particularly 
radical. 
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Proposed Modifications To Theory 
The case study found that groups with different professional orientations were 
committed to co-operation and network integration.  This finding contradicted 
established theoretical perspectives that difference in professional orientation 
acts to produce goal incongruence and inter-professional competition. The 
starting point of any discussion of desirable modifications to theory must be the 
desirability of developing theory that can account for inter-professional co-
operation that results in network integration and reductions in goal 
incongruence. In order to achieve this overarching objective there are a number 
of specific areas where it can be argued that modifications to theory would be 
appropriate and beneficial.  These are described below. 
 
 The Causes of Co-operation and Integration 
The research found that three factors were responsible for professional co-
operation and integration.  The first and most powerful was the collaborative 
nature of work within the criminal justice system.  The nature of the work itself, 
and professional’s shared experience of engaging with that work was found to be 
a powerful factor for co-operation and integration.  The integrating experience of 
work was reinforced by the institutional benefits of co-operation. Network 
integration increases agency influence over their network counterparts and 
reduces risks to agency legitimacy and network position. Integration also 
benefited agencies and senior individuals as it represents an effective strategy for 
acquiring professional recognition.   
It is proposed that theory should be modified to incorporate the role of these 
three factors in stimulating professional co-operation and network integration.  
This will enable empirical tests in other UK local criminal justice networks that 
share similar characteristics as the case study network.  It will also allow 
investigation of other public networks that exhibit different patterns of work, 
professional and institutional fields and opportunities for professional 
recognition.  
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 Rejecting the influence of professional control systems    
The case study rejected the influence of professional control systems as a cause 
of co-operation and integration.  This model of professional co-operation is 
theoretically plausible.  This model has been described as the logic of co-operate 
to compete.  Institutionally bound professionals are induced by external scrutiny 
to co-operate with professionals in their local network in order to compete more 
effectively with fellow professionals distributed across an organisational field.  
However the case study provided no support empirical support for this theory, 
however plausible. 
Unsatisfactory performance within professional control systems did not result in 
professional co-operation and integration. Instead three alternative 
organisational responses were preferred. One of these (gaming) is fundamentally 
illegitimate.  Another (concentration of resources) is unsustainable in that it 
operates on the principle of robbing Peter to pay Paul.  The third (remedial 
competence building), while legitimate, is internally focused and results in 
institutional introspection rather than network integration.   
It is proposed that theory should be modified to incorporate the hypothesis that 
professional control systems act to reduce network effectiveness and efficiency 
by disrupting the tendency for professional co-operation and integration. 
 
 Recognising the Influence of Peer Groups 
The case study confirms that professionals experience commitments to their 
organisation, their profession and their immediate peer group (Kidron 1965; 
Jauch, Osborn and Terpening 1980).  This is by no means a novel theoretical 
insight. However it is essential to recognise that in case study, the immediate 
peer group included professionals who exhibited a range of professional 
orientations and institutional affiliations.  
It is proposed that theory should be modified to give more significance to the 
influence of peer groups in the promotion of co-operation and integration and 
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the consequent reduction of goal incongruence within network contexts.  The 
findings of this study indicate that the influence of peer group has received 
insufficient theoretical attention. Without wishing to overstate the case, the 
author suggests that disproportionate attention is paid to institutional and 
professional membership. Peer group interactions are marginalized in theoretical 
explanations of professional interaction as ephemeral and second-order 
‘boundary-spanning’ activities.   
The findings of the case study suggest that peer-group interactions are of central 
importance to the development of professional co-operation and network 
integration.  However institutional and professional modes of organisation are 
empirically noisy and therefore theoretically visible.  Peer groups lack press 
officers, human resource departments and chief executives or other formal 
advocates.  The importance of peer groups can therefore recede from theoretical 
predictions and empirical accounts of practice.  This study suggests that models 
of professional interaction and goal incongruence should be modified to ensure 
that the evidence for the influence of peer group interactions could be tested.   
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that the evidence of participant observation is that 
groups with different professional orientations reduced goal incongruence by co-
operating and integrating network practices. This is the opposite of the 
theoretical prediction that the interaction of different professional orientations 
will increase goal incongruence and reduce co-operation. 
The significance of the contradiction between theoretical prediction and 
empirical finding demanded that the evidence was made available for further 
scrutiny.  Four examples of professional co-operation and network integration 
drawn from participant observation were presented and evaluated. They were the 
IVS project, two forms of IOM and a cluster of practices that support the local 
VAWG strategy.  The author suggests that they present compelling evidence for 
inter-professional co-operation within the case study network. 
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Analysis of the evidence indicates that the causes of professional co-operation 
are to be found in the particular nature of work within the criminal justice 
system, the institutional benefits of integration, and the professional recognition 
that can be acquired from association with integration projects.  The work of the 
criminal justice system demanded professional collaboration that crossed 
professional and institutional boundaries. It resulted in inter-professional 
relationships that were founded on mutual obligation and dependency.  In 
addition, integration allowed network agencies to reduce risks to network 
position and influence adjacent agencies.  It also enabled senior professionals to 
accumulate the prestige associated with professional recognition. 
However analysis rejected professional control systems as a cause of co-
operation and integration.  Evidence from the case study indicates that 
unsatisfactory performance against systems of external scrutiny results in 
gaming, concentration of resources and remedial competence building, but not 
inter-organisational co-operation.  Professional control systems are counter-
productive in that they reduce network effectiveness and efficiency by 
increasing goal incongruence and reducing inter-agency co-operation. 
The chapter has argued that theory should be modified to incorporate the 
empirical insight that: different professional groups act to promote co-operation 
and network integration; integration is caused by the nature of professional 
work, attempts to realise institutional benefits and the desire to acquire 
professional recognition; and that performance control systems act to increase 
goal incongruence and reduce professional co-operation and network integration.  
It has also argued that professionals within the case study network are engaged 
in peer group interactions characterised by mutual obligation and dependency.  
Furthermore, while the evidence shows that significant and contentious 
differences exist between professional groups, that difference is mediated within 
a shared commitment to the formal ends of the Criminal Justice System. The 
tendency to integration emerges from professional’s connected experience of 
work and the dependencies and obligation work produces, shared commitment to 
the overall objectives of the criminal justice system and a common identification 
with the experience of the victim.   This suggests that professionals’ conception 
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of equivalence produces a consensus around the desirability of co-operation and 
network integration. 
The final theoretical suggestion is that established theoretical models 
underestimate the influence of peer groups and conceptions of inter-professional 
solidarity. In both cases this work suggests that what is searched for is frequently 
what is found.  Modifying theory to include the influence of peer groups and the 
concept of equivalence is likely to lead to different interpretations of 
professional co-operation, network integration and the determinants of goal 
incongruence.    
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Chapter 9  Conclusion 
 
Introduction 
This study has attempted to identify goal incongruence within a public network 
in order to evaluate theoretical explanations of the source of goal incongruence.  
The research questions set out in the introduction were:  
1. What is goal incongruence?  Are current conceptualisations of goal 
incongruence adequate? If not, how should goal incongruence be 
conceptualised? 
 
2. How extensive is goal incongruence in the case study? 
 
3. What are the sources of goal incongruence?  Does the evidence provided 
by the case study validate existing explanations of the sources of goal 
incongruence? 
 
This concluding chapter will review the answers that the research has provided 
to these questions.  It will describe how the study developed a novel conceptual 
framework capable of identifying goal incongruence within a network context.  
The conceptual framework dispenses with difference as the empirical test of goal 
incongruence.  Instead goals must be contradictory in order to be incongruent.  
Contradiction is established by the criteria of goal-orientated behaviour 
impeding, deflecting or impeding the achievement of other network goals. 
Evidence was drawn from a single critical case study conducted within the 
strategic core of the UK's Ministry of Justice and the statutory agencies that 
operated the Criminal Justice system within an English City. Analysis of the data 
produced evidence for goal incongruence in five out of nine possible empirical 
contexts provided by the conceptual framework. This chapter will review how 
the results of this analysis were used to test two theoretical accounts of the 
	   	   	  
	   	   	  
	  
216	  
determinants of goal incongruence, bureaucratic hierarchy and professional 
difference.  The study strongly supports for the theory that goal incongruence is 
produced by the nature of downward delegation in bureaucratic hierarchies.  It 
rejects the theory that incongruence is caused by professional difference.  Indeed 
evidence from the case study demonstrates that individuals with different 
professional orientations defied theoretical predictions by co-operating to 
integrate network practice and reduce goal incongruence.   
Following a discussion of the development of the conceptual framework, 
research design and empirical findings the chapter will summarise the theoretical 
and policy implications of the research and suggest areas of further research.  
 
The Research Approach 
Chapter two examined how goal incongruence has been conceptualised and 
identified by previous authors. It described how recent theoretical and empirical 
accounts conceptualise goal incongruence solely terms of difference. An earlier 
generation of authors exhibited a more sophisticated conceptualisation of goal 
incongruence. They recognised different categories of goal, for example 
professed and operative goals (Selznick) and formal and operative goals 
(Perrow).   Rather than simply asking respondents to prioritise the importance of 
a range of potential goals these researchers established actual differences 
between formal and operative goals. This enabled a richer empirical description 
and theoretical analysis of the phenomena of goal incongruence.  Authors could 
describe and explain multiple dimensions of goal incongruence. Their research 
was also firmly placed within organisational contexts, descriptions of what 
organisational actors actually do rather than what they claim they do. 
The review of how goal incongruence has been conceptualised and identified in 
the literature concluded that definitions of goal incongruence were inconsistent.  
Furthermore the criteria for identifying goal incongruence have tended to be 
relaxed over time.  Increasingly permissive tests for empirical claims of goal 
incongruence are easier to satisfy, raising the possibility that accounts of goal 
incongruence are more prevalent than they deserve to be. They also tend to 
become less grounded in organisational practice and are consequently less 
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organisationally meaningful.  Chapter two concludes that the conceptualisation 
of goal incongruence in the majority of later research is unsatisfactory.  
Given the uncertainty, variation and confusion in the terms used to describe goal 
incongruence it was essential to develop a rigorous conceptual framework that 
could recognise and support claims of goal incongruence. The conceptual 
framework possesses three interlocking components: A description of various 
forms of goal incongruence, an analytical perspective, and a set of criteria for 
identifying organisational goals and defining them as incongruent or not. The 
conceptual framework adopts the established categorisation of formal and 
operative goals.  This means that there are three forms, or dimensions of goal 
incongruence, between formal goals, between operative goals and between 
formal and operative goals.  
Unlike recent research the conceptual framework regards difference as an 
unsatisfactory and insufficient criteria for goal incongruence.  Put simply goals 
may be different but complimentary. Difference may reflect task specialisation 
that is organised to achieve common ends. In order to establish goal 
incongruence goals must be shown to be different and contradictory. The 
conceptual framework recognises contradiction when the pursuit of goals can be 
demonstrated to impede, deflect, alter or subvert organisational purposes. As 
was described in chapter five, this aspect of the conceptual framework restricts 
claims of goal incongruence to practices that obtain an objective facticity by 
being enacted in organisational practice. The novel conceptual framework 
presented in chapter two possesses four elements: 
- Incongruence is contradiction.  Difference is taken to be insufficient to 
establish incongruence, as goals may be different but complimentary. 
- Incongruence is enacted.  Incongruence should be inferred from purposive 
behaviour observed within social contexts.  That is incongruence should describe 
enacted practice. 
- Incongruence should recognise contradictions between formal and operative 
goals. 
	   	   	  
	   	   	  
	  
218	  
- Incongruence should recognise the network context and distinguish between 
contradictory goals between the strategic core and delivery network and within 
each empirical contexts. 
Chapter three reviewed two explanations for the sources of goal incongruence.  
It organised theory into two models. The first (hierarchical) model, suggested 
that goal incongruence was caused by the nature of bureaucratic delegation.  The 
second (horizontal) model suggests that goal incongruence is caused by different 
professional orientations.  The first theoretical explanation of goal incongruence 
suggests that it is caused by the nature of bureaucratic delegation within 
hierarchical organisations. Goal incongruence is viewed as the inevitable 
consequence of the inability to sustain common commitments and shared 
purposes across the span of bureaucratic control. The theory provides six 
potential shaping influences for the production of goal incongruence.  The 
evidence drawn from the case supports three of these models (the bifurcation of 
interests, organisational segmentation and professional control models) and 
provides partial and qualified support for the fourth (Inadequate comprehension 
model). The evidence does not support two of the models (pre-occupation and 
compliance and the bureaucratic discretion model).  
Horizontal explanations of goal incongruence rest on the assumption that 
organisations are coalitions of groups and sub-groups, and not chains of 
command.  Shared professional orientations operate as particularly significant 
loci for the development of such groups.  The study conceptualises 
professionalization after DiMaggio and Powell as the: “collective struggle of 
members of an occupation to define the conditions and methods of their own 
work” (DiMaggio and Powell 1991, p.70). The struggle will be conducted 
against principally against other professional groups, and it is from this 
competitive and conflicted inter-professional milieu that goal incongruence 
emerges. 
The discussion of theory presented in chapter three isolated three models by 
which discrepant professional orientations are claimed to shape goal 
incongruence.  They were the; communities of practice model, the reinforced 
pre-dispositions model, and the inter-professional competition model.  
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Evidence for Goal Incongruence 
Chapter five presented the evidence for goal incongruence produced by the case 
study. The conceptual framework provides three forms of goal incongruence 
within three empirical contexts, giving nine possible expressions of goal 
incongruence (described in figure 5.1). In the event evidence for five expressions 
of goal incongruence were found. 
 
 Goal Incongruence within the Strategic Core 
Within the strategic core the case study provided evidence for incongruence 
between formal and operative goals. Participant observation provided two 
examples of incongruence. The first was the way that the formal goal of 
implementing the xCJS efficiency programme was subverted by staff who 
operated close to the senior leadership constituency of the strategic core.  
Despite the fact that implementation of the programme was a formal goal of the 
Ministry it was described as: “having a big name but little substance, lacking a 
clear narrative and as failing to secure the engagement of ministers” (participant 
observation notes). In addition it was thought sensible to: “resist changes that 
would deliver big improvements to the system, but which could be claimed by 
other Departments”  (Participant Observation Notes).  
The other example was the incongruence between the formal goals of the 
strategic core and the commitment of staff to what this thesis has described as 
the operative goal of Reporting.  The constituent elements of Reporting practice 
were described at length in Chapters five and six.  It includes the collection of 
data and its preparation and presentation to ministers and external audiences, 
frequently in the form of sophisticated documents or narrative accounts of 
practice that act to legitimise members of the strategic core.   
The commitment to reporting impeded the ability of the strategic core to achieve 
the formal goals of the MoJ.  The commitment to those goals was superficial and 
tactical, commitment to reporting was profound and embedded in habitual 
practices and taken for granted routines. The pervading commitment to the 
operative goal of Reporting enabled one insider to dismiss the formal goals set 
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out in the strategic core’s business plan, and the document itself as: “just for 
public consumption”. The real business of the strategic core was Reporting.  
Indeed attempts to challenge this reporting hegemony were forcefully countered.  
Participant observation indicated that attempts to promote alternative 
conceptions of the role of members of the strategic core (to a more active change 
management role) resulted in enforcement of Reporting practices, and the 
removal of instigators to the delivery network. 
 
 Goal Incongruence within the Delivery Network 
Within the delivery network the conceptual framework indicated the presence of 
formal - operative goal incongruence and operative - operative goal 
incongruence between the operative goals of different network agencies.  
Operative goals within the delivery network were organised around meeting 
operational imperatives.  Individual delivery agencies were found to focus on 
specific operational imperatives that derive from their task and professional 
orientation.  In that sense incongruence between operative goals in the delivery 
network were rooted in the differential experience of the operational imperative.  
Chapters five, six and seven described in detail how dissonant operative goals 
impeded, deflected and subverted organisational practice within the delivery 
network.   
The delivery network also provided evidence for incongruence between formal 
and operative goals of different agencies. The operative goals of specific 
agencies focused on attaining their own formal goals and frequently bore little or 
no relationship to the formal goals of adjacent network agencies. The examples 
of operative incongruence given in the proceeding section also stand as 
examples for formal –operative goal incongruence within the delivery network.  
Of-course it can be objected that formal-operative incongruence does no more 
than illustrate an inevitable consequence of the functionally specialised nature of 
delivery network organisations.  Nevertheless the case study indicated the 
presence of incongruence between the formal and operative goals of agencies 
within the delivery network.  
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 Goal Incongruence between the Strategic Core and Delivery Network 
The case study provides evidence for formal - operative and operative-operative 
goal incongruence between the strategic core and delivery network. The strategic 
core were motivated by operative goals which emphasised the need to report 
compliance with national policy.  This would enable the creation of a plausible 
and desirable narrative describing progress made by the senior leadership 
constituency in representing the interests of victims in the Criminal Justice 
System.  However members of the delivery network were motivated by the 
operational imperative of protecting victims from distress caused by encounters 
with the realities of the CJS.   
The study found incongruence between the strategic core’s goal of Reporting 
and the delivery network’s goals of meeting operational imperatives.  Participant 
observation demonstrated that interactions between members of the strategic 
core and delivery network organised around the practice of reporting were 
experienced as negative. In our discussion of the operative goals of the strategic 
core we spent some time describing the effort Headquarters staff devote to 
obtaining and reporting information from the delivery network.  It has been 
argued that providing such information could be a significant task within the 
delivery network where the practice is perceived as a frustrating distraction from 
their main purpose of meeting operational imperatives.   
Requests and demands for data were generally elicited minimal compliance at 
least effort.  On some occasions demands to report data were felt to be so 
onerous or sensitive that they were refused.  On other occasions misleading data 
was supplied in order to satisfy the requirements of the strategic core.  It was not 
uncommon for staff in the delivery network to be dismissive of the accuracy of 
official data (although.it was common for staff within the Strategic Core to be 
equally dismissive). Engagement with the Headquarters reporting culture 
appeared to be regarded as a distraction, an occupational hazard and an 
unfortunate but unavoidable fact of organisational life rather than an operative 
goal of individuals within the delivery network.  
This was incongruent with the delivery network’s formal goals that focused on 
operational performance and were grounded in the victim’s experience of the 
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realities of the Criminal Justice System. It is vital to stress that the experience of 
immersion in the work of the CJS is a sine qua non of the delivery network but is 
simply unavailable to staff within the strategic core. This work is not suggesting 
that the delivery network refrained entirely from engaging in such narrative 
creation practices.  However the nature of their formal goals (focusing on the 
operational imperative) and the public scrutiny of that performance significantly 
reduced their ability to present legitimizing narratives at the expense of taking 
responsibility for operational outputs and outcomes. 
 
Hierarchy as the Source of Goal Incongruence 
Chapter six discusses how far the empirical descriptions of goal incongruence 
support theoretical claims that goal incongruence is caused by the nature of 
bureaucratic delegation.  
In order to accomplish this purpose the chapter reviewed the major elements of 
the bureaucratic delegation model of goal incongruence. The discussion then 
considered whether each of the examples of incongruence identified in the case 
study is consistent with the bureaucratic delegation model of goal incongruence.  
For each relevant example of claimed goal incongruence the chapter described 
what might be expected to constitute criteria for identifying convincing evidence 
for bureaucratic delegation within hierarchical arrangements as the cause of goal 
incongruence.    
The chapter suggested that evidence would consist in actors subverting, 
deflecting or contradicting practices aimed at achieving delegated formal and 
operative goals.  The chapter finds that the data provides considerable support 
for vertical explanations of the sources of goal incongruence.  That is downward 
delegation within bureaucratic hierarchies is a source of goal incongruence 
within network contexts.  The theory provides six potential shaping influences 
for the production of goal incongruence.  The evidence drawn from the case 
supports three of these influences (the bifurcation of interests, organisational 
segmentation and professional control models) and provides partial and qualified 
support for the fourth (inadequate comprehension model). The evidence does not 
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support two of the models (pre-occupation and compliance and the bureaucratic 
discretion model). 
Analysis indicates that hierarchical goal incongruence arose from four of the six 
shaping influences.  Evidence indicated that a mixture of the pre-occupation and 
compliance model and the bifurcation of interests model provided the most 
prevalent shaping influence.  In the analysis evidence for the former model was 
described as 'equivocal'.  It is worth exploring this qualification in more detail in 
this conclusion.  While there was undoubtedly evidence that actors (particularly 
in the strategic core) became pre-occupied with complying with proximate goals, 
the pre-occupation and compliance model appeared excessively generous to 
those actors in ascribing an 'unintended' aspect to their actions.  It presented a 
passive view of their behaviour that was at odds with the active and deliberate 
choices actors were observed to make during the research.  In more technical 
terms, it appears to ignore the agency of organisational actors. 
On the other hand the bifurcation of interests model incorporates this evidence 
of active shaping of the operative goals very well.  Its exposition of individual's 
behaviour as social (and economic) actors presents an effective analytical lens 
and compelling explanation of why operative goals become incongruent with 
formal goals within hierarchical settings.  The case study provided considerable 
evidence of individuals prioritising their interests and behaving as social actors.  
In the strategic core this concentrated on reducing responsibility and blame for 
operational outcomes in favour of constructing and presenting plausible 
narratives. Within the delivery network it focused on meeting operational 
imperatives and the inability of actors to distance themselves professionally and 
personally from CJS outcomes experienced by the victims of serious crime.  
In addition the organisational segmentation and performance control models also 
explained the emergence of hierarchical goal incongruence within the delivery 
network.  Both models acted to produce and maintain a hierarchically imposed 
introspection that produced goal incongruence. Members of the delivery 
networked were compelled to by organisational segmentation to act in the 
capacity of 'organisational advocates', even in circumstances where this required 
them to act against the overall interests of the network.  Hierarchically imposed 
systems of professional control institutionalised a rigid goal incongruence that 
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was impossible to overcome by 'legitimate means'. Professionals were compelled 
to represent (with varying degrees of enthusiasm) contradictory organisational 
interests.  Perhaps most powerfully professional behaviour appeared particularly 
susceptible to the influence of the performance control regimes to which they 
were subject. 
However two proposed shaping influences were not supported. The case study 
found no evidence for inadequate comprehension model of hierarchical goal 
incongruence. Indeed on balance the evidence cast doubt on the explanatory 
value of these proposed models.  The problem for them appears to be that given 
modern communication technology and the manner in which pervasive social 
and formal media can transmit information, it is difficult to sustain a belief that 
top-most officials can be in ignorance of events 'on the ground' or that sub-
ordinates can mistake the intentions of top-most officials when the words of 
those officials are available verbatim.  
The effect of modern communications technology on collapsing the distance 
between hierarchically separated organisational actors in public networks 
appears to mitigate against the arguments of the discretionary gap and 
inadequate comprehension models. With regard to the discretionary gap model, 
it suggests that there will be a gradual decay (an entropy) in meaning as ends are 
delegated downward through hierarchies.  The case study found very little 
evidence of entropy.  Instead incongruence appeared to emerge from radical 
discontinuities.  This provides support for the bifurcation of interest model at the 
expense of the discretionary gap model.  
In the case of incongruence between formal and operative goals within the 
strategic core, the plausibility of this benign explanation based on the passive 
forgetting of ends is undermined in empirical accounts that emphasise the way in 
which members of the strategic core actively rejected and problematised the 
xCJS efficiency programme.  In addition the strategic core was able to engage 
with other challenging policy objectives despite the distraction of day-to-day 
challenges.  Equally tellingly, the strategic core were able to organise a limited 
engagement with the xCJS efficiency programme which was sufficient to give 
the appearance of compliance without requiring the full operative enactment of 
the formal goal.  Taken together, these strands of evidence tend to undermine the 
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argument that the xCJS efficiency programme was lost or forgotten due to a pre-
occupation with day-to-day challenges and proximate goals. 
The view that goal incongruence is caused by the incremental decay in meaning 
as means and ends are transmitted down bureaucratic hierarchies by successive 
delegations does not appear to correspond with empirical evidence for formal – 
operative goal incongruence between the strategic core and delivery network.   
The essential elements of the Victim Personal Statement policy appear to be 
transmitted accurately to the ‘lowest’ operational levels of the case study 
hierarchy.  There is little evidence for the application of discretion by 
intermediaries operating within the chain of delegation.  Instead subordinate 
actors at the operational level choose to implement the policy or not in ways 
determined most appropriate within their operational contexts.   
In the case of subordinate actors from case study delivery agencies, the response 
to the delegated policy is not a subtle and nuanced implementation of aspects of 
the policy (as predicted by the ‘decay’ concept of the model) but by the decision 
to entirely reject engagement with the policy, as evidenced by the statement 
made by one subordinate responsible for preparing Victim Personal Statements: 
“I haven’t written a victim report for five months” (Participant Observation).  
This response of subordinate staff is dissonant with the theoretical suggestion of 
the discretionary gap model that actors within the chain of bureaucratic 
command will apply a limited discretion to the implementation of delegated 
means and ends.  As such the empirical evidence does not appear to be 
consistent with the discretionary gap model of the determinants of goal 
incongruence.  
Nor does the case study support the inadequate comprehension model as an 
explanation for incongruence between the operative goals of the strategic core 
and the delivery network.  This model would predict that superiors would 
delegate confused, inappropriate and unachievable goals on subordinates.  There 
was little empirical evidence of this pattern of behaviour. The case study 
indicates that members of the strategic core were aware of the practical 
challenges and constraints encountered in the delivery network, but the 
operational areas of the delivery network were, if not actually irrelevant, then of 
only marginal relevance.   
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The Victim Personal Statement policy achieved the opposite of what it was 
intended to achieve. From the subordinate perspective of those implementing the 
policy this unsatisfactory position was compounded by the apparent refusal of 
top-most superiors to acknowledge and address deficiencies in the delegated 
policy.  This refusal to engage with practice appeared to derive from a desire on 
the part of top-most superiors and their functionaries in the strategic core to 
present a positive, uncomplicated and consequently legitimising narrative 
account of the success of the VPS policy.   
Finally, analysis of the evidence of goal incongruence produced an empirical 
surprise. Formal-operative goal incongruence was greater at the apex of the 
network than it was at the base.  In other words the operative goals of the 
strategic core were more incongruent with the formal goals of the network than 
were the operative goals of the delivery network. This contradicts the established 
view of goal incongruence presented in the literature, that senior staff and policy 
makers are more 'trustworthy' in terms of commitment to achieve formal public 
goals than junior or operational staff.   This insight problematizes the apex of 
networks rather than the base with regard to goal incongruence.    
 
Professional Difference as the Source of Goal Incongruence 
Chapter six presented and evaluated the theoretical argument that goal 
incongruence is caused by differences in the professional orientation of 
organisational actors.  This theoretical perspective derives from conceptions of 
organisations as coalitions of interest (Cyert and March 1963) rather than chains 
of commands.  Professionalization, understood as the “collective struggle of 
members of an occupation to define the conditions and methods of their own 
work” (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, p.154) is taken as the predominant 
institutional frame for the construction of those coalitions.  
This chapter has discussed three influences by which divergent professional 
orientations are claimed to shape goal incongruence.  It evaluates the claims 
made by these models with regard to the production of goal incongruence by 
testing them against case study evidence derived from participant observation of 
goal incongruence within the delivery network.   
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What conclusions can be drawn from the evidence? This study provides 
accounts of practice from the delivery network included evidence of inter-
professional integration within the delivery network. This represented an organic 
attempt to reduce goal incongruence and its negative consequences for the 
operational performance of the Criminal Justice System.  
How can this empirical surprise be resolved? Narratives that explore the 
experience of inter-professional interactions emphasise the evidence for the 
existence of mutual obligation and dependency that exist between professional 
groups within the Criminal Justice System.   Patterns of connection, similarity 
obligation and dependence emerge from analysis of the three shaping influences 
discussed in this chapter. The most important is the experience of work.  The 
nature of the work of the Criminal Justice System demands extensive, sustained, 
complex and intense communication and exchange of information.  This work 
has argued work acts to connect as much as to separate professional orientations.  
Communities of practice produced by the shared aspects of the experience of 
work within the delivery network are to some extent professionally inclusive and 
are not entirely co-terminus with professional and organisational boundaries.   
The case study provides evidence that indicates that the suggested shaping 
influences of goal incongruence were associated with the production of goal 
incongruence; they also appeared to account for organic actions to limit goal 
incongruence by promoting inter-professional collaboration in the shape of 
network integration. The propensity for network integration demonstrated in the 
case study stands against inter-professional conflict as a cause of goal 
incongruence. However we suggest that the organic integration initiatives 
represent a tacit recognition on the part of local professionals of the negative 
impact that inter-professional conflict on the effectiveness of all the local 
Criminal Justice Agencies. It can be thought of as senior professionals in the 
delivery network taking steps to ‘self-medicate’ against the effects of inter-
professional conflict and goal incongruence.  
However the empirical surprise provided by the data is that local professional 
elites organised to reduce goal incongruence by developing practices of network 
integration. This work concludes that this empirical surprise, that professionals 
who were supposed to compete with each other in fact attempted to co-operate, 
	   	   	  
	   	   	  
	  
228	  
reflects the fact that shaping influences of goal incongruence were moderated 
and altered by perceptions of inter-professional dependency and obligation that 
were experienced within the delivery network. The conclusion drawn from this 
account is that the tendency to professional introspection and the creation of 
contradictory conceptions of desired ends was not the source of goal 
incongruence within the case study. 
 
 Network Integration and Professional Co-operation  
The theory on inter-professional interaction discussed in chapter seven predicts 
that discrepant professional orientations will produce goal incongruence.  
However the case study provides evidence that the opposite is the case. 
Individuals from different professional orientations co-operated to integrate 
network practices, thereby acting to reduce goal incongruence.   This empirical 
surprise raised three questions that were addressed in chapter eight. Does the 
evidence really show professionals attempting to co-operate? Why do they 
attempt to co-operate by integrating working practices? What modifications to 
we need to make to the theory of goal incongruence? 
Chapter eight presented the argument that the case study provides compelling 
evidence for inter-professional co-operation and integration within the delivery 
network.  We provide four examples, the IVS project, two forms of IOM project 
and a cluster of co-operative practices organised around the local VAWG 
strategy.  These initiatives are examples organic and local attempts to address 
perceived deficiencies in the effectiveness and efficiency of the local Criminal 
Justice System.  
Four theoretical models for professional co-operation and integration were 
described and evaluated. The most compelling theory of network integration is 
that it emerges from the connected nature of work and the similar demands that 
patterns of work make on professionals.  The theory argues that the complex and 
intense interactions demanded by the work of the criminal justice system acts as 
a centripetal force that overcomes the barriers of professional orientation and 
institutional affiliation. Network integration develops from professionals’ 
identification with and their commitments to their immediate peer group (Kidron 
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1965). In network contexts the immediate peer group will frequently incorporate 
members from a variety of professional backgrounds and network agencies.   
The implication of this insight is that the professional experience of work acts to 
connect professionals rather then divides them. The close and meaningful 
interactions required by patterns of work gave rise to stable relationships that 
were characterised by intense collaboration and connected professionals in 
relationships of reciprocal obligation and dependency.      
This work has argued consistently that the professional experience was one of 
immersion in the work of the Criminal Justice System.  While we have argued 
that professionals are unlikely to engage with the abstract logic of co-operate to 
compete, the case study produced considerable evidence that professionals 
understood and took for granted that their performance depended on the 
performance of their counterparts in other network agencies. The study has also 
argued that the emergence of integrated organisation reflects professional’s 
recognition that the outcomes and efficiency of their own work were dependent 
on the actions, behaviour and good will of other groups of professionals within 
the criminal justice system. In other words the experience of work created 
normative and cognitive systems of reciprocal obligation and dependency 
between professionals.  These systems were reinforced by shared commitments 
to the overall objectives of the criminal justice system and a strong identification 
with the experience of the victim.   
Collective commitments could not eliminate the evidence that real differences 
existed between the operative goals of professionals within the network. 
However the experience of work in the criminal justice system produced 
network relationships founded on mutual obligation, and inter-professional 
dependency.  Co-operation and network integration is understood to enable 
professional work to be completed more efficiently and effectively. It is believed 
to improve the experience of the victim.  It also protects professionals from the 
negative experience of being associated with or even held responsible for 
perceived failure of the criminal justice system, negative outcomes for the 
victims of serious crime and inefficient and unrewarding working practices.  
	   	   	  
	   	   	  
	  
230	  
Another approach to theorizing the development of professional co-operation 
and network integration is to emphasise the institutional benefits it confers to 
integrating agencies.  We use the term ‘institutional’ to describe benefits that are 
not directly linked to service delivery.  Instead they reflect improvements in the 
agency’s ability to influence its proximate environment and maintain its network 
position. 
Network integration is attractive because it extends the influence of agency 
actors beyond agency boundaries. Such boundary spanning influence may be 
desirable as an end in itself. It is also likely to be used to achieve particular ends.  
The second category of institutional benefit is that integration makes it more 
difficult to marginalize or replace agencies within network contexts.  Integration 
creates shared tacit knowledge, informal structures, complex agency interfaces, 
collaborative relationships and, if successful, inter-agency goodwill.  Together, 
these act as a barrier to new entrants, thereby protecting and institutionalizing 
the position of network incumbents.  Integration therefore represents a strategy 
of solidarity and exclusion (Cousins 1987).  It acts to exclude new entrants and 
marginalize existing competitors.  
There was clear empirical evidence that integration was valued because it 
reduced the willingness and ability of agencies to be critical of their network 
counterparts.  Professionals appeared to be particularly sensitive to criticism 
from network peers.  This sensitivity appeared especially pronounced when was 
made to members of the public who experienced network services.  This was 
because it was thought to bring the professional reputation of agencies into 
disrepute.  Integration was felt to reduce inter-agency criticism because it was 
seen as a breach of good faith.  It also became difficult because under integration 
delivering effective outcomes became a shared network responsibility.   
Another theoretical explanation of their commitment is that integration provided 
professionals, particularly senior professionals, with an opportunity to acquire 
professional recognition.  Network integration was an effective method of 
achieving professional recognition. It was viewed as a legitimate and beneficial 
activity by the policy community and was generally perceived to deliver positive 
results.  Integration was therefore viewed as a good thing to do. Perhaps more 
importantly, integration represented a novel practice. Integration projects gave 
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senior professionals the opportunity to talk about themselves, their projects and 
their agencies and in turn to be talked about by other professionals. The case 
study provided considerable evidence that acquiring professional recognition 
was a significant factor in securing the commitment of senior professionals to 
integration projects. Integration projects enabled senior professionals to access 
professional recognition through the process of applying for prizes and awards, a 
discourse that appeared to enjoy a surprising currency among senior 
professionals.  
The final explanation of professional co-operation is that it is a response to 
imposed systems of performance control. The most important attributes of these 
control systems are that they make comparisons within professions and those 
comparisons are made public, frequently in the form of league tables.  We have 
argued that professionals care about their comparative performance within such 
systems.  We have also suggested that being placed at the bottom or close to the 
bottom of the performance range appeared to constitute a particularly powerful 
motivating factor for improvement.  
One of the ways in which performance can be improved is by collaborating with 
adjacent professional groups employed by different agencies.  Institutionally 
bound professionals are induced to co-operate with other professional groups in 
their local network in order to compete more effectively with fellow 
professionals distributed across an organisational field.  With reference to the 
case study, a local police service might seek co-operation with other local 
criminal justice agencies (Courts, CPS and Probation etc.) in order to directly or 
indirectly improve its performance and subsequent position in national police 
service league tables.  The case study provides very little positive evidence for 
the role of performance control systems in encouraging professional co-
operation. While there was certainly evidence of action taken to address 
unsatisfactory performance measurement outcomes, that action did not include 
network integration.  Instead, the repertoire of responses to unsatisfactory 
external scrutiny tended to concentrate on three types of action.  These were 
gaming, concentration of resources, and remedial competence building.  
However they did not act to promote inter-professional co-operation expressed 
in attempts at network integration. Therefore the study concludes that responses 
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to the adverse effects of performance control systems appear to lead not to 
integration, to organisational introspection.  Institutions appeared to turn away 
from their network partners in order to concentrate on introspective 
improvement strategies.  
 
Contribution to Theory 
This study has made contributions to theory in three areas. Firstly it has 
developed and tested of a conceptual framework for the study of goal 
incongruence.  Secondly it has evaluated hierarchical theories of goal 
incongruence.  Thirdly it has evaluated and the evaluation of horizontal theories 
of goal incongruence.  The study's theoretical contributions to in these three 
areas are set out in the following sub-sections. 
 
 A Conceptual Framework for the study of Goal Incongruence 
This study has developed and tested a new conceptual framework of goal 
incongruence.  It has made three specific contributions to theory in this area.  In 
the first instance the conceptual framework rejects difference as sufficient 
criteria for recognising goal incongruence. Goals may be different but 
complimentary, that is that despite their difference they act as separate means to 
the attainment of a common end.  The conceptual framework replaces difference 
with contradiction as the criteria for goal incongruence.  This acts as a higher 
test for recognising goal incongruence.  The study found incongruence to be 
present in five network contexts.  However had the criteria been difference, goal 
incongruence would have been ubiquitous.  The selection of contradiction as the 
marker of goal incongruence is theoretically significant. If the criteria of 
contradiction applied to the existing literature on goal incongruence it is 
reasonable to assume that the empirical findings and the theoretical conclusions 
derived from them would be significantly modified. 
The second contribution made by the conceptual framework is that it articulates 
criteria for recognising contradictory goals and a methodological approach for 
inferring operative goals.  Contradiction is indicated when there is evidence that 
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goal orientated behaviour acts to disrupt, impede or deflect the attainment of 
other formal or operative goals.  Operative goals are and their consequences are 
inferred from observed behaviour. Operative goals are only inferred when they 
attain an objective facticity Berger and Luckman (1966, p.30).  This was 
empirically and theoretically relevant because it ensured that the conceptual 
framework screened operative goals are not enacted.  The conceptual framework 
eliminated operative goals that were aspirational or potential.  For example ends 
that were deemed desirable but were not enacted, or self-reported goals intended 
to present individuals and groups in favourable terms, either to themselves or 
others.  This grounded empirical claims within organisational practice.  It 
allowed empirical accounts of goal incongruence to distinguish between what 
Richard Mitchell has referred to as "sentiments and acts" (Mitchell 2002, p.16).  
The author respectfully suggests that limiting the analysis of goal incongruence 
to enacted goal-orientated behaviours has the potential for significant influence 
on empirical and theoretical accounts of goal incongruence.  
Thirdly, the conceptual framework takes established approaches to the 
description of goal incongruence – contradiction between the operative goals of 
different groups and between formal and operative goals – and applies them 
within a network context.  The application to network contexts constitutes a 
novel contribution to a theoretical literature that has described goal incongruence 
within single organisations, organisational dyads and organisational fields. The 
ability to describe the presence and absence of goal incongruence within specific 
network contexts contributes to the theoretical literature on goal incongruence 
and to the analysis of public networks. 
 
 Testing Hierarchical theories of Goal Incongruence 
The study found compelling evidence that goal incongruence was caused by the 
hierarchical arrangement of bureaucracies. Bureaucratic delegation was found to 
be responsible for goal incongruence within the strategic core, within the 
delivery network and between the strategic core and delivery network.   To this 
extent the study provides empirical support for hierarchical theories of goal 
incongruence. 
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The study indicates that the bifurcation of interest model explains hierarchical 
goal incongruence.  The necessary use of intermediaries creates a tendency to 
the bi-furcation of interests, in which intermediaries are concerned chiefly with 
their social positions as agents.  The study presents evidence that bi-furcation of 
interests explains goal incongruence within the strategic core and between the 
strategic core and delivery network. Within the delivery network the bi-furcation 
of interests model is re-enforced by the hierarchical separation of professional 
groups by agency boundaries and the distinct and dissonant professional 
measurement and control systems that are applied to professional fields.  
At the heart of the bi-furcation of interest model is the question of the benefits 
that individuals hope to acquire from their organisational associations. Empirical 
evidence indicates that hierarchical position influenced the uses to which groups 
could put the organisation and the benefits that they could hope to gain from 
organisational membership. The study also found that organisational 
segmentation and professional control systems also promoted goal incongruence 
within network conditions.  
However the empirical evidence questions a number of the shaping influences 
that theory suggests are responsible for producing within hierarchies.  The 
empirical evidence rejects the pre-occupation and compliance; the entropy; and 
the inadequate comprehension models of hierarchical goal incongruence.  Goal 
incongruence was not found to be the product of passive forgetting, the decay of 
authority through iterated downward delegations or a lack of awareness of 
operational realities on the part of top-most officials.  Instead the study found 
radical discontinuities, active non-compliance with clearly articulated 
instructions on the part of subordinates, and an intended refusal to engage with 
operational realities on the part of top-most officials. These findings undermined 
representations of means – ends chains in the bureaucratic delegation model 
which presents operative goals and sub-goals as being derivations and 
distillations of formal goals (Hall 1996).  
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 Testing Horizontal Theories of Goal Incongruence 
The second theoretical explanation tested by the study suggests that goal 
incongruence is determined by professional difference.  The study contradicted 
the claims that goal incongruence was determined by difference in professional 
orientation.  It demonstrated that professionals co-operated to integrate network 
practices that resulted in reductions in goal incongruence. The study revealed 
that not professional difference acted in subtle and complex ways.  However on 
balance professional difference did not produce goal incongruence. On the 
contrary, the study provided empirical evidence that professionals overcame 
difference in professional orientations in order to address the negative outcomes 
of hierarchically produced goal incongruence by pursuing organic strategies of 
network integration. 
The empirical evidence for inter-professional co-operation contradicts 
theoretical predictions that difference in professional orientation will act to 
increase goal incongruence within network contexts. The empirical surprise; that 
professionals within the case study do not behave toward each other as theory 
predicts they should, raised the issue of why they chose to co-operate and reduce 
goal incongruence.   
The most important factor shaping network integration was professional’s 
experience of work. This acted to connect individuals with different professional 
orientations in relationships of mutual dependency and obligation.  This suggests 
that peer group relationships were key in promoting network integration and 
reducing goal incongruence.  The importance of peer groups is recognised in the 
goal incongruence literature.  The theoretical implications of the study is to 
focus attention on the issue that within network relationships, peer groups are 
likely to incorporate individuals with a range of professional orientations.  
Secondly, the study suggests that the role of peer group relationships (as 
opposed to professional and organisational affiliations) is under-theorised in the 
goal incongruence literature. 
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Implications of the findings for Practice  
A certain expression of common sense, an imprecise term that has described as 
the existence of a: "shared imaginary universe" (Geertz 1983, p.11), assumes 
that bureaucratic authority decays as it is transmitted downward through a 
bureaucratic hierarchy.  Groups close to the apex of the hierarchy can be trusted 
to adhere closely to the formal goals of organisation. Those who are separated 
from ultimate authority by successive levels of delegation will show an 
increasing inability to understand, share and reproduce ultimate ends.  The most 
abject members of the bureaucratic hierarchy, those who occupy the last position 
in means-ends chains and lacking sub-ordinates to whom they can delegate have 
no alternative but to produce, are the most unreliable.  That is they are the most 
likely to put the organisation and its resources to their own, illegitimate ends.  
This mode of thought is taken for granted by managerial elites and maintained 
and reproduced by theorists and other commentators who adopt the perspective 
of those elites when they write about organisations. It is even to be found in the 
concept of the Street Level Bureaucrat.  While Lipsky’s work adopts the sub-
ordinate perspective it still argues that operational employees act in their own 
interests rather than follow delegated instructions.  The implication of this 
widely distributed common-sense view of hierarchy is that the ‘lower orders’ of 
organisations are untrustworthy. As they cannot be trusted they must be 
controlled.  The controllers are to be the same managerial elites who sit at the 
apex of hierarchy and control the discursive agenda. In other words is employed 
to justify the formation and authority of controlling institutional elites. 
This evidence presented in this case study suggests that this common sense 
conception of hierarchy has one flaw.  It is wrong.  The operative goals of the 
strategic core were more incongruent with the formal goals of the Ministry of 
Justice than were the operative goals of the delivery network. In other words it is 
managerial elites and their staffs at the apex of hierarchies who are the most 
likely to exhibit goal incongruence and divert the organisation to their own 
illegitimate purposes.  Correspondingly, delivery network members who operate 
lower levels in the hierarchy are more likely to act in accordance with formal 
network goals.  This study acts to falsify the common sense hypothesis that 
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incongruence between formal and operative goals increases as move down the 
hierarchy is falsified.   
The evidence for this conclusion was presented in chapters five to eight.  It 
catalogues what we have described as the strategic core’s commitment to the 
practice of reporting.  This involved members of the strategic core ‘turning 
away’ from the operational effectiveness of the Criminal Justice System, 
denigrating members of the delivery network as ‘business as usual people’ as 
opposed to the ‘thinking people’ found within the core.  It described a 
managerial elite concerned with presentation, appearances and the construction 
of plausible narrative at the expense of achieving objective improvements in 
output and outcome.  At its most extreme it was expressed in the elevation of 
colour schemes above content in presentations to Ministers and making sure that 
time wasn’t naively ‘wasted’ delivering big improvements to the system that 
could be claimed by others.  
On the other hand the operative goals of the delivery network were organised 
around meeting the operational imperatives of the Criminal Justice System.  
Consequently they were far more congruent with the formal goals of the 
Ministry of Justice.  A number of practical explanations emerge for this 
congruence between means and ends.  Members of the delivery network were 
immersed in the experience of work within the Criminal Justice System and 
appeared unable to distance themselves, professionally or personally, from the 
outcomes of that system. We have described this as the ‘because we have to, 
because its right’ logic.  
The most powerful expression of this logic was the spontaneous attempts by 
delivery network professionals to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
local Criminal Justice System by integrating network practice. The practical 
concern must be that these projects were conducted despite (and not because of) 
the strategic core’s professed efforts to achieve the same ends. 
The evidence indicates that the strategic core’s methods for controlling professionals 
into improving performance were either counter-productive or ineffective. This 
finding appears to support the conclusion that:  "highly centralised and vertically 
differentiated organisational structures are liable to have dysfunctional effects" 
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(Sheaff et al 2010b). 
Demands for ad-hoc performance information were ignored, resisted or 
complied with at least effort.  Financial scrutiny of the hierarchical organisations 
that employed professionals within the delivery network resulted in the 
suspension of boundary spanning activities that were vital for performance but 
presented accounting and budget difficulties. More formal professional 
measurement and control systems did have a significant influence on 
professionals, but those were more likely to be outright gaming, concentration of 
resources to avoid coming toward the bottom of the performance distribution or 
remedial competence building. They did not appear to be influential in 
encouraging inter-agency co-operation. In summary the efforts of the strategic 
core to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the delivery network didn’t 
work and actually undermined spontaneous attempts by professionals to achieve 
exactly the same objective. 
 
Further Research 
The themes, questions and evidence discussed in this study point to four areas 
for further research, these are described below:  
Firstly, the present case study compared hierarchical relationships between 
members of the strategic core and the delivery network. It concluded that goal 
incongruence was produced by the nature of bureaucratic delegation within 
hierarchies.  The work is silent on interactions between Ministers and top-most 
officials.  Research that tests hierarchical theories of goal incongruence between 
these two select and elevated constituencies would comprise a logical and 
desirable continuation of this study.     
The second theme emerges from the study's conclusion that the operative goals 
of members of the strategic core are the most incongruent with the formal goals 
of the network. This finding establishes the opportunity to develop and test 
theories that explain why the formal goals of members of the strategic core are 
the most incongruent with the formal goals of the network.  This suggests the 
development of a research agenda concentrated on the need to develop a theory 
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capable of explaining the apparently deliberate (or at least active) institutional 
irresponsibility that was exhibited by organisational elites within the case study. 
The third theme is one that was expressly referred to in chapter seven.  It is the 
contention that the influence of peer group membership (as opposed to 
organisational and professional identities) is under-represented in theoretical and 
empirical accounts of the performance of public organisations and networks.  
The work suggested that peer group interactions within network contexts were, 
if not empirically invisible, then indistinct when compared to the highly visible 
professional and organisational interactions.  Another way of articulating this 
argument (following Brunsen’s distinction between organisational talk and 
organisational action) is to say that peer group interactions are under-represented 
in the sphere of talk.  If this is the case then theory might be improved by 
adopting methods capable of reflecting the importance of peer groups in 
determining practices within the sphere of organisational action. 
Finally the research has emphasised the propensity for actors with different 
professional orientations to organise informal co-operation aimed at reducing 
goal incongruence and improving the performance of public networks.  These 
organic initiatives occur in-spite of the negative effects of inter-professional 
competition and the introspection caused by hierarchically imposed control 
systems. This points to the desirability of a research agenda intended to explain 
how such inter-professional co-operation and congruence can be encouraged, 
nurtured and sustained. Such a research agenda would focus theoretical attention 
on how, without abandoning performance measurement systems that ensure 
professional practice is not placed beyond public scrutiny, a beneficial personal 
and professional integrity might be encouraged to re-emerge in public networks.  
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